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Translating Revolution in Twentieth-Century China and France 
Diana King 
 
 In “Translating Revolution in Twentieth-Century China and France,” I examine 
how the two countries translated each other’s revolutions during critical moments of 
political and cultural crisis (the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth Movement (1919), the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76), and May 1968 in France), and subsequently (or 
simultaneously), how that knowledge was mobilized in practice and shaped the historical 
contexts in which it was produced. Drawing upon a broad range of discourses including 
political journals, travel narratives, films and novels in French, English and Chinese, I 
argue that translation served as a key site of knowledge production, shaping the 
formulation of various political and cultural projects from constructing a Chinese national 
identity to articulating women’s rights to thinking about radical emancipation in an era of 
decolonization. 
While there have been isolated studies on the influence of the French Revolution 
in early twentieth-century China, and the impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution on 
the development of French Maoism and French theory in the sixties, there have been few 
studies that examine the circulation of revolutionary ideas and practices across multiple 
historical moments and cultural contexts. In addition, the tendency of much current 
scholarship to focus exclusively on the texts of prominent French or Chinese intellectuals 
overlooks the vital role played by translation, and by non-elite thinkers, writers, students 
and migrant workers in the cross-fertilization of revolutionary discourses and practices.  
 
Given that potential solutions to social and political problems associated with 
modernity were debated through the recurring circulation of translations (and 
retranslations) of ideas such as “democracy”, “natural rights,” “women’s rights,” and so 
on, I examine: who was translating whom, and for what purposes? What specific 
concepts and values are privileged, and why? Taking translation and translingual contact 
as my point of departure, I illuminate how French and Chinese intermediaries envisioned 
and attempted to create a just society under fraught historical conditions.  
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This dissertation is the unlikely outgrowth of a research project undertaken in 
Paris almost nine years ago. At the time, I was exploring the relationship between exile 
and artistic creation, as well as the negotiation of an identity situated between cultures, in 
the work of François Cheng, a Franco-Chinese writer and Zao Wou-ki, a Franco-Chinese 
painter. As I researched and wrote about exile, I found myself in the odd position of 
being literally suspended between languages (English, Chinese), between countries (U.S., 
China), and between cultures. I found myself in Paris, trying, in a way, to reconcile my 
own dual cultural heritage via French as an intermediary. It was through French that I 
first found myself gravitating towards Chinese, which was, for some time, a lost heritage.  
 These initial interests in questions of exile and cross-cultural exchange, through 
many enriching workshops, seminars, and conversations at Columbia, were productively 
broadened to include an interrogation of the politics of translation, the historical 
asymmetry in power between cultures, and the ways in which that unevenness continues 
to shape cross-cultural encounters, and the world we live in. I am deeply grateful to 
Professors Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Madeleine Dobie, Lydia Liu, and the late Philip 
Watts for their belief in and support of my research, even in its most inchoate forms. 
Their inspiring scholarship, models of teaching and writing, and guidance were 
instrumental to its conceptualization and development. This project slowly unfolded, 
taking many twists and turns, and it could not been completed without, especially, the 
unflagging support and philosophical interventions of my advisor, Professor Diagne, the 




rigor of Professor Liu, who introduced me to many new “worlds of thinking.” I would 
also like to thank Professors Etienne Balibar and Brent Edwards for generously agreeing 
to participate in the defense. And I am grateful to Professor Edwards for his introductory 
comparative literature seminar, which in many ways, helped set the stage for my 
comparative work. 
 A warm thanks to Professors Madeleine Dobie, Emmanuelle Saada and  
 
Joanna Stalnaker for organizing and leading dissertation workshops, and my fellow  
 
graduate students in those workshops for commenting on different stages of this  
 
project. Many thanks to Yurou Zhong, Jenny Rhodes, Lindsay Van Tine, and  
 
Johanna Magin for their camaraderie, stimulating conversations, and for reading or  
 
talking through various parts of this study with me.   
 
 Finally, I owe much gratitude to my oldest friends and family for their warm  
 
support, and my partner for his understanding and patience through the long final stages  
 

























In memory of Philip Watts (1961-2013), and George Moskos (1949-2011), 
Professors of French, whose inspiring teaching, scholarly example, and sense of humor 












 Evoking the language of the French Revolution, Karl Marx once prophesied:  
When in their imminent flight across Asia our European reactionaries will 
ultimately arrive at the wall of China, at the gates that lead to the very stronghold 
of arch-reaction and arch-conservatism, who knows if they will not find there in 
the inscription: 
République chinoise 
Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.1 
 
Marx’s paradoxical vision of a walled off, archly conservative Chinese empire 
transformed into a republic founded upon the French revolutionary ideals of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity would prove oddly prescient, if inaccurate and historically 
deterministic. Writing in the aftermath of the European Revolutions of 1848, the First 
Opium War (1839-1842), and the start of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), Marx 
predicted that the forces of capitalist imperialism led by the British would “batter down 
all Chinese walls” and lead to a bourgeois, democratic République chinoise. For a brief 
period in the early 1850s, he viewed China with its struggles against European 
imperialism and civil war as the site of a revolt with worldwide significance. On the one 
hand, this positioning of China as the epicenter of a global revolutionary revival would 
seem to go against the grain of Marx’s well-known depiction of China as a pre-capitalist 
land “vegetating in the teeth of time.” On the other, it reinforces Marx’s notion of 
                                                       
1	“Revue,” in Karl Max and Fresderick Engels, Werke. Berlin, 1964, 7: 222. Cited in Maurice Meisner, 
“The French Revolution and Chinese Socialism” in The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution, 
Joseph Klaits and Michael H. Haltzel, eds. Princeton and Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and 





inexorable historical progress driven by capitalist imperialism, and his paternalistic image 
of China as socioeconomically backwards and incapable of moving into modern history 
on its own.2 In other words, Marx’s description of nineteenth-century China is a prime 
example of what Spivak and the Subaltern Studies group have criticized as the insertion 
of non-Western histories into a “great modes-of-production narrative.”3 As laudatory as it 
appears on the surface, Marx’s commentary inscribes China within a history of 
colonialism that “is generally defined as a change from semi-feudalism into capitalist 
subjection.”4 Framing change as a positive transition from feudalism to capitalism – and 
one could add, from tradition to modernity, from “East” to “West” – this narrative has 
been productively challenged in recent decades by postcolonial paradigms emphasizing 
confrontation rather than transition in studies of the encounter between “East” and 
“West.” As I discuss below, we might add to the paradigm of confrontation – at least in 
the case of China and France – a certain amount of complicity and collaboration in cross-
cultural exchanges. 
 Although the failed Taiping Rebellion did not “throw the spark into the overloaded 
mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of … political revolutions 
                                                       
2	As Meisner has argued, Marx was writing at a time (the early 1850s) when he was inclined to look for the 
seeds of revolution in less economically developed countries, and when he was passing through what some 
have called his “Jacobin-Blanquist aberration.” He was also “filled with moral outrage over the atrocities” 
the British government committed in China during and after the Opium war. With the failure of the Taiping 
Rebellion, he would abandon his avowal of China as the site of a revolutionary revival, but continue to see 
it as compelled to a bourgeois-type revolution via Western capitalist imperialism. For Marx, as for Hegel, 
China had no history outside of the West. Ibid, p. 177-178. 
 
3	Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
	





on the [European] continent,”5 and the 1911 Xinhai Revolution hardly led to a bourgeois 
democracy, Marx’s anticipatory linking of the French and Chinese Revolutions would be 
realized, first in 1911, and throughout the twentieth century as social, political and 
cultural crises in both China and France led each to seek inspiration in the revolutionary 
ideals of its “Republican sister.”6 In the early 1900s, the slogan “Liberty, equality, 
fraternity” was a proclaimed goal of Sun Zhongshan’s (Sun Yat-sen’s) revolutionary 
Tongmenghui (Alliance Society), which later became the nationalist Guomindang; 
universal brotherhood, liberty, and equality also served as the guiding principles of other 
influential radical movements and groups, notably of Francophile Chinese anarchists. 
Between 1919 and 1921, an anarchist educational program sent thousands of Chinese 
youth to France in a program that combined study and labor. Some of these sojourners, 
including Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, would become future Chinese Communist 
Party leaders. As a number of scholars have shown, the Chinese Revolution in its 
multiple stages (republican, peasant, communist, cultural) drew inspiration from the 
French Revolution and the Paris Commune.7 It has also been argued that the French 
                                                       
5	Karl Marx, “Revolution in China and Europe,” New York Tribune, 14 June 1853.  
 
6	France and China were fêted in Paris as “les deux Républiques soeurs” by French and Chinese diplomats 
at a celebration for the newly founded Republic of China in 1912. 
	
7 See Zhang Zhilian, ed. China and the French Revolution: Proceedings of the International Conference, 
Shanghai, 18-21 March 1989. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1990; Feng Ziyou, Scattered Historical Materials 
of the Revolution, Vol. II: The Revolutionary League Branches in Shanghai and Jiangsu; Gao Yihan, 
“General Situation of Intellectual Changes Among Young Students of Anhui Province Before and After the 
1911 Revolution” in Reminiscences of the 1911 Revolution, and Li Xiping, “A Chronicle of the Wuchang 
Uprising” in Reminiscences of the 1911 Revolution; John Bryan Starr, “Revolution in Retrospect: The Paris 
Commune Through Chinese Eyes” in The China Quarterly, Vol. 49, Issue 49, 1972, p. 106-125. Pro-
Revolution political journals such as Minbao, Qingnian, Xin Qingnian, Guominbao, and Zhejiang Tide 
published articles that drew parallels between eighteenth-century France and twentieth-century China, and 
espoused French revolutionary values. Many of these journals were published in Tokyo, where Chinese 




Revolution itself grew out of the Enlightenment; and for many Enlightenment thinkers, 
ancient China served as a model of an ideal, moral secular society. In effect, France and 
China have long served as attractive alternative social, political, and cultural models for 
each other during periods of political and social crisis.8 Over a century after Marx’s 
conjecture, French Maoists seeking to challenge Western imperialism and revive the 
French revolutionary legacy in the 1960s would consider Maoist China, and especially 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution to be the vanguard of a world revolution. 
The pronounced and long-standing mutual fascination between France and China 
raises a number of questions. Beyond the obvious question why China and France?9, one 
might ask: how much of what Chinese Communists took to be distinctly French 
revolutionary ideals were actually French interpretations of traditional Chinese thought? 
And in what ways may French Maoism have recycled Chinese interpretations of French 
revolutionary ideals? These questions point to the impossibility of fixing a single point of 
origin. But we should be wary of taking them too literally and avoid the temptation to 
evaluate degrees of influence, or focus too much on cultural hybridity. The former misses 
the point, and the latter has already been productively argued10, or shown to be less 
                                                       
8	Marx’s oscillation between praise of China’s revolutionary potential and censure of her backwardness 
encapsulates the long history of Western, and certainly French perceptions of China from the Jesuits to the 
Maoists. As French missionary Évariste-Régiste Huc remarked in 1854, European views of China tended to 
“swing erratically from admiration to condemnation depending on the individual’s own particular political 
and philosophical concerns.” In Bailey, Paul. "Voltaire and Confucius: French Attitudes toward China in 
the Early Twentieth Century." History of European Ideas Vol. 14.No. 6 (1992): 817-37, p. 817. Cf. Huc, 
Évariste-Régiste. L’Empire chinois. Paris: Éditions Kimé, 1992. 
 
9	I do not want to downplay the importance of this question – it will be addressed in this introduction, as 
well as in each chapter, as the France-China relationship evolves throughout the century – but it is not the 
central concern of this project.  
	
10	To a certain extent, as Edward Said has argued, given that cultures do not exist and have never existed in 




effective in analyzing cross-cultural exchanges in the case of non-European languages.11 
For me, the more crucial point these questions raise concerns the interwovenness of the 
two revolutions and their representations across space, time, and languages. Alain Badiou 
once remarked that the Chinese Cultural Revolution was possibly “the last revolution,” 12 
the final heir of “the first revolution” in a historical sequence that began in 1789. He was 
speaking, I believe, of a certain ideology – the idea of a truly free and equal democratic 
society inaugurated by the French Revolution, and expressed to a certain extent in the 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme, but which has yet to be fully realized. Related notions 
such as “democracy,” “natural rights,” “human rights,” and “women’s rights” would 
emerge time and again under fraught historical conditions, be suppressed by reactionary 
forces, and reemerge. In the case of China in the twentieth century, these notions were 
discussed and debated, translated and retranslated in a newly burgeoning and politically 
radical press in an effort to save China (jiuguo) from foreign incursions and her perceived 
                                                                                                                                                                     
earlier Egyptian and Phoenician civilizations, see Martin Bernal. Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of 
Classical Civilization, vol. I. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987. In the case of ancient China, 
numerous scholars have demonstrated that Chinese dynasties have long borrowed terms and concepts from 
Central Asian, Arabic, and Northern Asian sources; in particular, the translation of Buddhist texts during 
the Six Dynasties period introduced a large number of Sanskrit terms into Chinese. The work of linguists of 
modern Chinese have shown that it is composed of foreign, especially Japanese loanwords and neologisms 
to a remarkable degree, resulting in a near total reconfiguration of the language and rendering classical 
Chinese nearly obsolete. Mikhail Bahktin and Homi Bhabha, among others, have persuasively established 
the hybridization of cultures and languages in the context of, respectively, the European Renaissance and 
post-colonial diasporas. Bhabha’s concept of hybridity in The Location of Culture (1994), for example, 
points to diasporic situations where hybridized colonial dialects “return to caricature the presumed integrity 
of the language of the colonizer.” See Liu, Lydia. Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture and 
Translated Modernity, China, 1900-1937. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, xvi.  
 
11	As Lydia Liu argues, while Bhabha’s notion of cultural hybridity has done much productive work in 
challenging the opposition between Self and Other in postcolonial contexts, it does not adequately account 
for cross-cultural exchanges between the “West” and non-colonized but nevertheless subjugated peoples. 
See ibid. 
 
12 Bruno Bosteels, trans. “The Cultural Revolution: the Last Revolution?” in the special issue ‘Alain 
Badiou and the Cultural Revolution,’ positions, vol. 13, no. 3, 2005, p. 481-513. Originally published as La 





weaknesses on the world stage. Revolution was one possible solution (among others) to 
the problems posed by modernity, which, for the purposes of this study, I define broadly 
as a set of values, beliefs, and material and social conditions structured by the forces of 
capitalist imperialism, and linked to the Enlightenment project of liberating humankind 
from superstition, and enriching everyday life through (scientific) knowledge and 
reason.13 Modernity, as Habermas has claimed, is inevitably an “unfinished project” due 
to its many internal contradictions. The largest of these contradictions, according to the 
intellectual historian and literary critic Wang Hui, is the contradiction between 
democracy (“understood as a broad social politics”) and modernization (“defined 
exclusively as economic developmentalism”).14 Throughout this study, I analyze how 
revolution and rights were translated and mobilized to address the manifold problems – 
political, social, cultural, ethical, existential – faced by China and France in the twentieth 
century as they attempted to articulate and put into practice new, more egalitarian 
relationships between individuals as well as between states. 
 To that end, a more productive set of questions might be: how did the French and 
Chinese Revolutions inflect each other throughout the twentieth century in response to 
the crises and contradictions of modernity? What values, concepts, and discourses did 
French and Chinese intellectuals and diverse social groups privilege, and why? How were 
privileged concepts, categories, and discourses – often presumed to be universal – 
                                                       
13	As a contested concept, modernity has variously been defined as a project (Habermas), a temporality 
(Hegel), an attitude (Foucault), an ideology, and so forth. In offering this capacious – and doubtless, 
reductive – definition, I am by no means attempting to provide a standard description. 
	
14	See Rebecca Karl’s Foreword in Wang, Hui. The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of 





translated cross-culturally under highly unequal historical and geopolitical conditions? 
Taking seriously the term’s Latin etymology – “to carry over, bring across” – what 
happens when concepts travel from one language to another? Who was translating whom, 
and for what purposes? What form did these translations take, and how did their forms 
both limit and enable their impact on existing historical conditions? What role does 
translation play, as Lydia Liu puts it, “in the construction of power between so-called 
First and Third worlds?”15 In the following chapters, I examine how France and China 
translated each other’s revolutions during critical moments of national crisis in the 
twentieth century, and subsequently (or simultaneously), how that knowledge was 
mobilized in practice, and shaped the historical contexts in which it was produced. 
Drawing upon a broad range of discourses, including political journals, travel narratives, 
films and novels in French, English and Chinese, I argue that translation served as a key 
site of knowledge production, shaping the formulation of various political and cultural 
projects from constructing a strong, sovereign nation (Chapter One) to articulating 
women’s rights (Chapter Two) to thinking about radical emancipation in an era of 
decolonization (Chapter Three), and finally, to reframing revolution in a transnational, 
post-socialist age (Chapter Four). 
      Before discussing in greater detail the theoretical framework of this project, it 
may be useful to address the question: why China and France? While Vietnam has more 
obvious connections to France due to French colonial history in Indochina, there is a rich 
and underexplored history of literary, cultural, and political exchanges between China 
                                                       
15	Liu, Lydia. Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture and Translated Modernity, China, 1900-





and France, particularly in the tumultuous twentieth century. Of course, early twentieth-
century Chinese radicals were reading about Japanese, Russian, American, and other 
European revolutions in addition to the French Revolution, and leftists around the world, 
not just in France, considered themselves Maoists in the 1960s and 70s. Additionally, one 
might raise the critique that focusing on China and France reinforces the China versus the 
West/Japan dyad that typically dominates scholarship on China’s encounters with the 
world. The two main criticisms about the China-West/Japan emphasis are that 1) it tends 
to create a semi-feudal/capitalist, traditional/modern dichotomy in which China is seen as 
needing to catch up to the capitalist, modern West; and 2) it obscures the larger globality 
of which revolutionary China was a part, and to which it contributed.16 By focusing on 
nearly a century of translational exchanges between the two countries, and on Chinese as 
well as French texts, we see a dialectical exchange of revolutionary ideas, rather than a 
one-sided borrowing; this was a reciprocal yet largely asymmetrical exchange 
conditioned by the historical circumstances of global unevenness during the twentieth 
century. For example, as I argue in Chapter Three, while French Maoism has largely been 
studied as an Orientalist construction of French intellectuals, it was in fact to a large 
degree mediated by Mao and China’s substantial foreign translation and propaganda 
machine. And as I examine in Chapter Two, Chinese feminism was no mere offshoot of 
Western and French feminism, but emerged as a broad, transnational rethinking of social 
relations.  
                                                       
16	For an alternative approach that attends to China’s interactions with the non-Euro-American world 
during the height of Chinese nationalism, see Karl, Rebecca. Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at 





Moreover, partly because interwar Paris was a cosmopolitan nexus for foreign 
exiles, anticolonial militants, and international labor and socialist movements, the focus 
on China and France, rather than concealing a larger globality, reveals a remarkable 
internationalist history. There was a certain exceptionalism to the France-China 
relationship – and not simply because the French tended to exceptionalize Sino-French 
relations, accentuating cultural affinities in order to situate France as the best-equipped to 
mediate between China and the West17 – but because there exists a history of important 
but largely forgotten radical – notably, anarchist – connections between the two countries 
that has been obscured by the dominance of Marxist historiography in both China and 
France.18 As I explore in Chapter One, France served as the site of a number of Chinese 
nation-building and diplomatic ventures in the early twentieth century. Not only were 
thousands of Chinese youth sent to study and labor in France as part of the well-known 
Diligent Work-Frugal Study Movement, France was also host to the first mass literacy 
program for Chinese laborers in modern Chinese history.19 This literacy program, in turn, 
                                                       
17 This French self-positioning was politically and economically motivated to enhance French interests in 
China against European competitors. For example, Paul Painlevé, mathematician, politician, and director of 
the Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, remarked tellingly in 1923: “France should not be lacking at a 
time when China, in the process of modernizing, is looking for intellectual guides and technical advisers. If 
we abandon the promotion of French culture in China today, German culture will benefit tomorrow at our 
expense. French civilization is the one best able to harmonise with ancient civilisations and allow them to 
develop unhindered. The peace of the world has nothing to gain from an Americanized or Anglicised 
China, guided solely in industrial and commercial methods.” Cited in Paul Bailey. "The Sino-French 
Connection: The Chinese Worker-Student Movement in France, 1902-1928." China and the West: Ideas 
and Activists. Ed. Goodman, David S.G. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990. 
72-102, p. 96. 
 
18	Marxist histories in general tend to marginalize the significance of anarchism to socialist and 
revolutionary ideologies. 
	
19	The program was founded and organized by Yang Yangchu (James Yen), an American-trained teacher 
and educator, who developed a basic vocabulary primer of 1300 characters. See chapter one of Yurou 
Zhong’s dissertation, “Script Crisis and Literary Modernity in China, 1916-1958” (Ph.D. dissertation: 




was affiliated with the Chinese Labor Corps (roughly 140,000 to 200,000 Chinese 
soldier-laborers) sent to France to aid British and French troops during the Great War. 
Some of the soldier-laborers would remain in France after the War, a few as participants 
in the Diligent Work-Frugal Study program. Others would join the International Brigades 
to fight in the Spanish Civil War, heading to Spain across the French Pyrenees, or by boat 
from Marseilles. I suspect that these early twentieth-century Sino-French connections 
may be due less to perceived cultural affinities than to a somewhat paradoxical 
combination of nationalist geopolitical agendas, and an emergent socialist 
internationalism. In fact, one of the most exciting moments in this study of the translation 
of revolution between China and France has been the revelation of the internationalist 
aspect of revolution at certain historical junctures – an internationalism that has been 
subsequently lost to the nationalization of communist and anticolonial movements. The 
Sino-French connection uncovers an extraordinary history of Chinese students and 
workers, who participated in European wars of their own accord, at times without the 
backing of a home state, who joined non-Chinese Communist parties, and who were 
active in labor movements that were organized along class rather than ethnic or racial 
lines.20 
My focus on translation and its relation to the political is inspired by the work of a 
number of translation and comparative literature scholars, such as Lydia Liu, Mary 
Louise Pratt, Emily Apter and Lawrence Venuti, as will be evident in subsequent 
chapters. However, the overarching framework of my problematic is most indebted to the 
                                                       
20	For more about the internationalism of overseas Chinese, see Gregor Benton. Chinese Migrants and 




work of Liu on translation and cross-cultural exchanges between China and the West. In 
particular, my notion of translation exceeds the traditional notions of an interlingual 
exchange between “target” and “source” languages, and encompasses a wider range of 
what Liu terms translingual practices such as rhetorical strategies, legitimizing 
processes, naming practices, discursive formations, tropes, and narrative modes:  
Broadly defined, the study of translingual practice examines the process by which 
new words, meanings, discourses, and modes of representation arise, circulate, 
and acquire legitimacy within the host language due to, or in spite of, the latter’s 
contact/collision with the guest language. Meanings, therefore, are not so much 
“transformed” when concepts pass from the guest language to the host language 
as invented within the local environment of the latter. In that sense, translation is 
no longer a neutral event untouched by the contending interests of political and 
ideological struggles. Instead, it becomes the very site of such struggles where the 
guest language is forced to encounter the host language, where the irreducible 
differences between them are fought out, authorities invoked or challenged, 
ambiguities dissolved or created, and so forth, until new words and meanings 
emerge in the host language itself.21 
 
In place of “target” and “source” language, Liu proposes “host language (zhufang yuyan) 
and “guest language” (kefang yuyan) to avoid the problematic concepts of authenticity, 
origin, fidelity, influence, and so on, embedded in the idea of a source language, and the 
teleological goal implicit in the term “target” language. By focusing on “host” and 
“guest,” Liu is able to emphasize the agency and complicity of the (non-European) host 
language in interlingual contact. Interestingly, in French, the single word “hôte” refers to 
both guest and host, suggesting an even more profound co-existence and complicity 
between host and guest languages – a felicitous way to describe the France-China 
                                                       
21	Emphasis mine. Liu, Lydia. Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture and Translated 





relationship, as each country at various moments strove to situate itself as the most 
appropriate hôte for mediating East-West relations. 
 Fundamental to Liu’s theory of translation is the argument that translation is a 
fundamentally political act with potentially far-reaching consequences. Texts and 
discourses do not merely reflect history, but are “social facts like any other facts, capable 
of being deployed for political or ideological purposes.”22 The changing meaning of 
words, concepts, and discourses, and the invention of neologisms do not – as per 
Raymond Williams’ keyword study – simply “bear witness to larger historical 
processes,” but are constitutive of those processes themselves. As Liu has demonstrated 
in her study of the Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International 
Law,23 and P.C. Chang’s contribution to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 
translation is much more than a matter of intercultural communication, of linguistic 
equivalence or (in)commensurability; it is very significantly a meaning-making event in 
its own right. As Liu has elaborated, the Chinese translation of the Elements of 
International Law (Wangguo gongfa) can be said to constitute three distinct events: a 
textual event (the invention, suspension, or removal of words and their meanings in the 
course of translation), a diplomatic event (the selection of which texts were to be 
included or excluded reflected the diplomatic tensions among the imperial powers in 
                                                       
22	Ibid., p. 22. 
 
23	Liu, Lydia. “Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth Century” 
 in Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1999, p. 127-164. 
	
24	Liu, Lydia. "Shadows of Universalism: The Untold Story of Human Rights around 1948." Critical 





China), and an epistemological event (the emergence of a new, global geopolitical 
consciousness).25  
Translation, in other words, is a site of struggle where meaning, embedded in 
specific times and places, is negotiated between individuals with particular and often 
conflicting worldviews and agendas. Inherent in the process of translation are acts of 
mistranslation, omission, and substitution, whether conscious or unintentional. To 
understand the “eventfulness” of translation then, is to track how texts and discourses 
move across space and time – their multiple temporalities, spatiality, layers of mediation, 
agents, and means of transport. In Liu’s elaboration of an alternative translation paradigm 
that rethinks the relation of translation to the political, she proposes the notions of 
temporality, difference (i.e., the marking of difference in relation to a universal, 
normative standard), and competing universals (e.g., non-Western humanisms). This 
method, as Liu puts it, involves “analyzing the multiple temporalities of translation in 
differentially distributed discursive practices across languages.”26 By “differentially 
distributed discursive practices,” I believe Liu is pointing to the role that writing and 
discourse play in marking difference, as well as to the knowledge/power relationships 
produced in and through discursive formations. Playing with the multiple meanings of the 
verb différer in French (to disagree, to differ, and to defer), Derrida famously invented 
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the homophone différance to express the plural meanings lost by the noun différence.27 In 
the case of a translational encounter between China and the West, this triple signification 
captures aptly the marking of difference, the staging of a disagreement, and the over-
determined sense of delay when traveling between “East” and “West.” By the latter, I 
mean the dominant discourse – as exemplified by Marx’s great modes-of-production 
narrative – that situates the West on one end of a temporal spectrum (the apex of progress 
and the end of history), and the rest of the world in various stages of delay and 
behindness. This global diachronic narrative, as Tang Xiaobing has remarked, is “the 
lasting dilemma of modernity,”28 too often assumed by Western and non-Western 
scholars (not to mention non-scholars) alike.  
Moreover, I take Liu’s concept of differentially distributed discursive practices to 
refer to the asymmetry of translation between the West and non-Euro-American 
countries. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, translations were carried 
out disproportionately in favor of Western languages; that is, a tremendous number of 
Western texts, discourses, and concepts traveled to Asia while relatively few traveled in 
the reverse direction. As Talal Asad remarked in his incisive critique of British cultural 
anthropology: 
 
To put it crudely, because the languages of Third World societies … are “weaker” 
in relation to Western languages (and today, especially to English), they are more 
likely to submit to forcible transformation in the translation process than the other 
way around. The reason for this is, first, that in their political-economic relations 
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with Third World countries, Western nations have the greater ability to 
manipulate the latter. And second, Western languages produce and deploy desired 
knowledge more readily than Third World languages do.29 
 
Drawing upon Foucault’s critique of institutional practices and the knowledge/power 
relationships that legitimize certain ways of thinking while discouraging others, a wide 
range of scholars have argued that powerful social ideologies and discourses are 
produced in and through (translated) texts.30 The asymmetry between languages Asad 
highlights not only reflects conditions of geopolitical and economic inequality, but also 
plays a fundamental role in contributing to that very inequality. At stake in this analysis 
of discursive practices across languages, space, and time, as Liu and Asad have cogently 
argued in different contexts, is the historicity of translation between cultures.31  
Liu’s focus on the discursive mobility of texts, concepts, and people across 
languages, places, and temporalities seems to me especially pertinent for the study of the 
exchange of revolutionary ideas between China and France because it attends to the 
historical and political contingencies, as well as to the material conditions of translation. 
In doing so, it avoids what Keith Baker in Inventing the French Revolution calls “an 
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30	For different approaches, see Mary Louise Pratt. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 
Transculturation. London, New York: Routledge, 1992; Lydia Liu, Translingual Practice: 
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endless genealogical regression into the history of political doctrines.” 32 Since 
revolutionary concepts such as liberty and equality, and the idea of a social contract 
“have existed more or less confusedly in all human society,” reconstructing a history of 
revolutionary ideas that emphasizes influence or origins would likely lead us in circles. 
Furthermore, as a theory of how concepts and discourses are (re)invented through 
translation, the eventfulness of translation and its focus on temporality dovetails with my 
emphasis on revolution. Revolution, as a metaphor and vehicle of radical change, by 
definition restructures how we think of time. As Baker argues elsewhere, throughout 
most of the eighteenth century, revolution was seen as something that had already 
happened, often out of human control. By the nineteenth century, revolution no longer 
signified a fait accompli, but an ongoing act, “a process of transformation within modern 
society.” 33 In Baker’s words, “from 1789… the moment of revolution was opened up and 
extended from within to become a domain of lived experience with its own dynamic and 
its own chronology.” It was “[no] longer viewed solely from without or through the lens 
of historical hindsight” but had “emerged as an immediate present in a frame of action 
opening up to the future.”34 That is to say, revolution became the site of convergence of 
multiple temporalities (past, present, future), and as “the name for a collective political 
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act ushering in the birth of a new world,”35 it also pointed to a competing vision of the 
world – a rival modernity – that has yet to come into existence. The rather abstract sense 
of temporality Baker refers to was concretized in the invention of a new clock (that 
divided the day into 100,000 seconds) and calendar (the briefly used French 
Revolutionary Calendar of 1793-1805), and commemorated in the name of the 1911 
Xinhai Revolution (Xinhai geming 辛亥革命) that overthrew the Qing Dynasty. The 
revolution was so named because it occurred in 1911, the year of the Xinhai stem-branch 
according to the sexagenary cycle of the Chinese calendar. With the establishment of the 
Republic of China in 1912, the traditional Chinese calendar was abolished, and the 
Gregorian calendar implemented in its place, marking the institutionalization of a new 
temporality that brought China, literally, in tempo with the Western world.36  
 To comprehend twentieth-century Sino-French sites of translation and their 
implications for the Chinese Revolution, we must first turn to China’s fraught historical 
situation during the late Qing (1860s-1911), and Chinese intellectuals’ engagement with 
diverse “worlds of thinking” that made possible the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and 
the birth of the Chinese Republic. I borrow the term “worlds of thinking” from Lydia Liu, 
Rebecca Karl and Dorothy Ko’s introduction to The Birth of Chinese Feminism to signify 
the various texts and contexts, languages and concepts, both foreign and native, that 
Chinese radicals engaged with and operated in, and through which they understood their 
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36	Public acceptance was slow, however, and due to President Yuan Shikai’s switch to a dual-calendar 
policy later adopted by the Communist Party, the Chinese calendar remained in limited use. Today, China 
follows the Gregorian calendar for most purposes but traditional holidays, such as the Lunar New Year, are 





historical moment.37  
 
On Cross-Cultural Exchange and the Translation of “Worlds of Thinking” 
 
 Frantz Fanon once asserted, “to speak a language is to take on a world, a 
culture.”38 What happens when the very foundations of that world, including its language 
and culture are called into question? When calls for revolution beckon to make the world 
anew? And more to the point, given that no spoken languages are pure, uncontaminated 
by other cultures and linguistic communities, what happens when multiple worlds collide 
within language? In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, China was facing 
such a crisis in the wake of a forced opening up to the world via several consecutive 
military defeats against foreign powers, as well as the import into China of paradigm-
changing ideologies and sociocultural values through missionary work and translated 
texts. 
 On the eve of the 1911 Revolution, the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), China’s last 
imperial regime, was on the brink of collapse.39 After centuries of regional domination 
and the economic upper hand in dealings with foreign nations, the historically self-
sufficient Chinese empire and its traditional values and sources of authority began to 
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unravel. Although the Qing was initially a robust empire, by the 1800s, growing demand 
for Chinese tea, silk and porcelain in Europe combined with the global silver crisis led to 
a trade imbalance that deeply troubled European powers. Britain tried to offset the 
imbalance by substituting opium (a product easily grown in its new Indian colony) for 
silver payments. As opium spread rapidly and destructively through China, the Dao 
Guang Emperor attempted to enforce a ban on the addictive substance, leading to the 
infamous Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860), which forced the Qing government to 
agree to free trade and territorial concessions. Other foreign powers, including France, 
Germany, Russia and the United States, competing against each other for wealth and 
territory, soon joined Britain in a land grab for spheres of influence in East Asia. By the 
turn of the twentieth century, after decades of internal and external conflicts from the 
Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) to the Opium Wars, the Sino-French War (1884-1885), 
the Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901), and all the more humbling, China’s defeat in the first 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) to Japan – a tributary country historically seen as 
inferior – the very foundations of China’s age-old civilization were crumbling. 
 In this radically new global context, educated elites sought to rethink Chinese 
civilization from its core – literature, philosophy, cultural customs, military institutions, 
political systems, educational establishments, even the Chinese language itself – were 
reevaluated and reimagined in an ambitious “self-strengthening” (ziqiang) campaign that 
later became known as modernization (jindai/xiandai hua).40 Progressive elites led by 
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Kang Youwei and his disciple Liang Qichao embarked on a monumental restructuring 
program, the Hundred Days Reform of 1898, which called for, among other things, 
establishing a constitutional monarchy, eliminating the civil service exams, and 
industrializing the country in line with capitalist principles. Although the reform-minded 
Emperor Guangxu was receptive, his mother, the Empress Dowager Cixi and her 
conservative supporters staged a coup d’état, crushing the movement in its tracks. The 
failure of the Hundred Days Reform followed by the violently crushed anti-foreign Boxer 
Rebellion, which further stoked patriotic outrage and forced the Empress to enact several 
of the suppressed reforms, paved the way for a more revolutionary radicalism. The 
Wuchang Uprising in October 1911 against Qing proposals to nationalize the railways in 
order to pay off Boxer indemnities proved to be the last straw. In a matter of months, 
China’s millennia-old monarchic system was swept away, and a provisional republic 
proclaimed on January 1, 1912.41   
 Leading up to the revolution and the establishment of a Chinese republic, numerous 
editorials in a newly burgeoning newspaper and print industry debated how best to save 
China from territorial dissolution and racial extinction. The emergence of a global 
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political consciousness among Chinese intellectuals was shaped by and motivated an 
unprecedented surge in translations of foreign, especially Western texts. Most of these 
translations appeared in a politically radical overseas press that helped set the stage for 
revolutionary uprisings.42 I explore the nature of these translations in Chapter One. For 
now, I would like to emphasize the emergence of a new transnational public sphere in 
the early 1900s that emerged in the wake of China’s forced entry into the world, and 
intensified after the fall of the Qing. The new public sphere was not only the product of 
translated texts, but of transculturated individuals – exiled intellectuals and overseas 
students, who engaged with foreign peoples, ideas, and languages as part of their daily 
lived experience. Translation and transculturation played a crucial role in the articulation 
of Chinese modernity, and I would add, in the articulation of Chinese revolutionary 
discourse.43 Not only did histories of other civilizations (both Western powers, and “lost” 
or colonized countries such as India and Poland), and translations of foreign texts 
produced by missionaries, Qing officials, and scholars explode at this time, but the 
interest in Western learning led to the establishment of an Interpreter’s College 
(Tongwenguan) affiliated with the Zongli Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), a 
scientific translation bureau based at the Jiangnan Arsenal, as well as numerous study 
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societies.44 Once frowned upon, overseas study began to be encouraged among educated 
elites; state schools incorporated scientific study alongside Confucian ethics, and 
numerous private academies, and professional training institutions designed along 
Western lines were opened.45 At stake in the unprecedented translation and dissemination 
of foreign ideologies and practices during the last few decades of the Qing dynasty is not 
the influence of the West on China or vice versa, but the complex processes of 
negotiation between conflicting values and paradigms, as Chinese intellectuals 
simultaneously questioned and assimilated foreign ideological models under highly 
unequal geopolitical conditions. 
In the chapters that ensue, I show how changes in meaning of revolutionary 
ideologies, and of the notion of revolution itself in both China and France occurred via 
translation and translingual practices. These historically contingent displacements of 
meaning, in turn, did not merely reflect or bear witness to existing material conditions 
and historical processes, but served as the very grounds of change; they were 
simultaneously shaped and helped to shape the Republican Revolution of 1911, the New 
Culture (1915) and May Fourth (1919) movements, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution (1966), and May 1968. The first chapter examines how Chinese intellectuals 
such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Liu Shipei and Li Shizeng processed the French 
Revolution as they articulated their own politics in the context of dynastic overthrow, 
semi-colonialism, civil war, and peasant revolution. I argue that anarchism was a key 
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mode of translation in the invention of a unique revolutionary discourse that attempted to 
negotiate between a race-based nationalism, and a socialist internationalism. In the 
second chapter, I show how the debates surrounding socialist revolution were linked to (a 
global) feminism. As Lydia Liu, Rebecca Karl and Dorothy Ko demonstrate in The Birth 
of Chinese Feminism (2013), the Chinese women’s movement was not a derivative of 
socialism and a complement to nationalism, but in fact introduced communism to 
Chinese radical intellectuals. The Communist Manifesto was published for the first time 
in Tianyi Bao (Natural Justice), an important anarchist journal edited by He-Yin Zhen, a 
female theorist who played a leading role in the birth of Chinese feminism. I bring He-
Yin Zhen into conversation with Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva, whose works on 
Chinese women (published in 1957 and 1974 respectively) have been roundly criticized 
for their blatant Orientalism.  
 The third chapter shifts to the relationship between Maoism, May ’68, and the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution in the French/Francophone context. It examines the 
interwovenness of the French and Chinese revolutionary traditions made explicit by the 
mutual fascination of Parisian soixante-huitards for the Beijing Red Guards, and of Mao 
and the Red Guards for the Paris Communards. Drawing upon Maoist journals, films, and 
material book history, I investigate the processes of translation and mistranslation, 
naming and omission that were involved in the search for, and articulation of new 
cultural and political models. The final chapter examines how the Francophone Cultural 
Revolution novels of Chinese-origin novelists draw upon and reinforce  
the reversal in attitude – the repudiation of revolution – that many prominent French 




François Cheng’s Le Dit de Tianyi, Dai Sijie’s Balzac et la petite tailleuse chinoise, and 
Wei Wei’s Une fille zhuang recount coming-of-age tales in which young men and women 
are sent to labor camps in the countryside, but whose true reeducation occurs through the 
illicit reading of French literature. French, as the language of self-liberation, is associated 
with Enlightenment ideals and human rights, as well as with a certain idea of France as a 
world literary capital. I argue that revolution is displaced from these texts in favor of a 
discourse of individualism concomitant with the global shift from “revolution to ethics” 
that occurred in the late seventies and eighties, and that has since manifested itself as a 








The Sword of Revolution:  
Translating Change in Late Qing and Early Republican China 
        
 
 In a quiet wooded glade in the Bois de Boulogne, a former hunting ground for 
Louis XVI located on the western edge of Paris, eighteen Chinese youth gathered from 
various corners of Europe to found the European branch of the Chinese Communist 
Youth League (Lü-ou Zhongguo Shaonian Gongchangdang).46 It was the summer of 
1922 – approximately ten years after the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the 
establishment of Republic of China, five years after the Russian Revolution, over three 
years after the Great War and the May Fourth Movement, and one year after the founding 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai. France, as much of the rest of the 
industrialized world, was in a deep recession. The young Chinese republic was divided 
among inland territories ruled by militarist warlords and coastal cities run by imperialist 
powers. Worldwide, numerous mass movements with competing ideologies were 
gathering force in response to the global economic slump and concomitant political 
unrest. Interwar Paris, nevertheless, was a dynamic, cosmopolitan nexus where writers, 
artists, students, migrant laborers, anticolonial activists, and exiled intellectuals 
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congregated, engaging in myriad political, artistic, and cultural debates and movements. 
The crucible of various prominent aesthetic and cultural modernisms, and political and 
anti-colonial movements, France served as the site of an overlooked but crucial encounter 
between Chinese and French intellectuals and laborers that forged a particular 
revolutionary consciousness in the early twentieth century. 
 Over the course of three days in the Bois de Boulogne, the eighteen founding 
members of the European Chinese Communist Youth League, representing a total of 
forty Chinese students and workers from France, Germany and Belgium, debated 
organizational goals and structures, drafted rules of conduct, and elected three principal 
officers.47 Among the league’s members were several important future Communist Party 
leaders, including Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Li Lisan and Deng Xiaoping, to name just a 
few.48 These young Chinese and their compatriots were studying in Europe, mainly in 
France, as part of a Sino-French work-study program first launched in 1912, the same 
year as the birth of the Chinese Republic. Organized by anarchists, the program’s 
principal aims were threefold: to help Chinese youth acquire Western scientific and 
cultural knowledge, to cultivate moral virtue through labor, and – anticipating the sending 
of students to rural villages and factories during the Cultural Revolution and the établi 
movement during May ’68 – to abolish the division between intellectual and manual 
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labor. Renting chairs from an old woman who operated a tea concession in the park, the 
young Chinese radicals attired in stylish Western suits could have easily passed for 
leisurely city-dwellers enjoying a summer picnic in a scene out of a nineteenth-century 
French novel or painting, rather than patriotic radicals plotting revolution.49 
 The pronounced discrepancy between act and setting, reality and perception, 
reflects the eclecticism and internal contradictions of a movement that was not quite what 
it seemed on the surface, and whose historical significance has long been over-shadowed 
by the celebrity of some of its participants.50 Due to the political prominence of many of 
the student-workers in CCP history in later years, the Diligent-Work-Frugal-Study 
movement (Qingong jianxue yundong 勤工儉學運動) (1919-1921) has been studied 
primarily as an important precursor to China’s communist revolution in French, 
American, and Chinese historiography. The majority of French and American studies 
focus on the radicalization of an intellectual elite who purportedly turned to Marxism 
under the influence of post-war labor and communist movements in Europe, treating the 
European Chinese Communist Organizations as influential conduits for the development 
of (a European-directed) communism in China,51 while Chinese studies tend to 
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mythologize the moral rectitude and illustrious career trajectories of early party leaders. 
Starting in the post-Mao 1980s, after a period of silence on the subject during the Cultural 
Revolution, interest in the work-study program surged and numerous studies were 
published in China, ostensibly because Deng Xiaoping was a participant, but more likely, 
as Paul Bailey has noted, to underscore Zhou Enlai’s role in the Communist movement.52 
In general, much of the scholarship on the Sino-French Work-Study movement over the 
last three decades emphasizes a linear progression in Chinese political discourse from 
national salvation by way of education (jiaoyu jiuguo 教育救國) to salvation via 
(communist or ultra-nationalist) revolution (geming jiuguo革命救國), overlooking the 
myriad correspondences and conflicts between educational and revolutionary activities. 
 More recent studies argue for the diffuse nature of political discourse and activities 
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within the movement,53 examine the evolving educational thought of the period,54 or 
analyze the communists’ radical break with tradition in terms of a worldwide 
generational conflict.55 These histories assert that, despite its deep identification with 
early Chinese Communist Party leadership, membership in the European Chinese 
Communist organizations was extremely diverse and overlapped with many other 
Chinese political organizations founded in Europe at the same time.56 Zhou Enlai, for 
instance, was instrumental in the founding of the European Chinese Communist 
organizations, as well as of the European branch of the Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist 
Party).57 In the early 1920s, Chinese radicals dissatisfied with the results of the 1911 
Revolution were divided as to what the continuing Chinese revolution should entail, as 
well as how to achieve it. There were numerous socialisms being discussed, theorized 
and practiced by Chinese revolutionaries, both at home and abroad; of these, anarcho-
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communism was the most significant, and Marxism, still fairly marginal.58 The anarchist 
founders of the Work-Study Movement, Li Shizeng and Wu Zhihui, for example, had 
joined Sun Zhongsan’s nationalist Alliance League (Tongmenghui 同盟會) in 1905, and 
were later instrumental in the GMD’s suppression of Communists, while Sun 
Zhongshan’s nationalist agenda included elements of a socialist program. 
 Although recent scholarship has revealed the Work-Study program’s political and 
ideological heterogeneity, most studies still largely attribute the politicization of students 
to either the May Fourth Movement, or to European socialist influence. While it is true 
that many of the Chinese student-workers were politicized during the May Fourth 
protests in China, and radicalized (or in some cases deradicalized) in France, other 
participants gained a new political consciousness through their experience laboring in 
French factories alongside French workers and living in impoverished conditions. Several 
program participants had also been worker-soldiers during the Great War, and were 
politicized by their war experience as well as through interactions with Chinese 
intellectuals and radicals, and through the various organizational and educational 
activities of the program. Still others, through the introduction of Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho 
Chih Minh) attended the Congrès du Tours and joined the French Communist Party. The 
politicization of the student-workers was thus not the result of the May Fourth 
Movement, or the French labor experience alone; it was a truly transnational convergence 
of diverse persons amidst several, overlapping moments of political awakening in the 
context of global warfare, mass education movements, and an emergent socialist 
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internationalism, mediated at the time largely through the lens of anarchism. 
 As Arif Dirlik has argued, most radical thought of the time, including Marxism, 
was filtered through an anarchist lens.59 That is not to say that all ideas of the time, or all 
of the student-laborers were or considered themselves anarchist. Nevertheless, anarchism 
underpinned the “curious mixture of ideas of liberalism, democratic reformism and 
utopian socialism,”60 and the general mood of “euphoric revolutionary eclecticism”61 
present during the New Culture (1915)62, and May Fourth Movements (1919) out of 
which the Work-Study program grew, and to which it contributed. Remarkably, despite 
the prevalence of anarchist ideology among Chinese intellectuals in the early 1920s, and 
its formative role in the Work-Study program, anarchism is little mentioned if at all in 
current scholarship on the movement. There is, in effect, a curious tension between the 
anti-government philosophy of anarchism that sees all authority as corrupt, and the rising 
nationalism driving the politicization of Chinese student-laborers, as well as French 
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relations with China during this period that has yet to be addressed. What are we to make 
of, on the one hand, an emergent socialist solidarity emphasizing globalism, and the 
liberty and equality of all peoples, and on the other, a nascent nationalism that aims to 
enhance the wealth and power – and ultimately, the inequality – of individual nation-
states? It seems to me that this was a period when two radically different projects – one a 
utopian socialist, and the other, a nation-building project – co-existed, sharing 
proponents, goals, and activities to a certain degree, and diverging and conflicting in 
other ways. 
 In contrast to accounts that leave out anarchism, or treat the transition from 
education to revolution in Chinese political discourse as a linear progression, I argue that 
anarchism is the missing link to understanding how revolutionary concepts were 
mediated at this time. I further advance that anarchism was a mode of translation that 
enabled the articulation of a rival vision of modernity, a “competing universal.” As a 
mode of translation it legitimized certain discourses by linking, for instance, European 
anarchism’s concept of “a stateless society based upon the principles of justice, equality, 
and brotherly love”63 to the Confucian notion of datong 大同 (great unity), and very 
importantly, it “provided a vocabulary, a language, with which a new generation could 
articulate concepts that were emerging into its consciousness.”64 Moreover, anarchism 
did not only mediate discursive formations, it also set into motion several transnational 
projects, such as worker education programs, cross-cultural exchanges, literacy programs, 
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communal villages, and Esperanto schools; in doing so, it created the spaces for exchange 
between diverse individuals and groups. That is, anarchism was a lived experience. In the 
first few decades of the twentieth century, in addition to the Work-Study movement, 
anarchists were involved in two related but largely forgotten Sino-French encounters: the 
Chinese Labor Corps sent to France to aid British and French troops during the Great 
War (1916-1919), and the Chinese soldiers of the International Brigades in the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-1939). Even though the principal agents for the recruitment of Chinese 
workers and students for both wars and the Work-Study program, as well as some of the 
participating students, and worker-soldiers were the same, only very recently have these 
connections come to light, with a small number of scholars publishing on the Chinese 
involvement in twentieth-century European wars.65 Additionally, the first mass literacy 
program in modern Chinese history was launched in Bourgogne during the Great War. 
Chinese soldier-laborers first began to learn to read and write Chinese on French soil 
through the organizational efforts of Yan Yangchu (James Yen, 1893-1990).66 Although I 
do not wish to exaggerate the links between the Sino-French Work-Study programs and 
China’s participation in overseas wars, I believe studying the processes of travel, 
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translation, and transculturation that occurred in this period will help concretize the 
abstract relationships between war, revolution, education, and labor.   
 One of the main objectives of this chapter is to highlight the importance of Sino-
French connections between the first and second world wars as crucial moments in the 
circulation of not only revolutionary ideas, but of diverse individuals – intellectuals, 
students, and laborers – who debated, transformed, and put into practice these ideas, and 
who were themselves changed, translated, by their French experience. It is for this reason 
that the Work-Study program, as a crucial site of translation, operates as the point of 
departure for this chapter. Looking both backward and forward from 1919, I aim to trace 
the development of an emergent revolutionary discourse, and the reciprocal effects 
between this discourse and the historical contexts in which it developed, and which it 
helped to transform. By examining how a diverse spectrum of ideas about rights and 
revolution were translated and put into practice by late Qing and early Republican 
intellectuals, overseas students, and migrant laborers, I hope to elucidate the historicity of 
revolutionary discourse as it was translated between China and France in the first half of 
the twentieth century. As I argue below, abstract values and notions of rights translated 
from the West through the lens of anarchism both diverged from and merged with 
Chinese intellectual traditions, resulting in a unique Chinese revolutionary discourse that, 
enabled and limited by existing material conditions, oscillated between a radical 
internationalist solidarity, and a more narrow nationalism. 
 As we embark on the examination of a nascent Chinese revolutionary discourse, we 
might first ask, why, of the many social and political paradigms available for emulation, 




connections play in the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, the elaboration of the New Culture 
and May Fourth movements, the turn from reform to revolution, and from anarchism to 
communism? Reciprocally, how did the various revolutions and radical movements 
impact the development of revolutionary discourses? Part of the answer to these 
questions lies in the conflicting interpretations of the French Revolution circulating in 
China prior to 1911. 
 
The French Revolution in late Qing Translation: Interlingual Slippage  
and the Resignification of Geming 革命 
   
 Leading up to the 1911 Revolution, the national salvation debate was framed 
largely as a choice between reform and revolution. Both reform royalists and anti-
Manchu revolutionaries sought to learn from foreign revolutionary models. Introduced to 
Chinese intellectuals principally through translated Japanese histories, the French 
Revolution, far from being a beacon of inspiration at the time, was perceived primarily as 
an example of what China should avoid. Yet, due to the superficial connections between 
the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the French Revolution of 1789, Chinese and Western 
historians have long described the French Revolution as an important model for the 
Chinese Revolution.67 Focusing on their similarities – both revolutions overthrew a 
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monarchy and installed a secular republic in its place; both have been considered 
“bourgeois revolutions” (despite evidence that a nascent Chinese bourgeoisie was too 
weak to have played a leading role in the Revolution)68; both were sparked by foreign 
wars and invasions – such studies generally follow Marxist orthodoxy in proclaiming the 
French Revolution “the mother of all revolutions,” and the direct model for subsequent 
socialist revolutions. However, Chinese reception towards the French Revolution at this 
early stage was ambivalent at best. In actuality, the American and British Revolutions, 
and especially, the Japanese Meiji Restoration were looked upon more favorably than the 
French Revolution by reformers and revolutionaries alike. Curiously, Sun Zhongshan 
(Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1925), father of the anti-Manchu revolution and the Chinese 
Republic, made little mention of the French Revolution, even in his direct appeals to 
French authorities for aid and protection.69 Nevertheless, I contend that Chinese 
intellectuals’ understanding of the French Revolution was integral to twentieth-century 
Chinese Revolutions in two principal ways: in this early period, Chinese interpretations 
of Japanese histories of the French Revolution reshaped how Chinese intellectuals 
conceived of rights and revolution, paving the way for a republican revolution; and in 
subsequent periods, anarchist ideology cut from the mold of the French revolutionary 
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tradition would inform the elaboration of Chinese social, cultural, and Communist 
revolution.  
 The ambivalence of late Qing intellectuals toward the French Revolution is perhaps 
best encapsulated by the fate of the word revolution, geming 革命, itself. In this regard, 
the work of Chen Jianhua is particularly enlightening. As Chen argues, geming 
underwent a radical change during the late Qing through a series of Sino-Japanese-
European translations, evolving from a classical Confucian term that signified cyclical 
changes in dynasty mandated by Heaven, to a neologism (the classical term returned to 
China with a new meaning by way of Japan) that conveyed a modern, universal sense of 
“revolution” as a mass movement leading to historical progress.70 That is, geming was 
modernized and universalized – it no longer referred specifically to a Chinese political 
philosophy derived from an ancient divination text, the Yi Jing (Book of Changes, tenth to 
fourth century B.C.), but to a historico-philosophical tradition with global ramifications 
launched by the French Revolution and steeped in French universalism. In the early 
twentieth century, Chinese revolution, Chinese geming, became linked to world 
revolution. 
 This new sense of geming as a fundamental break with the past, as an inevitable 
element of universal progress, and of democracy as the highest stage in the development 
of human government did not occur smoothly, but, leading up the 1911 Revolution, 
underwent a number of slippages and changes in meaning. In its original sense, geming as 
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described in The Book of Changes referred to legitimate dynastic overthrow: “Heaven 
and earth undergo their changes, and the four seasons complete their functions. The kings 
Tang and Wu overthrew the thrones (geming) of Xia (2100-1600 B.C.) and Shang (1600-
1100 B.C.) in accordance with the will of Heaven, and in response to the wishes of men. 
Great indeed is what takes place in a time of change.”71 The linking of the Tang-Wu 
Revolution to changes in the four seasons, in the will of Heaven, and in the wishes of 
man legitimized geming on three levels: naturally, cosmologically, and socio-politically. 
Although emperors of later dynasties, anxious to avoid being overthrown, called upon 
Confucian scholars to reinterpret geming, this sense of revolution as a legitimate transfer 
of power ordained by Heaven, and driven by the people’s will lasted well into the late 
Qing. It was through the historiographical problem of how to write about the transfer of 
power in entirely different political systems that forced East Asian scholars to reconfigure 
geming.  
 Prior to 1890, revolution in its modern sense was often translated as zaofan (revolt), 
panluan (armed rebellion), and described as bringing great luan (chaos), as seen in the 
earliest mention of Faguo geming 法國革命 (the standard modern translation for “French 
Revolution”), Wang Tao’s Zhongding Faguo Zhi lue 重訂法國志略 (A Revised History 
of France).72 One of the first classically trained scholars to spend a considerable period of 
time in the West, Wang Tao (1828-1897) was an influential cultural mediator who was 
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among the first to translate Western ideas into Chinese, and Chinese classical texts into 
Western languages.73 Having traveled to France during his extended stay in Europe as the 
Scottish missionary and scholar James Legge’s collaborator, Wang Tao was impressed 
with French political, educational, legal, banking, and other institutions, which he praised 
in Faguo Zhi lue.74 First published in 1871, and expanded to twice its size in 1890, Faguo 
Zhi lue was a popular text among educated elites, “a must-read for all reformers.”75 Wang 
based his text on Japanese translations of French and world history, which in general, 
displayed ambivalent attitudes towards the French Revolution, as well as toward the 
classical Chinese notion of geming.76 Faguo Zhi lue reflected this ambivalence, but also 
differed markedly from Japanese sources. On the one hand, Wang Tao accepts and 
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repeats, almost verbatim, his Japanese sources in describing the process of revolution as 
“ran” (disaster, luan), and the restoration of Louis XVIII to the throne as “kakumei” 
(revolution, geming). On the other hand, he rejects the Japanese praise of militarism, and 
considers French militarism a “disease” transmitted to the Japanese.77    
 Wang Tao’s conflation of revolution and restoration – the actual outbreak of 
revolution in 1789 describes how the people of Paris “made a revolt” (zuoluan), and 
geming is not mentioned until the chapter on the Bourbon Restoration – reflected the 
Japanese conflation of the two terms. As Chen Jianhua notes, since contemporary Japan, 
unlike China with its multiple dynasties, had been ruled by a single imperial house, 
Japanese intellectuals altered both the classical Chinese meaning of geming (righteous 
dynastic overthrow), and the Western notion of a radical regime change essential to 
historical progress, emphasizing instead a concept of restoration that would strengthen 
the existing Japanese empire. 78 Subsequent late Qing intellectuals would persist in 
employing similar descriptions, referring to the revolutionary masses led by Robespierre 
and Danton as luanmin (rebellious mob), and luandang (rebellious party). Even Sun 
Zhongshan was referred to well into the early 1900s as the leader of a feidang (bandit 
gang) rather than as the head of a revolutionary alliance.  
 Sun did not refer to himself as a “revolutionist” or his cause as “revolutionary” until 
1895, when, during his exile in Japan after a failed coup attempt, he found himself 
described as the leader of a revolutionary party (kakumei to) in a Kobe newspaper. Sun 
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then purportedly remarked to a comrade, “The word geming [kakumei] is rooted in the Yi 
Jing. Kings Tang and Wu made revolutions according to the will of heaven and people 
[…] From now on we can call our party geming dang 革命黨.” 79 Appropriating geming 
for the anti-Manchu movement, Sun legitimized his attempt to overthrow the Qing by 
linking his uprising to the classical Chinese notion of a virtuous, Heaven-mandated 
revolution. By the turn of the twentieth century, the meaning of geming was in flux: it 
concurrently referred to Sun Zhongshan’s anti-Manchu cause, Japan’s Meiji Restoration, 
and righteous dynastic overthrow. 
 Interestingly, it was constitutional monarchists such as the prominent late Qing 
scholar Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and his disciple Liang Qichao (1873-1929), who 
would ultimately, inadvertently, do the most to remove resistance to and legitimize 
revolution by helping to shift the very meaning of geming in public discourse. Kang 
Youwei, for example, uses the “calamity” and “tragedy” of the French Revolution 
primarily as a negative example. Warning the Emperor Guangxu against the excesses of 
the French Revolution in July 1898, Kang writes,  
The whole of France was bleeding. In Paris, 1.29 million people died in 100 days, 
during which revolts broke out three times. The calamity even stretched into the 30 
years after the monarchy was overthrown. During that period, hundreds of 
thousands of nobles, millions of wealthy people and tens of millions of common 
people suffered in the chaos … The unprecedented tragedy shocked the whole 
world. From then on monarchs were thrown into constant fear and the people into 
constant war in Europe…. No killings and riots in human history could have been 
as cruel and violent as these revolutions, which all originated in France.80  
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While Kang’s exaggerated statistics and impassioned rhetoric may reveal more about his 
tactics of persuasion than his grasp of European history, Kang nonetheless concedes, “the 
recent upsurge of constitutionalism has its roots in the French Revolution. Though it is 
extremely unruly, revolution has become a general trend followed by millions of people. 
It is like overwhelming tides spreading over the land, formidable and irresistible.”81 For 
Kang Youwei, the French Revolution is simultaneously a bloodbath to be avoided, and 
utterly unavoidable. Nevertheless, it led to constitutionalism, a path he heartily 
encourages the Emperor to undertake during the Hundred Days Reform. Kang also 
paradoxically idealizes French democracy, brought to fruition by the French Revolution, 
as belonging to the Age of Universal Peace (Taiping shi 太平時), the most perfect stage 
in his modernized adaptation of Confucius’ Three Ages Theory (San shi 三時 ). 
 Even more curious than Kang Youwei’s simultaneous disavowal and legitimization 
of the French Revolution in the 1898 Reform Memorials is his careful avoidance of the 
word geming. Although the Draft Memorials of 1898 (Wuxu zougao 戊戌奏稿), the 
standard source for the study of Kang Youwei and the 1898 reform movement include 
texts containing the term geming, recent studies suggest that a number of memorials and 
prefaces were revised or forged after the reform failed and Kang fled abroad.82 Chen 
Jianhua’s comparison of texts verified as “authentic” by Qing court archives, and those 
suspected to be revised or “inauthentic,” reveals that Kang strategically employed terms 









such as bianfa 變法 (changes in law), bianzheng 變政(changes in political institutions), 
and weixin 維新 (reform, modernization) instead of geming.83 For instance, Kang 
submitted the Mingzhi bianzheng kao (A Study of the Meiji Reformation) without any 
mention of geming in either the book or its preface, and in a memorial dated April 10, 
1898, he mentions in passing a study he planned to submit titled, Faguo bianzheng kao 
(A Study of Political Change in France).84 This substitution was not due to lack of 
awareness of geming and Faguo geming, given his familiarity with popular histories of 
the French Revolution translated from Japanese. Kang Youwei, in his positive appraisals 
of parliamentary democracy and calls for radical reform clearly had revolution in the 
back of his mind. So why does he omit geming in his submitted memorials?  
 While I agree with Chen Jianhua that he likely wished to avoid offending the 
Emperor, I would add that the omission reflected the clash between the various “worlds 
of thinking,” both native and foreign, that Kang Youwei found himself enmeshed in and 
was responding to. Since revolutionary discourse in China had its origins in the 
Confucian classics, and had been mediated for centuries by (among other schools of 
thought) the New Text School (jingxue), which was predominant during the late Qing, 
Kang was, on the one hand, drawing upon a native, classical tradition in an effort to 
preserve aspects of that practice. On the other hand, geming, as an important term for 
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radical political change, had to be reinterpreted in light of China’s contemporary situation 
and its growing awareness of other traditions and histories. Late Qing intellectuals like 
Kang Youwei furthermore had to navigate between multiple layers of mediation across 
several languages. Given the New Text debates over geming, as well as Sun Zhongshan’s 
appropriation of the term for the revolutionary cause, Kang likely wished to distinguish 
his proposals for reform from Sun’s anti-Manchu movement as well as from any 
reference to dynastic change. Ultimately, Kang Youwei’s substitution of geming with less 
provocative terms like bianfa and bianzheng reflected not just an awareness of his 
audience’s sensibilities and Qing court politics, but points to differences between Chinese 
and Japanese interpretations of geming, as well as between Chinese and Japanese 
perceptions of Europe and the French Revolution.  
 Even having omitted the incendiary term geming, however, Kang Youwei’s reform 
memorials were considered treasonous, and he was sentenced to death after Empress 
Dowager Cixi’s suppression of the Hundred Days Reform movement. Kang went into 
exile and continued his calls for constitutional monarchy through a series of articles in 
Xinmin Conbao 新民叢報 (New Citizen Journal). Founded in Tokyo by Liang Qichao, 
Kang’s leading disciple, Xinmin was the major organ of the reform movement and one of 
the most widely read journals of the time. In “Faguo geming shi lun” 法國革命釋論 (On 
the History of the French Revolution), Kang warned once more against imitating the 




of securing “freedom and equality” (ziyou pingdeng 自由平等) for the common people.85 
These attempts at curbing the anti-Manchu movement through public discourse, however, 
sparked a series of counter-arguments in the Tokyo-based pro-revolution journal, Minbao 
民報 (People’s Journal) that would ultimately help seal the demise of the reform 
campaign.86  
 It was Kang Youwei’s illustrious protégé Liang Qichao (1873-1929) who would 
modernize geming most fully, linking it to a Darwinian concept of evolution, and modern 
historical consciousness, as well as expanding the concept to include not only political 
but also social and cultural change.87 A prolific scholar, journalist, translator, and 
novelist, Liang Qichao, like Kang Youwei, was ambivalent about the French Revolution, 
and advocated reforms modeled after Meiji Japan. On the one hand, he saw the French 
Revolution as dangerous and destabilizing, and preferred constitutional monarchy to a 
republic. On the other, as one of the first Chinese intellectuals to consider rights (quanli) 
consciousness in a sustained way, he was an admirer of the principles set forth in the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man. In his promotion of the Meiji Restoration as an 
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alternative to the anti-Manchu movement, Liang repeated and reinscribed in Chinese the 
common Japanese slippage between kakumei (geming, revolution) and gaikaku (gaige, 
reform). As Chen Jianhua notes, the Meiji period was commonly referred to in Japanese 
texts as kakumei jidai (the revolutionary era), the Meiji Restoration eulogized as ishin dai 
kakumei (reformation as great revolution), and occasionally, the term was translated as 
“changes in all societal affairs.”88  In Liang’s 1902 article “Shi ge” 釋革 (An explanation 
of the meaning of revolution), Liang suggests substituting for geming and its 
connotations of violence and terror the broader and rather toothless term, biange 
(transformation, change): 
Extinction and change occur not only in political but various other realms of 
worldly affairs. There are Japanese translated terms, such as religious revolution, 
moral revolution, academic revolution, literary revolution, custom revolution, and 
industrial revolution. In the favorite terms of today’s youth, revolution can occur 
everywhere: classics, historiography, prose, poetry, drama, fiction, music, language, 
and so on. So why can we not call all these geming when they have nothing to do 
with dynastic changes? Those who fear geming would do well to know that its real 
meaning is biange 變革.89 
 
In claiming that geming can be used interchangeably with biange, Liang, more than any 
of his contemporaries, unmoored geming from its classical Chinese meaning. He further 
linked geming to China’s survival in a world governed by Darwinian principles of natural 
selection, arguing, “If the people want to survive, they must effect great change and take 
action immediately. If the monarch and officials want to survive and win people’s favor, 
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they must not fear great change, but promote it.”90 In Liang’s use, geming is no longer 
associated with cyclical dynastic changes, but assimilated into a concept of biological and 
historical determinism. Revolution, as biange, change, is seen as inevitable and driven by 
processes of natural selection.91  
 During his exile in Japan after the failed Hundred Days Reform, Liang founded two 
journals in 1902 reflecting the main elements he saw as essential to China’s survival in a 
competition of the survival of the fittest, Xinmin 新民 (New Citizen) and Xin xiaoshuo 新
小說 (New Fiction). Believing that “to transform the people of a country, the only way is 
to first transform the country’s fiction,” Liang promoted the translation of foreign texts as 
the most effective means of revolutionizing Chinese literature, which in turn would 
change Chinese consciousness, and lead to progressive, free-thinking individuals who 
would bring about China’s salvation.92 Liang, in contrast to Kang Youwei, spent most of 
his years in exile (1899 to 1911) in Japan, where he learned to read Japanese, and met 
many Japanese scholars and political figures. Yet, like Kang, most of his ideas about 
Meiji Japan preceded his sojourn. Meiji Japan was an imagined construct that served as 
an envisaged solution to Qing-era China’s problems. Whether consciously or 
unintentionally noting the primacy of the imagination in effecting reform, Liang began to 
link literature and national salvation, literature and geming as early as 1899, when he 
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coined the terms shijie geming (poetry revolution), and wenjie geming (prose 
revolution).93 Ironically, his call for a revolution in literature would set the stage for the 
iconoclastic New Culture and May Fourth movements that attempted to create China 
anew, starting with the wholesale rejection of Confucianism.  
 Although the interlingual slippage between revolution, rebellion, and reform stalled 
the acceptance of geming as a household term, by the time of the 1911 Xinhai 
Revolution, it would come to signify not only dynastic overthrow but also the installation 
of a modern nation-state. The interlingual slippage of geming originated in and helped to 
shape the animated debates of the period between supporters of reform and those of 
revolution. The call for change grew increasingly urgent as foreign imperialist powers 
converged on China, carving up the country into European, American and Japanese 
spheres of influence. China’s humiliating defeat in 1895 at the hands of Japan sparked a 
public protest – stretching nearly a third of a mile long in front of the Qing Censorate – 
that led to the Hundred Days Reform movement.94 Although the suppression of the 
Hundred Days Reform led to the arrest and death, or exile of leading reformists, the 
movement marked a pivotal shift in how Chinese intellectuals conceived of the 
relationship between a country’s ruler and its people. Since 1898, as Peter Zarrow writes, 
Chinese leaders have had to “justify their rule in terms of representing the nation,” to the 
extent that “even the most dictatorial regime has claimed to rule in the name of the 
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people.”95 Even though Kang and Liang did not directly challenge imperial rule, they 
helped to desacralize monarchy by emphasizing the idea of people’s power (minquan) as 
a crucial element of good government. 
 In the wake of the failed Hundred Days Reform, and the huge indemnities the 
Boxer Rebellion incurred for the Qing government, Sun Zhongshan’s anti-Manchu 
revolution gained momentum. Many of the suppressed reforms were belatedly revived 
and instituted in a last-ditch effort to quell popular unrest. The resulting tension between 
the concept of an all-powerful monarch, and new structures that acknowledged the 
sovereignty of the people further eroded the absolute power of the monarchy. When the 
dynasty fell in 1911, however, the newly established Republic proved no more capable of 
fending off foreign, especially Japanese aggression than the Qing. Early Republican 
China, wavering between imperial restoration and military rule, was a chaotic mix of 
warlords, secret societies, and an authoritarian but weak government. The failure of the 
1911 Revolution to achieve a stable democracy led to a shift in focus in Chinese 
revolutionary discourse from political to social and cultural revolution. Mediated largely 
through anarchist thought and practice, this anarchist turn in some ways echoed Kang’s 
promotion of datong (great unity), as well as, in a broad sense, Liang Qichao’s call for a 
transformation in popular consciousness through intellectual and cultural change, but also 
departed from Kang and Liang’s criticism of the French Revolution. Francophiles as 
diverse as Chen Duxiu, father of the New Culture movement and co-founder of the 
Chinese Communist Party, and Li Shizeng, a leading anarchist and later one of the “Four 
                                                       





Elders” of the Nationalist Guomindang Party, took the French Republic as their model of 
an ideal, democratic civilization. Fundamental to anarchist thinking was the 
popularization of a new rights consciousness that had emerged in the late Qing.96 
 
Datong大同 and Quanli 權利: The Emergence of a Rights Discourse 
 In an essay titled “The French and Modern Civilization” (Falanxi ren yu jinshi 
wenming) published in the first issue of New Youth 新青年 (Xin qingnian), the magazine 
said to have launched the New Culture Movement, Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) extols the 
virtues of “modern civilization” inaugurated by the French Revolution: 
Modern civilization has three characteristics that played the greatest roles 
in changing the way (dao道) of ancient [civilization], and, thus, in marking a new 
era in human thought and society. These are the ideas of human rights (renquan
⼈權), evolutionism, and socialism. 
Prior to the French Revolution, all European nations were founded on the 
privileges (tequan特權) of the monarchs and aristocrats. Only members of this 
minority were regarded as individuals with independent and free personalities 
(renge⼈格). The majority of people were the slaves of those with privileges … 
Since The Declaration of the Rights of Man … was published in 1789 by 
Lafayette, the author of the American Declaration of Independence, the 
Europeans awakened, as if from a dream or drunken stupor, and recognized the 
value of human rights. They rose up and fought against their monarchs, threw 
down the aristocracies, and established constitutions… The ability of humans to 
be persons (weiren偉⼈) and not to sink forever into slavery – is this not a gift of 
the French?97 
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Writing in the wake of Yuan Shikai’s attempted imperial restoration and Japan’s 
humiliating Twenty One Demands of 1915,98 Chen Duxiu was employing a rhetoric of 
human rights to critique the Chinese state. In doing so, he was participating in a new 
discourse that Peter Zarrow has termed “rights talk.” As Zarrow argues, “rights talk” 
spread rapidly during the late Qing, taking hold among reformers, revolutionaries, as well 
as political elites because “it was a powerful tool for the critique of Qing despotism as 
well as for the building of a modern state.”99 If the return neologism geming ⾰命 
prepared the ground for revolution, the new concept of quanli 權利 was central to the 
revolutionary discourse that led to the toppling of the Qing. Rights (quanli), like 
revolution (geming), had undergone a radical transvaluation during the late Qing. The 
term was first translated consistently as quan and quanli – which combined “power” 
(quan 權) and “profit” (li 利) – in W.A.P. Martin’s Chinese translation of Wheaton’s 
International Law (Wangguo gongfa 王國公法) in 1864.100 Both quan and li carried a 
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negative connotation in Chinese, often associated with quanshi 權勢 (power/domination), 
and with commercial interests as signified by li. After the Sino-Japanese War, and the 
proliferation of translations of liberal Western political thinkers by Yan Fu (1853-1921), 
and by Japanese translators, quanli was increasingly used to refer to legitimate political 
rights, and eventually, related terms like zizhu zhi quan ⾃主之權 (the power/quan of the 
self) and minquan 民權 (the power/quan of the people) were used to refer to individual 
autonomy, popular power, and even loosely, “democracy.”101 The new meaning and 
valence of quan and quanli would be naturalized through repeated use. Disseminated and 
institutionalized through Qing administrative reforms, and contemporary ideologies such 
as liberalism, anarchism, socialism, evolutionism (social Darwinism), and so forth, rights 
became generally accepted “as part of a package that included popular sovereignty, 
citizenship, and constitutionalism as well as nationalism.”102 Although prior to 1890, 
rights was of limited interest and made little sense to Chinese people who believed in the 
power of the emperor to maintain order and justice (ren, 仁, benevolence), by the time 
Chen Duxiu referred to renquan (⼈權, human rights) in 1915, the pursuit of rights had 
become a common element of diverse radical discourses. 
 The earliest, most prominent “rights” thinkers were reform rather than revolution-
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minded. In this regard, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were instrumental in legitimizing 
a nascent quanli discourse, as they had been in developing the related geming discourse. 
Both Kang and Liang’s thinking on rights reflected their classical training, as well as 
their engagement with non-native sources. Kang Youwei linked universal moral truths 
such as the Confucian ren 仁(benevolence) to equality among humans. He envisioned an 
egalitarian society of Great Unity (Datong) that would achieve renmin quanli ⼈民權利 
(the rights of the people) under progressively more free and equal forms of society – from 
the constraints imposed by autocratic states, to equal rights (albeit with racial disparities) 
under democratic governments, and finally to the “breaking down [of all] boundaries” 
(jie 界) in a stateless society featuring absolute equality.103 Kang Youwei’s datong 
combined Confucian ethics with Western political ideals of liberty and equality. This 
proto-anarchist, communal ideal, as Dirlik writes, “drew its name and virtues from a 
native Chinese utopian tradition, but already its inspiration came from the future – a 
future, moreover that transcended China’s own world and took as its scope the global 
society of which China had just become an integral part.”104 In other words, the 
development of a rights discourse was shaped by indigenous concepts as well as by 
Chinese understanding of Western and Japanese notions of rights. This did not mean, 
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however, that Western-Japanese discourses were simply transformed to meet local needs. 
Both indigenous and imported concepts were constantly evolving as intellectuals adjusted 
their interpretations to address contemporary concerns. As Stephen Angle puts it, 
“Chinese rights discourse should be understood as an ongoing creative achievement, 
rather than a reaction to, or misunderstanding of Western ideas and institutions.”105 In the 
context of late Qing China, this meant the ongoing (re)assessment of China’s present as 
well as its future as one society among many in a new global world order. 
 While Kang envisioned an egalitarian society of great unity, Liang began thinking 
about rights in relation to a system of law in a series of articles written during his exile in 
Japan called Xin min shuo 新民說 (On the New People). In an essay published in 1902, 
he advocated the development of a Chinese rights consciousness:  “If one wants to attain 
[rights], if one wants to preserve [rights], then the place to begin is truly with rights 
consciousness (quanli sixiang 權利思想).”106 Liang further insisted that “rights 
consciousness” is natural: “when people are born they are endowed with (tianfu 天賦) 
rights consciousness, which is due to innate good-knowing (liangzhi 良知) and good 
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ability (liangneng 良能).”107 Although Liang considered rights consciousness to be 
natural, or heaven-born (tianfu 天賦), it can be weakened and lost (as in the case of the 
Qing dynasty) through continuous despotic rule. This loss of rights consciousness in turn 
leads to inequality between persons and between societies:  
If one observes the histories of nations that have been destroyed – whether Eastern 
or Western, ancient or modern – one sees that, in the beginning, there have always 
been a few resisting tyrannical rule and seeking freedom. Again and again, the 
government seeks to weed out [those resisting its tyrannical rule], and gradually 
those resisting get weaker, have [their resolve] melt away, until eventually that 
violent, intoxicating rights consciousness comes increasingly under control, is ever 
more diluted and thin, to the point that any possibility of a return to its former 
strength is forgotten and it is permanently under control. After a few decades or 
centuries of this situation, rights consciousness will have completely 
disappeared.108 
 
In some ways drawing upon Kang Youwei’s reworking of Confucian datong, Liang, 
nevertheless, by no means advocated a stateless society. On the contrary, he saw rights 
consciousness as essential to developing a strong nation-state in a competitive world. 
Linking the Mencian notions of liangzhi and liangneng to the social Darwinism of Katō 
Hiroyuki and the positive legalism of Rudolf von Jhering, Liang stressed the need of 
individuals and nations to struggle for their rights in the name of survival and social 
progress. In this regard, it is interesting that Liang proposed a natural “rights 
consciousness” rather than a concept of “natural rights.” In fact, Liang rejected “natural 
rights;” for Liang, while the desire for rights was natural, rights themselves were not 
natural but rooted in law. An individual or a state’s rights, or claims to its interests, had to 
                                                       







be constantly struggled for in a world in which “might makes right” (qiangquan zhuyi 強
權主義).109 
 
Anarchism as Mode of Translation: Rights and Revolution in Theory and Practice 
 
 At the same time that Kang Youwei was completing his utopian work Datong Shu 
大同書 (Book of the Great Unity) in India, and Liang Qichao was promoting rights 
consciousness in Tokyo, “rights talk” was further naturalized by two separate groups of 
overseas radicals who began elaborating a distinctly anarchist vision of rights and 
revolution that drew from eclectic Asian and European traditions. Based in Paris and 
Tokyo, respectively, these anarchist groups were among the first Chinese intellectuals to 
establish political study societies abroad.110 The first of these groups founded the Shijie 
she 世界社 (World Society) in Paris in 1906. Led by Li Shizeng (1881-1973) and Wu 
Zhihui (1865-1953), the World Society and its major organ, Xin Shiji  新世紀 (New 
Century) served as an important bridge between Chinese and European anarchism. A few 
months later in 1907, the exiled classical scholar Liu Shipei (1884-1919) and his wife, 
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He-Yin Zhen (1884-1920?), established the Shehui zhuyi jiangxi hui 社會主義講習會
(Society for the Study of Socialism) and began publishing Tianyi bao 天義報 (Natural 
Justice) in Tokyo. 
 Although the two groups had many differences – the Francophile World Society in 
general promoted a forward-looking anarchism emphasizing scientific progress while the 
Tokyo-based group idealized Chinese agrarian societies of old – they overlapped in their 
fundamental principles, kept track of each other’s activities, and sometimes reprinted 
articles that had first appeared in the other journal.111 They were instrumental in shaping 
a number of important discursive formations (“rights talk”, education as revolution), as 
well as revolutionary practices (assassination, mass protest, programs linking labor and 
learning). Most significantly, anarchism provided Chinese radicals of diverse persuasions 
with a powerful, new language and vocabulary with which to think about the 
contemporary global situation. It is in this sense that I see anarchism as a crucial mode of 
translation during its heyday between 1905 and 1930.112 Derived from native (familiar) 
and foreign (new) traditions, and invented in a transnational environment, Chinese 
anarchism was more than the sum of its parts. As Dirlik has cogently argued, anarchist 
ideology was at the core of an extremely diffuse and diverse combination of ideas that 
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marked the New Culture and May Fourth eras.113  
 Fundamental to anarchist philosophy was its rethinking of rights; anarchists helped 
to naturalize “rights talk” by creating a systematic ideology of how to balance different 
kinds of rights in a vastly unequal world of competing interests. As Zarrow writes, “the 
fundamental anarchist argument might even be reduced to rights: it is because humans 
could not be legitimately deprived of their rights (liberty) that all systems of rule and 
exploitation were immoral. Authority in all its forms – the state, the family, capitalism, 
landlordism, even representative democracy – deserved to be overthrown and replaced by 
freely cooperating social units.”114 On the most basic level, anarchism emphasized 
individual liberation from coercive social institutions – in particular, the state and the 
family – which were seen as corrupting influences. Founded on a basic belief in human 
goodness, anarchist philosophy held that, once freed from the shackles of authority, man 
would be restored to his natural (moral) self. In Emma Goldman’s words, 
Anarchism … really stands for the liberation of the human mind from the 
dominion of religion; the liberation of the human body from the dominion of 
property; liberation from the shackles and restraint of government. Anarchism 
stands for a social order based on the free grouping of individuals for the purpose 
of producing real social wealth; an order that will guarantee to every human being 
free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life, according to 
individual desires, tastes, and inclinations.115 
 
This egalitarian vision resonated with Chinese intellectuals’ concerns about their place 
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within Chinese society, and China’s place in the world at a time when both were 
contested; it also resonated with classical notions of datong (great unity). Anarchism 
emphasized the unity of all humanity at a time when imperialist and colonial aggression 
was dividing the world into stronger and weaker, “modern” and “backwards” nations and 
races. This was a radically different solution to the problems of global modernity than 
that promoted by race-conscious anti-Manchu nationalists116, by liberals, or later, by 
Marxists. It was a vision of revolution that was fundamentally anti-nationalist, anti-state, 
anti-military, and anti-political – insofar as political revolution was rejected as “a 
revolution of the few.”117 Paradoxically, however, it emerged and developed concurrently 
with nationalism, and Chinese anarchist projects overlapped with nation-building 
projects. 
 In the early twentieth century, anarchism linked an emergent Chinese nationalism 
to broader, global sociopolitical problems (namely extensive socioeconomic inequalities 
and the exploitation of “weaker” countries by stronger ones) created by capitalist 
modernity. Both Li Shizeng and Wu Zhihui had joined Sun Zhongshan’s revolutionary 
Tongmenghui (Alliance League) while in Paris, and Liu Shipei was a fervent nationalist, 
although he would return to China as an agent-provocateur for the Qing government in 
1908, and would later support Yuan Shikai’s attempt to become emperor.118 Anarchists 
shared with nationalists a desire to strengthen the nation, and free China from conditions 
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of semi-colonialism. But in contrast to nationalist discourses promoting political 
revolution, anarchist ideology was ethical and existential in nature, promoting a 
revolution that reimagined the individual’s relationship to society; anarchist revolution 
was essentially social and cultural. Among the first to criticize Confucianism, discuss 
feminism, and promote language reform, Chinese anarchists were invested in a revolution 
that would fundamentally transform society by transforming everyday life and social 
institutions.  
 In some ways, the concurrent emergence of anarchism and Chinese nationalism was 
anomalous, for the central problem facing China at the time was often framed as how to 
create the material conditions of “wealth and power” (fuqiang 富強) necessary to assert 
political sovereignty. If the prevalent nationalist discourse emphasized the pursuit of 
wealth and power, anarchist visions of a world free of power struggles and hierarchies 
would seem to contradict nationalist aims. The very existence of anarchism in China 
suggests, as Dirlik has argued, that revolutionary discourse was by no means reducible to 
a search for wealth and political power.119 In making both individual and collective rights 
“central to the project of building a stateless society on principles of justice,”120 anarchist 
discourse pointed to “a new kind of universalism,” a vision of “ a world in which nations 
would once again disappear and humankind would discover a new kind of unity.”121 
Other universalisms would emerge – socialism, and communism for example – to rival 
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and eventually overtake anarchism. Anarchists were in effect “midwives to the social 
radicalism that was to burst forth on the Chinese scene” in the coming decade. Ironically, 
anarchism laid the seeds for the flourishing of communism that would spell its own 
demise.122  
 Despite their common ideological principles, the solutions proposed by the Tokyo 
and Paris anarchists were dramatically different. Tokyo-based classical scholar, and 
leader of the national essence (guocui 國粹) movement, Liu Shipei advocated an 
anarchism in Natural Justice that was deeply rooted in premodern native utopian 
ideologies, including elements of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism.123 But he also 
turned to non-native sources such as Tolstoy and Rousseau. Whether or not, as it has 
been argued, he saw elements of Tolstoy’s idealization of rural life and manual labor, and 
Rousseau’s concept of a social contract in premodern Chinese thought, one can 
conversely argue that echoes of Rousseau’s “general will” can be found in Liu’s 
articulation of a Chinese social contract: “If one can extend one’s self-interest to others 
(empathy), then the boundaries between the social whole (gong 共) and the individual (si 
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私) will disappear.”124 Liu saw rights/quanli as rooted in natural desires, but given the 
social nature of human beings, rights would need to be balanced with duties: 
Humankind has three basic rights: equality, independence, and liberty. Equality 
consists of everyone having the same rights and duties; independence consists of 
neither enslaving others nor depending on others; and liberty consists of being 
neither controlled by nor enslaved by others. We consider these rights to be natural 
(tianfu). Independence and liberty treat the individual as the basic unit; equality 
must be considered in terms of humankind as a whole… Independence is what 
maintains equality. However, since the excessive exercise of the liberties of one 
conflicts with the liberties of another, and since the liberties of one tend to conflict 
with the overall goal of equality, individual liberties must be limited.125 
 
In Liu Shipei’s anarchist understanding of rights and social contract, liberty was as 
important as equality. For Liu, the ideals of liberty and equality would be best achieved 
through the establishment of rural communes, and the participation of all in manual labor, 
a goal that likely inspired later Communist thinking about the relationship between 
agriculture and society, and urban and rural regions. Liu was criticized by the Paris 
anarchists for looking to the Chinese past, and advocating native utopias; yet, Natural 
Justice’s analyses of social and political problems such as the questions of militarism, 
labor, women, and peasants were prescient, and more concrete than anything put forth by 
the New Century anarchists, as will be evident in the next chapter. On one hand, Liu 
“perceived anarchism only as a modern version of a rural utopianism that had long 
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existed in China;”126 on the other, he was possibly “the first Chinese intellectual to see in 
socialism a means to liberate China from western oppression.”127 This tension, I believe, 
underscores the fact that Chinese anarchists were not simply “backward-looking,” or 
“forward-looking” as has been claimed; rather, they drew upon China’s past and present, 
upon several different “worlds of thinking,” both foreign and native, to envision a future 
wholly different from the struggle for wealth and power advanced by the imperialist 
powers. 
 In Paris, the New Century anarchists neither approved of their Tokyo counterparts’ 
focus on rural agrarian utopias, nor, as cosmopolitan Francophiles, were they particularly 
attentive to the anti-imperialism question.128 In general, they saw modern urban life as a 
corrective rather than corrupting influence. Perhaps nowhere is the contrast between the 
two groups more evident than in Wu Zhihui’s description of utopia in which science and 
urban industry, and futuristic mechanical inventions take center stage.129 In the New 
Century view, economic and social progress would be achieved through scientific 
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127	Ibid., p. 152. Anarchists were not, however, the first to advocate social revolution in China. Sun 
Zhongshan’s Tongmenghui included a socialist program in its revolutionary agenda in 1905. But Sun’s 
social revolution was at heart a political revolution, relying on the state to implement changes, whereas 
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128	The disagreements between the Paris and Tokyo anarchists reflected to a certain extent different 
attitudes towards the modern West. As Dirlik claims, “The Paris anarchists were Francophiles who found 
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disagree with Dirlik here; the New Century anarchists were indeed fascinated with the fancy gadgets and 
scientific advances of modern, urban life but they were also aware of the strengths of China’s past.  
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innovation; novel technology would help reduce the time spent on labor, potentially 
enabling people of all classes to engage in intellectual and creative projects. In addition to 
its devotion to science, New Century anarchists promoted education and mutual aid as 
crucial components of their social revolutionary program. 
  Much of this thinking, as many scholars have noted, was influenced by Chinese 
anarchists’ interest in Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin. New Century, having published 
an extraordinary 121 issues over the course of three years, was a critical source for the 
diffusion of translated radical literature. Notably, Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid, The Conquest 
of Bread, and Fields, Factories, and Workshops were first translated in New Century, 
then reprinted in other radical journals such as Tokyo-based Hengbao, providing 
inspiration for many of the Chinese communal experiments of the time.130 What has been 
oddly overlooked in most research on overseas Chinese anarchists is their engagement 
with the international anarchist community; in this case, especially with contemporary 
French anarchists and anarchism in France – a surprising oversight given Li Shizeng’s 
associations with the family of Elisée Reclus, from whom he first learned about 
anarchism.131 Additionally, Paris anarchists’ attention to classical Chinese texts has been 
downplayed, likely due to their criticism of the Tokyo group’s “nativism.” I would argue 
that the cosmopolitan environment and material conditions in France, as well as classical 
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traditions were crucial to the elaboration of the Paris anarchist group’s theory and 
practice. Like other contemporary radical ideologies, anarchism was very much shaped 
by (and helped to shape) linkages to both a classical Chinese heritage and the 
transnational context(s) in which the ideology developed.  
 Turn-of-the-century Paris provided Chinese anarchists access to an extremely 
vibrant and international community of radicals, liberals, anarchists, and socialists. The 
Paris Commune of 1871 was a not-so-distant memory; there were frequent worker strikes 
and marches; and French intellectuals had been polarized recently by the Dreyfus Affair. 
Although there is little evidence Chinese radicals took much interest in the affair, they 
were inspired by the role intellectuals played in French society, for, the Dreyfus Affair 
“was the final proof that truth, freedom, and justice remain outside the established order 
and could be reached only through battle with the state.” 132 By the end of 1906, a 
moderately leftist government under Georges Clemenceau allowed socialism to grow in 
influence with few constraints compared to some of France’s European neighbors. 
Radicals from the world over enjoyed relatively greater freedom of movement and 
freedom from persecution. Paris was also a major site of technological and scientific 
innovation. The hundred or so Chinese students in France in 1906 were amazed by the 
automobiles and gas-lit streets, the ubiquity of street cars and railroads, the newly 
constructed métro, as well as the occasional flying zeppelin. Several Chinese anarchists 
visited or stayed at the Aiglemont commune in Ardennes, befriending radicals from 
                                                       





France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Germany, and Russia.133 Their anarchism was thus 
decidedly more cosmopolitan than their Tokyo counterparts; it embraced (at least the 
scientific advances of) modernity, and linked Chinese revolution to a world revolution.  
 The Paris anarchists, as most anarchists, rejected a political revolution “of the few” 
in favor of a broader social and cultural revolution that would benefit the many. They 
advocated a “revolution of all the people” (quantizhi geming 全體之革命) based on 
universal principles (gongli 公理) such as liberty (ziyou 自由), equality (pingdeng 平等), 
fraternity (boai 博愛), community (gongtong 共同), and justice and altruism (gongli  yu 
liangxin 公理与良⼼ ).134 In short, for the anarchists, revolution was a process broadly 
identified with progress. Progress in turn signified realization of the universal ideals of 
the French Revolution combined with certain humanist aspects of Confucian ideology. 
For the Chinese anarchists, progress meant “perfect benevolence, perfect kindness, 
perfect public-spiritedness, and perfect rectitude (zhiren, zhici, zhigong, zhizheng 至人，
至慈，至公，至正),”135 rather than an inevitable triumph of the strongest and fittest 
over “weaker” peoples. These moral abstractions were supported by six concrete 
activities: propaganda, mass associations, mass uprisings, popular resistance, 
assassination, and education. Of these, education was most closely identified with 
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anarchist philosophy.136 In fact, education and revolution were equivalent in the minds of 
the anarchists; one was seen as necessary for the fulfillment of the other:  
Revolution will be effective only if, with the spread of education, people get rid of 
their old customs, and achieve a new life. From the perspective of effectiveness, 
this means that if there is education for revolution before the revolution is 
undertaken, there will be nothing impossible about education. Therefore, anarchist 
revolution … is nothing but education.137 
 
Anarchist education (wuzhengfude) that promoted civic virtue and autonomy was 
contrasted with government education (youzhengfude), seen as inculcating militarism, 
self-interest, and obedience to authority. As Wu Zhihui wrote:  
“What is selfish learning? It is learning for [the purpose of] making a living, 
supporting a family, enriching the country and strengthening the race. It is 
learning for becoming an official and getting rich. It is learning for becoming 
famous and raising the standard of one’s family…What is public learning? It is 
learning for the improvement of society. It is learning for the evolution of the 
world.”138  
 
Paradoxically, anarchist education was at once anti-political and intimately linked to 
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politics. In some ways, this was an extension, rather than a repudiation of Confucian 
ideology, which placed education at the center – as the main criterion – for participation 
in politics. The empire had long determined what was acceptable as appropriate 
knowledge in the service of the state. Given China’s tremendous dislocation in the new 
global context, the state and the ideological apparatuses underpinning it had to be 
radically rethought. The anarchists were among the first to advocate the universalization 
of education (jiaoyu puji 教育普及), and to insist on the education of the “whole person” 
(quanren 全⼈) rather than on just the development of the intellect as key to human 
progress.139 Anarchist education aimed to sweep away all classes in society by ending the 
division between rich and poor, between those with status and those without.140 In this 
regard, their thinking was indistinguishable from elements of New Culture thinking in 
general. For example, Cai Yuanpei, President of Peking University (Beida), summarized 
his philosophy of education as promoting “civic morality”141:  
“What is civic morality (gongmin daode 公民道德)? It is the French Revolution – 
its slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity. The essence of morality is here. 
Confucius said, “… you cannot deprive the humblest peasant of his opinion.” 
Mencius said, “A great man … is one whom riches and honors cannot taint, poverty 
and lowly station cannot shift, majesty and power cannot bend.” This is a definition 
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of liberty, and so this is what the ancients called righteousness or justice (yi 義).”142 
 
Drawing parallels between the French Revolution and Confucian morality, Cai goes on to 
match equality with the classical notion of “reciprocity” (shu). For Cai, as for the 
anarchists, liberty and equality were intertwined: “the two are opposites but are truly 
reached together.”143 Cai saw the reconciliation of liberty and equality as achievable 
through an educational curriculum that emphasized civic virtue and internationalism 
rather than private gain and national interests; that would benefit society rather than 
politicians and warlords. In this respect, he was a faithful supporter of Li Shizeng’s 
anarchist educational ventures in Paris, Lyon, and Shanghai.144 
Co-founder and organizer of several anarchist enterprises in France, including the 
World Society, a bean curd factory, the Chinese Labor Corps, a number of Sino-French 
educational associations, the Work-Study Movement, and co-editor of New Century, Li 
Shizeng (1881-1973) was a dynamic force in the development of Chinese anarchism, and 
a spirited intermediary between China and France in the early twentieth century. 
Educated in Confucian classics as well as Western science, Li was the son of an elite 
Qing official and one-time tutor to the Tongzhi emperor. He first traveled to France as an 
embassy student (suiyuan xuesheng) under the auspices of Sun Baoqi, the Chinese 
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minister to France (and a family neighbor) in 1902.145 Accompanied by two other 
embassy students, Zhang Jingqiang (1887-1950) and Chen Lu (1876-1939), Li enrolled 
in the École Pratique d’Agriculture in the town of Montargis, just south of Paris, and 
later studied biology and chemistry at the Institut de Pasteur in Paris, where he met Paul 
Reclus, nephew of the famous anarchist geographer Elisée Reclus (1830-1905).146 
Through the Reclus family, he was introduced to the works of Proudhon and Kropotkin, 
to leading French anarchists such as Jean Grave (1854-1939), editor of Les Temps 
nouveaux, whose address Li borrowed to publish New Century,147 as well as to prominent 
French intellectuals such as Paul Painlevé and Edouard Herriott. 
In 1906, Li founded the Shijie she (World Society) to promote anarchism and 
science. With Europe’s only Chinese printing press, the Shijie she published its first 
journal, a pictorial called The World (Shijie), which featured biographies of famous 
scientists and thinkers, including Darwin and Elisée Reclus. These activities were funded 
by Zhang Jiangqiang, fellow embassy student, and heir to a silk fortune. Zhang had 
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earlier established a successful trading company in Paris for the import of Chinese silk, 
tea, antiques, and chinoiserie. Li and Zhang were soon joined by Wu Zhihui (1864-1953), 
who became the dominant intellectual voice of the weekly journal the three friends 
founded on June 22, 1907, Xin Shiji (New Century). Unlike Li and Zhang, Wu came from 
a poor family in Jiangsu province. An excellent student, he passed the competitive juren 
examination (a provincial level civil service exam), and became an accomplished 
linguist, philosopher, and labor organizer. Wu is as well known for helping to standardize 
Chinese pronunciation as for his journalism in radical publications. An important fourth 
member was Chu Minyi (1884-1946), a major contributor to the journal, whose role in 
the Nanjing collaborationist government during the Second World War would lead to his 
execution in 1946. 
New Century, with 121 issues published between June 1907 and May 1910, was 
the longest-running revolutionary journal in Chinese history, and became one of the 
leading voices of Chinese radicalism at the time.148 Geared principally toward Chinese 
students in Europe and Japan, it was also sized to be smuggled back to China in the 
bedding of Chinese merchant seamen. Li, Zhang, Wu, and Chu were all members of Sun 
Zhongsan’s Tongmenghui, and promoted anti-Manchu revolution through their articles. 
In addition to attacks against the Qing government, New Century criticized traditional 
Chinese culture and social structures, calling for wide-scale reforms such as the abolition 
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of the family and of marriage.149 The journal also wrote articles introducing readers to 
radical thought, and translated European anarchist texts. Among these was Li’s 
translation of Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid (huzhu lun 互助輪), and Elisée Reclus’ 
six-volume L’Homme et la terre (Ren yü di 人與地), which had been published 
posthumously between 1905 and 1908. There were many resonances between the thought 
of Reclus and that of Li. Most notably, Reclus’ emphasis on science and education, and 
his belief in a gradual, evolutionary process in the creation of a new society helped to 
inform Li’s ideas for worker education and work-study, which Li saw as essential to 
abolishing the distinction between intellectual and worker, and creating an egalitarian 
society based on “mutual aid” (huzhu 互助) and “cooperation” (hezuo 合作).150 As his 
colleague Wu Zhihui remarked: “Far-sighted men regard the fact that higher education is 
not yet universal as the reason why classes are born. They grieve about this and [think 
that] the way of remedying the situation is to make education equal [for all].”151 Like 
many radicals of the time, Li hoped to uproot hierarchical and authoritarian Confucian 
values; his unique contribution to that task was to unite labor with learning. 
It was in the context of educating migrant workers at a Chinese bean curd factory 
that Li first began to promote the idea of “qingong jianxue” (diligent work and frugal 
study). Like Reclus and many of his anarchist colleagues, Li was a strict vegetarian, and 
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believed that there existed a market for tofu in France.152 While in Paris, in addition to his 
political activities, he conducted research on the chemistry of the soybean, co-authored a 
book in French on the subject, helped to popularize “le fromage chinois,” and founded a 
bean curd factory (the Usine Caseo-Sojaine) in Colombes.153 The factory opened its 
doors in 1908 with 30 workers recruited from his native village in Zhili. Li then 
established a school near the factory that offered the workers Chinese, French, and 
general science courses, and invited Wu Zhihui and Cai Yuanpei to teach there.154 No 
smoking, drinking, or gambling was permitted, and the workers were expected to devote 
their spare time to study. For Li, qingong jianxue, as Bailey writes, “would have both a 
moral and educational function, transforming Chinese workers into knowledgeable, self-
reliant and public-minded citizens shorn of their superstitions and backward customs.”155  
Li, an ardent Francophile, believed that France was the ideal environment for 
promoting such a transformation because of its model of secular education, the prestige 
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of French advances in science and philosophy156, the structure of its university system 
(daxue zhidu)157, and its progressive and republican ideals.158 With the overthrow of the 
Qing, and the establishment of the Chinese republic, Li saw the perfect opportunity to 
advance republican ideals through education. In 1912, with Wu Zhihui and Cai Yuanpei, 
recently appointed Minister of Education, Li founded the Liufa Jianxue Hui (Society for 
Frugal Study in France) to “cut down on expenditures in order to expand overseas study, 
and by labor and a simple life to cultivate habits of diligence and hard work.”159 The 
study society, funded entirely by the founders, organized a preparatory school in Beijing 
that offered courses in French, Chinese, math, and hygiene. The first group of 160 
students departed for France between 1912 and 1913, and enrolled in schools in 
Montargis, Paris, and Fontainebleau. While in France, the students were expected to eat 
and dress simply, perform chores including cleaning, cooking, and mending clothes, and 
avoid vices such as smoking, drinking, and visiting prostitutes. The program aimed to 
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send 3000 Chinese students to French cities over the course of 5 years, regardless of 
background or financial need. As Wang Jinwei noted, “others than the rich or influential 
could go abroad and a more positive contribution would be made to the raising of the 
educational level of the population as a whole.”160 But these plans were interrupted by 
President Yuan Shikai’s suspicion of the subversive effects of study in France and his 
closure of the preparatory schools, and more significantly, by the outbreak of world war.  
 
Anarchism in a New Era of Nationalism and International Diplomacy:  
The Chinese Labor Corps and the Expansion of Diligent Work-Frugal Study 
 
 During the Great War, China seized the opportunity to improve its semi-colonial 
status by sending workers to France to help offset labor shortages in the allied war effort. 
It also officially declared war on Germany in 1917.161 These two activities won China the 
right to attend the Versailles Peace Conference two years later. A new international order 
was imminent, and the young Chinese Republic was determined to ensure an equal place 
for itself among the world’s nation-states. After a number of failed attempts to join the 
war between 1914 and 1915, Liang Shiyi (1869-1933), acting Minister of Finance, 
proposed the yigong daibing (literally, laborers in place of soldiers) plan, and began 
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discussions to implement the program with Allied diplomats in 1915. Recruitment of 
Chinese laborers began in 1916, and was overseen by the private Huimin Company, as 
well as by the anarchist Qinggong Jianxue hui (Society for Diligent Work and Frugal 
Study) founded in 1915, and the Société franco-chinoise d’éducation (Huafa Jiaoyu 
Hui).162 The first group of approximately 1,700 Chinese workers (Hua gong) arrived in 
France in August 1916. The Chinese laborers worked alongside workers from French 
colonies in North Africa and Indochina, and were organized under the supervision of the 
Colonial Labor Service (Service d’organisation des travailleurs coloniaux) – violating 
China’s claim to national sovereignty, and belying France’s official insistence on the 
cultural affinities between the two civilizations, and its non-imperialist aims in China. 
Between 1916 and 1918, roughly 140,000 Chinese workers under French and British 
command were sent to France to aid in a wide range of undesirable and dangerous 
activities, such as digging trenches, manufacturing and cleaning ammunitions, rescuing 
wounded soldiers during combat, and excavating dead bodies from battle sites.163 Most of 
the laborers came from poor, rural areas in Shandong, Fujian, and Zhejiang provinces. 
There were also a small number of students, unemployed minor officials and soldiers, 
and impoverished xiucai (traditional lower-degree holders).164 Although roughly 5,000 
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Chinese workers died during the war, including 700 en route to France from German 
submarine attacks165, and it is believed that the Chinese Labor Corps effort was crucial to 
the Allied victory, China’s expectation of the return of Shandong was betrayed by prior 
secret negotiations between Japan and Yuan Shikai’s government, as well as between 
Japan and the Allies. The Versailles treaty accorded Shandong to Japan, sparking mass 
protests in China and abroad, and leading directly to the May Fourth Movement.166 
Despite the great disappointment, Chinese attendance at an international peace 
conference symbolized “for the first time in the modern era, the Western powers’ 
recognition of China’s membership in the international community [after] a century of 
repeated humiliations.”167 It also set the groundwork for the 1921 Sino-German treaty, 
the first equal treaty signed with a major power after the Opium War, and China was 
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May Fourth Era. University of Wisconsin Press, 1978; and Schwarcz, Vera. The Chinese Enlightenment: 
Intellectuals and the Legacy of the Fourth Movement of 1919. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986. In Chinese communist historiography, May Fourth is portrayed as marking the start of the era that 
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eventually able to recover Shandong at the Washington Conference in 1922. 
Consequently, despite China’s naïveté in believing the Allied powers would follow their 
own principles of open diplomacy, justice and national sovereignty, it managed to use the 
Great War "as a springboard for national renewal, for carving out a new national identity 
… and for sorting out a more equitable basis for interacting with other nations."168  
 Although we cannot treat the Chinese Labor Corps, and the captivating personal 
stories of the worker-soldiers in detail here, suffice it to say that it was an unprecedented 
historical moment in which hundreds of thousands of mostly illiterate workers traveled 
halfway around the world to support in wartime, nations, that had (and for the most part 
still) treated them as an inferior race. This was a defining moment in Chinese national 
identity: for the first time, a sizable number of non-elite Chinese “saw with their own 
eyes what a Western country looked like, and how people in other countries worked and 
lived.”169 More importantly, they experienced how other peoples perceived them, and 
gained a visceral consciousness of what it meant to be Chinese in the world. One laborer, 
Fu Xingsan 傅省三, argued perceptively in an essay published in The Chinese Laborers’ 
Weekly that prior to their sojourn in France, Chinese laborers did not understand the 
relationship between individuals and families, or between families and nations. 
Witnessing foreigners sacrifice their lives in defense of their nation, and seeing China 
being denied its right to speak at the Peace Conference while Japan was elevated as a 
                                                       







great nation, aroused immense patriotism and nationalism in the laborers.170 The same 
journal frequently published records of workers’ donations from their earnings abroad to 
national causes such as flood relief, the National Salvation Fund, and the Patriot Fund. 
Most of the workers returned to China after the war, and were active in mass protests and 
the organization of labor unions during the May Fourth period. Roughly 3,000 workers 
remained and eventually settled in France, finding employment as industrial workers.171  
 Most significant for our purposes is the link between the Chinese Labor Corps and 
worker education initiatives established by elite Chinese overseas. During the war, Li 
Shizeng continued his anarchist activities, founding a Chinese workers’ school in Paris to 
train interpreters, and establishing as mentioned, a number of Sino-French work-study 
associations through his French and Chinese contacts. Through the Société Franco-
chinoise d’éducation, Li published two workers’ journals, The Chinese Labor Journal 
(Huagong zazhi) and The Magazine of Chinese in Europe (Lüou zazhi). Another 
important education program for the laborers was organized by the Chinese YMCA, 
which offered education, entertainment, letter-writing services, religious instruction, and 
classes on national conscience, civil rights and modern government.172 It was also an 
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171	In Xu Guoqi, China and the Great War, p. 146. The fact that most Chinese laborers in France worked 
in factories is unusual; most overseas Chinese worked on railroads, plantations, in mines, or aspired to enter 
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important site of worker and intellectual exchange – elite Chinese educated abroad such 
as Yale graduate Yan Yangchu (James Yen) wrote letters for the workers to their families 
in China, read and translated foreign newspapers, and offered basic literacy classes. In 
fact, Yan established the first mass anti-illiteracy program in modern Chinese history, 
creating a basic 1,000-word primer.173 The effectiveness of the program may be seen in 
Fu Xingsan’s aforementioned essay on the benefits of the Chinese laborers’ presence in 
France, which was submitted to a writing contest in The Chinese Laborer’s Weekly, a 
YMCA publication edited by Yan.174 
 Preparatory schools for sending students to France that were closed in 1913 by 
Yuan Shikai were reopened, and in early 1919, the Society for Diligent Work and Frugal 
Study (Liu Fa qinggong jiangxuehui) sent its first group of students and workers to 
France.  Between March 1919 and December 1920, roughly 1600 students departed for 
France, mostly from Hunan and Sichuan provinces. They ranged in age from 16 (Deng 
Xiaoping) to 42 (Xu Teli175), though most were in their early twenties. According to one 
set of figures, of the approximately 500 students placed in factories, the majority were 
concentrated in iron and steel plants in Firminy and Saint-Chamond, and the Schneider 
armaments plants at Harfleur and Le Creusot; and of the 579 students placed in schools, 
most were in secondary schools in the Paris vicinity, while a few enrolled in lycées and 
                                                       









vocational schools.176  
 At the same time that Chinese educators like Li Shizeng and Cai Yuanpei were 
advocating study in France and study of the French language in China, French politicians 
were eager to exert French cultural influence in China. By the mid-1910s, the economic 
and cultural power of Britain and the U.S. was a major concern, with numerous French 
publications expressing alarm that Anglo-Saxon culture was overtaking French influence 
in China.177 As Paul Painlevé remarked: 
 
France should not be lacking at a time when China, in the process of modernizing, 
is looking for intellectual guides and technical advisers. If we abandon the 
promotion of French culture in China today, German culture will benefit tomorrow 
at our expense. French civilization is the one best able to harmonise with ancient 
civilisations and allow them to develop unhindered. The peace of the world has 
nothing to gain from an Americanized or Anglicised China, guided solely in 
industrial and commercial methods.178 
 
Three things should be noted about this statement: the threat of German, American and 
British competition; the cultural harmony of France and China; and France’s benevolence 
in wanting to ensure world peace. This rhetoric of cultural affinity and benevolence belies 
French anxiety over its waning global cultural and economic influence. Coincidentally, 
French anxieties dovetailed with Chinese cultural and political crisis. Both China and 
France were deeply concerned with their positions in the world, and leveraged a 
diplomatic relationship with each other to advance self-strengthening objectives. 
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 Ultimately, the nationalist interests underpinning the Diligent Work-Frugal Study 
program, as well as the program’s noble goal of creating a more just society by 
abolishing the gap between mental and manual labor were undermined by post-war 
recession, conflicts between the students and the program’s administrators, and 
increasing disillusionment with work-study as a means of national salvation. Some 
students, rather than being imbued with the spirit of labor, found factory routine 
stultifying, and their fellow workers, both French and Chinese to be idle, pleasure-
seeking, and disorderly. Chen Yi, a future foreign minister, insisted that factory life had 
nothing to do with the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, but 
revealed the evil nature of European capitalism.179 At this time, principally under the 
influence of Cai Hesen’s Marxist study group at Montargis, many students began to turn 
to Marxism. As funding dried up, and the recession forced more factories to lay off 
workers, students began to protest and demanded financial assistance from the Chinese 
government. Events came to a head when the students learned of a new university to be 
opened in Lyon, the Institut Franco-Chinois, in 1921. They assumed they would be 
allowed to study at the new institution, but it was soon apparent that enrollment would be 
based on competitive examinations, and students were also expected to have a certain 
level of income, and knowledge of French. The impoverished students accused Li 
Shizeng and Cai Yuanpei of abandoning them, and over 100 demonstrators converged on 
Lyon to protest the new institute’s opening. The protestors, including future CCP leaders 
Cai Hesen, Li Lisan, and Chen Yi were arrested and deported, marking the definitive end 
                                                       





of the program. Those who remained, such as Zhou Enlai, Wang Ruofei and Zhao Shiyan 
would go on to found the Chinese Communist Youth League in the Bois de Boulogne in 
1922. 
 
Conclusion: The Afterlives of Anarchism and Work-Study 
   
 Ironically, the intentions of Li and his peers to create a Sino-French work-study 
program open to the masses resulted in the creation of an elitist institution for a select 
few. And the work-study participants France hoped would sing its praises back in China 
would become some of the most vocal critics of French imperialist interests. 
Nevertheless, it was not the end of the anarchist dream to “turn schools into fields and 
factories, and fields and factories into schools” (xuexiao nongchang gongchanghua, 
nongchang gongchan xuexiaohua).180 Although Li Shizeng, Wu Zhihui, Zhang Jingjiang, 
and Cai Yuanpei all became loyal members of the Guomindang, partly out of hostility to 
the Communists, and partly due to longstanding personal ties dating to their alliance with 
Sun Zhongshan, they continued to promote anarchism from within the GMD. In 
September 1927, they helped to found the National Labor University (Guoli laodong 
daxue) in Shanghai to “train a new kind of labor leader, and a new kind of 
intellectual.”181 Doomed from the start due to its reliance on the political authority of the 
GMD, the Labor University represented anarchism’s last attempt to translate a 
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revolutionary theory of labor and learning into practice. While the anarchist ideas of 
qingong jianxue (work-study), and dao minjian (“go to the people”) would emerge time 
and again in Chinese history, labor learning was disassociated from the original anarchist 
goal of a stateless, harmonious society, and rendered into an instrument of state politics. 
Notoriously, during the Cultural Revolution, labor learning in the form of the reeducation 
campaign, although initially utopian, was instrumentalized in later stages in the service of 
state power. 
 Among anarchism’s most significant achievements as a mode of translation, it “not 
only brought labor into the consciousness of Chinese intellectuals, but brought labor and 
intellectuals together in the spaces they created.”182 In French factories, schools, and 
combat zones, politicized intellectuals and laborers collaboratively contributed to a 
revolutionary discourse that was constantly evolving, from anti-Manchu revolution to 
cultural and social revolution, to a fervent anti-imperialist nationalism, to a “dictatorship 
of the proletariat.”  
 In the mid 1930s, after escaping the GMD’s brutal persecution of Communists in 
Shanghai and other urban centers, and following years of protracted guerilla warfare, and 
the yearlong Long March across China, Mao and the CCP settled in Yan’an to 
consolidate the party’s peasant base and rebuild the revolutionary movement. It was in 
Yan’an, in the context of civil war and war with Japan, that Mao began to elaborate a set 
of revolutionary practices and theories that became known as Mao Zedong Thought. At 
the same time, war broke out in Spain between Franco’s Nationalists and the left-leaning 
                                                       





Republican government, attracting worldwide attention and aid. While Madrid became a 
political mecca for radical exiles, refugees, and workers from all over the world who 
joined the fight against fascism, Yan’an was the political destination of most Chinese 
revolutionaries who might otherwise have enlisted in Spain.183 As Mao told the Spanish 
in 1937, “many Chinese Red Army fighters want to go to Spain to join your struggle” but 
could not do so because of China’s war with Japan.184 Yet, according to a new study by 
Chinese-American scientists, Nancy Tsou and Len Tsou, several dozen Chinese went to 
Spain; some as part of the International Brigades, others as part of Spanish squadrons.185 
The majority of Chinese soldiers in Spain came from France, and were members of the 
ECCO, and/or the PCF. Many of them had been participants in the Chinese Labor Corps 
of World War I, the Diligent Work-Frugal Study program, or both. Zhang Ruishi (1893-
1968) and Liu Jingtian (1890 - ?), for example, were both soldier-laborers who had 
stayed in France after the Great War, where they found factory jobs at the car 
manufacturer Renault, and became members of the PCF. With roughly 100 of their 
French peers, they joined the “Renault Company” recruited to fight in Spain. Both Zhang 
and Liu were over 40, and knew they could not expect their jobs back if they returned to 
France. They were in fact arrested and briefly imprisoned upon their return in 1939, but 
were freed through the intervention of French colleagues, who also helped raise their 
return fares to China. They reached Yan’an in November 1939, where they were admitted 
                                                       
183	Benton, Chinese Migrants and Internationalism, 2007.	
	
184	Ibid, p. 67. 
 
185 Ni Huirui and Zou Ningyuan. Dang shi jie nian qing de shihou: Can jia Xibanya nei zhan de Zhongguo 
ren, 1936-1939 (The Call of Spain: the Chinese Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939). Guilin: 




into the CCP.186 Remarkably, these two men from rural China, after participating in two 
wars on European soil, joining a non-Chinese communist party, and working in a French 









 CHAPTER TWO: 
 
La Chinoise I: Translating Feminisms 
 
Contemporary discourses about women’s rights tend to situate an enlightened, 
humanitarian West against the repressive traditional practices of the non-West (killing of 
infant girls in China, immolation of young brides in India, female genital mutilation in 
parts of Africa, etc.). Often these discourses are used to villainize non-Western 
governments, and legitimize political marginalization, coercion, and in some cases, war. 
Even while pressing for ending violence against women, and granting women equal 
access to education, elections, and political office among other rights, such discourses 
reinforce an essential hierarchy in which the West is seen as superior to the rest. This 
superiority then justifies the use of Euro-American financial, political and military forces 
to effect not just positive changes in other regions, but also to coerce and exploit those 
regions to benefit Western economic and political interests (sometimes intentionally, 
sometimes unintentionally).  
The reverse scenario occurred during the Cold War, when Western liberals 
disillusioned with both Euro-American imperialism and Soviet totalitarianism turned to 
China as a socialist utopia. French feminists Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva, for 
example, toured China mid century, and praised its socialist commitment to women’s 
rights. They have subsequently been criticized for their Orientalism and facile acceptance 
of Potemkin village-style tours. These cases are not very interesting in themselves; the 
analytical tendency to set the “East” in binary opposition to the “West”, whether as an 




centuries of encounter between China and the West, and has been much commented on. 
Rather, this chapter is interested in how this logic gets naturalized, what it masks, and 
what an alternative to such binary thinking might look like.  
The dominant logic seems to assume that women’s rights and feminism are 
Western concepts. By attending to the particularities of the China/France feminist lens at 
specific historical junctures, and how ontological categories such as East/West, 
male/female, man/woman are constituted and translated, this chapter will also challenge 
the assumption that feminism is a European import, filtering into non-Western lands by 
way of Euro-American theory. Most scholars of Chinese feminism, for example, trace its 
conception to early twentieth-century Chinese translations of European thinkers such as 
John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer and Mary Wollstonecraft. Such translated texts 
concerning “natural rights” inspired male liberal reformers like Liang Qichao and Jin 
Tianhe to advocate for women’s education and rights as a way of strengthening the 
Chinese nation against Western imperialism.  
Until recently, Chinese feminism was thus seen as a derivative of nationalism and 
socialism. However, as Lydia Liu, Rebecca Karl and Dorothy Ko assert in The Birth of 
Chinese Feminism (2013), the work of He-Yin Zhen, a female theorist considered to be 
one of the founders of Chinese feminism, suggests otherwise. Liu, Karl and Ko’s 
reconstruction of her essays makes available for the first time in English a radical 
transnational understanding of gender, labor, and power at the moment of China’s semi-
colonization and imminent dynastic overthrow. By bringing He-Yin Zhen into 
conversation with Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva, I do not want to imply that He-




she is a “native.”  Instead, I will show that Beauvoir and Kristeva were limited by their 
categories of analysis, and the particular genre of the travel narrative, whereas He-Yin 
Zhen’s analytical categories proved productive because of her particular engagement with 
feminist theory through the lens of anarchism, a philosophy inclined towards dissolving 
binary categories rather than enforcing them. Instead of focusing solely on Kristeva and 
Beauvoir’s Orientalism, I hope to answer: How else could they have written about 
Chinese women? Was/Is Orientalism inevitable in translating the “other”? What other 
possibilities can be envisioned?   
Before addressing these questions, let us examine the context and nature of 
Beauvoir and Kristeva’s visits to China and their writings on Chinese women. 
 
Passage to China/the China Impasse: French Feminist Myths of China 
 
 
 In 1955, Simone de Beauvoir was one of the first Western intellectuals to visit the 
People’s Republic of China upon the personal invitation of Zhou Enlai.  Beauvoir and her 
lifelong companion, Jean-Paul Sartre, were among 1500 foreigners sponsored by the 
Chinese government to tour and observe China during its transition to socialism.187  
Approximately twenty years later, another European intellectual, Julia Kristeva, traveled 
to Beijing with the Parisian literary journal, Tel Quel.  In the spring of 1974, the Tel Quel 
group, which included Kristeva, her husband, Philippe Sollers, Roland Barthes, Marcelin 
Pleynet and François Wahl (Lacan was scheduled to attend but canceled at the last 
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moment), was one of the first Western delegations received by President Mao after China 
joined the United Nations in 1971.  Both trips culminated in the publication of texts, 
which may be best referred to as travel narratives: Beauvoir’s La longue marche: essai 
sur la Chine was originally published by Gallimard in 1957, and Kristeva’s Des 
Chinoises was published by Éditions des Femmes in 1974. 
 In their prefaces, Beauvoir and Kristeva acknowledge their scholarly deficiencies 
in Chinese language and history, presenting their respective texts not as serious academic 
studies, but rather as collections of personal reflections and open-ended interpretations.188  
Beauvoir had no linguistic training, Kristeva had recently completed a licence (B.A.) in 
Chinese, and both women’s knowledge of Chinese history and culture were limited to a 
handful of works by Western sinologists such as Marcel Granet and Joseph Needham.  
Neither writer had any training in anthropology or sociology, as might befit the author of 
an ethnographic travelogue. In fact, if one were to situate these texts within the body of 
their more well-known works, La longue marche and Des Chinoises represent, perhaps, 
at once the most obscure and most criticized of their publications.   
 Notably, Gayatri Spivak in “French Feminism in an International Frame” finds 
fault with Kristeva’s lack of analytical rigor, particularly her “stupendous 
generalizations” and “wishful use of history” which ultimately result in the reinforcement 
of the colonialist tendencies Kristeva herself criticizes.189  For Spivak, Des Chinoises is 
emblematic of a particular strain of Western leftist politics exhibiting what she terms 
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“colonialist benevolence.”  Such clumsily executed goodwill is what results in, or 
supports the marginalization of Third World women in Western feminist discourse as a 
special class of subordinated women who are even more oppressed than their First World 
sisters.  As Jinhua Emma Teng has noted, this phenomenon “represented a means not 
only of understanding cultural difference but also of asserting the superiority of women’s 
status in the West.”190  This production of a Third World difference is the same 
phenomenon that supported (and continues to support) representations of China as 
culturally backwards.  
 Since Spivak’s critique, a number of studies have interpreted Kristeva’s Des 
Chinoises as an Orientalist project.191  Although she may not have intended it as such, 
and even self-consciously sought not to judge Chinese women by Western standards, she 
nevertheless portrays Chinese women as the Oriental “other”, a category always 
antithetical to the West.  Beauvoir, likewise, has been criticized roundly for constructing 
a utopian myth in which Chinese socialism is a (superior) radical alternative to Western 
capitalism, and in which the emancipation of women figures as a key theme.  Despite her 
critique of Western hegemony, Beauvoir, too, reproduces its hierarchical relations to the 
“other.” As Eric Hayot has remarked, if even such “specifically anti-colonialist texts 
experience and contain forms of Orientalism,”192 what else, or how else can scholars in 
the Western academy write about ‘Third World’ women, then and now?   
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 In order to answer (or at least begin to answer) these questions, I propose a three-
fold analysis: historical contextualization (what were the specific historical conditions 
under which these projects were undertaken), theoretical contextualization (how do 
Beauvoir and Kristeva’s concepts of Chinese women relate to their general feminist 
theories), and textual analysis (where do the texts contradict or problematize their stated 
intentions).  I argue that both writers construct a monolithic image of Chinese women as 
oppressed victims in the process of being emancipated by Maoist policies.  This image 
furthermore serves as an instrument to advance a) socialist politics and b) avant-garde 
theory in France during two distinct periods of disillusionment with Western ideology.  
For Beauvoir, Mao’s socialist transformations held political promise; Kristeva, however, 
located the potential for revolution in theory.  The construction of a fixed Chinese 
identity, however sympathetic, to support politics or theory in the West ultimately results 
in a type of colonial discourse.193  Building upon Spivak’s critique, I contend that this 
colonialist gesture occurs via three modes: 1) the establishment of a binary relationship 
between self/other, the West/China, man/woman in which the “other” of each equation is 
always defined in negation to the dominant category; 2) the assumption of an ahistorical, 
universal category of Chinese women; and 3) the assumption of a direct correspondence 
between representation and reality (that textual representations are simple reflections of 
reality).  I will then explore alternatives to these discursive modes. 
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 Let us first situate these texts historically. Beauvoir’s six-week trip to China 
occurred during a period of escalating tension between Eastern and Western blocs during 
the Cold War.  This was a period marked by decolonization and the rise of nationalist 
movements in Third World countries often allied with, or perceived to be allied with 
communist groups. Although Beauvoir was not a member of the French Communist 
Party, she was an outspoken critic of Western capitalism and colonialism.  Her support of 
the anti-colonial struggles of the Viet Minh during the French Indochina War (which 
terminated in 1954 in the defeat of the French), as well as her anti-colonial position on 
the French-Algerian War led her to be labeled anti-French by the French press.  In April 
of 1955, Beauvoir and Sartre attended the Bandung conference, the first large-scale 
meeting of Asian and African states, many newly independent, to promote Afro-Asian 
economic and cultural cooperation, and national sovereignty.194  As Western observers 
sympathetic to the socialist cause, Beauvoir and Sartre were invited by Chinese premier 
Zhou Enlai to visit China during the implementation of the First Five Year Plan.  This 
invitation, extended in the wake of Bandung, can be read as an attempt on the part of 
Chinese officials to quell rising fears, among both communist and anti-communist 
nations concerning China’s growing power and alliance with the Soviet Union.  Beauvoir 
was thus in the privileged position of witnessing and writing about China’s development 
as a new socialist nation – following of course a government-organized itinerary, and 
guided by government-selected interpreters.  
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 In La longue marche, Beauvoir is writing against the dominant politics of the 
West at a specific historical juncture: the Cold War.  The text is a response to anti-China, 
anti-communist Western intellectuals who equated all forms of communism with Stalinist 
totalitarianism. Her chapter on the changing status of women in the family, for instance, 
directly challenges the anti-communist argument that socialist policies cause the 
degradation of family ties: “New China’s enemies take the regime very bitterly to task for 
the antifamilial policy they impute to it. The government, they charge, scoffs at, as good 
as denies the existence of blood ties, is riding roughshod over the most sacred values [...] 
China is doing nothing of the sort.”195  Beauvoir erects in place of the myth of China as 
an autocratic state, the myth of a Marxist utopia.  Her message is that Chinese 
communism is not Soviet communism; it’s revised, it’s workable, it represents the hope 
of freedom and progress.  Specifically, for Beauvoir, Chinese socialism promises the 
liberation of women from a tyrannical patriarchal system.   
 While Beauvoir’s trip to China occurred in the midst of Cold War tensions and 
decolonization movements, Kristeva’s three-week voyage took place during a period of 
French left-wing fascination with China, inspired largely by the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976).  Leading up to and during the revolt of May 1968, there was a 
heightened interest in Mao Zedong Thought and the political struggles in revolutionary 
China with intellectuals such as Beauvoir and Sartre sympathizing with the Maoist group 
La Gauche prolétarienne. 196  Tel Quel’s Maoist period (1971-1976) coincided with the 
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review’s poststructuralist phase.197  Its editors were fascinated by Mao Zedong Thought 
largely for literary and philosophical reasons.  They hoped to show that social revolution 
could be achieved through avant-garde art, and that social realism was not the only 
aesthetic possibility resulting from the alliance between communism and the arts.  From 
1972 onwards, traveling to China became popular (partly as the result of China joining 
the United Nations), and the Tel Queliens took the opportunity to embark on their own 
journey to the PRC.  At the time of Tel Quel’s visit (April to May 1974), its editorial 
committee did not belong to the French Communist Party, and were staunchly anti-
Stalinist.  Kristeva, having fled the Bulgarian communist regime for life in France, 
expressed skepticism of communist ideology.  For her, China was interesting not so much 
as a socio-political model, but as a theoretical lens, a figure of alterity whose radical 
cultural and linguistic differences enabled her to theorize in new ways about language, 
writing systems, and the feminine.  One could say that, “Tel Quel ‘exploited’ China for 
its own ‘theoretical exigencies,’ as nineteenth-century Orientalists had done before 
them.”198  Des Chinoises portrays Mao’s Cultural Revolution as a nonviolent movement 
                                                                                                                                                                     
streets and in factories, there were frequent clashes between activists and police. Many intellectuals sided 
with the reformers (some more out of protest against the government-sanctioned violence than with the left-
wing politics of the protestors). Although dominant narratives portray May ’68 as a student-led revolt 
against traditional values with few lasting effects, its ties to anticolonial and political protests, and 
relationship to Maoism suggest a much more complex, heterogenous event. See my analysis of Maoism in 
Chapter 3. Kristeva would remark in interviews regarding her later works, Le sens et le non-sens du révolte 
(1996) and La révolte intime (1997), that it was the metaphysical questioning of all values, power and 
identity – revolt as philosophical inquiry rather than political manifestation – that interested her in May ’68. 
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198 Cf. Ieme van der Poel, “Orientalism and the French Left: The Case of Tel Quel and China” in Oriental 






that encouraged the participation of students and women.  For Kristeva, Chinese 
socialism is valuable because it offers a feminine ideal of “self”: “Le socialisme chinois a 
donné un idéal au “moi” feminin, à tel point qu’on peut se demander si l’idéal du moi 
socialiste n’est pas fait pour les femmes.”199  Women of all ages are depicted as striving 
to live up to Mao’s dictum, “l’homme et la femme sont égaux. Ce que l’homme peut 
accomplir, la femme peut aussi.”200  To support this concept of a feminine ideal, Kristeva 
constructs a universal portrait of Chinese women based on a unique, matriarchal kinship 
model. 
In order to examine how the image of Chinese women is produced, and 
subsequently employed to support Western leftist agendas, let us turn to the texts 
themselves.  Contradictions within Des Chinoises and La Longue marche reveal a tension 
between the desire to avoid essentialist generalizations and the tendency to elide 
individual differences and historical changes. For example, Kristeva writes, “Il ne s’agira 
pas […] de dire que la réalité chinoise est observable à partir de nos modèles, de nos 
habitudes, et qu’elle se prête à nos lunettes.”201  Beauvoir insists, “J’ai déjà compris que 
ce pays n’est pas une entité politique, ni une idée à analyser: il a son climat, sa flore, ses 
moeurs; c’est une réalité de chair et d’os qu’il faudra essayer de déchiffrer.”202 However, 
both theorists frequently make sweeping statements such as “on peut se demander si, tout 
en restant sans réalisation sociale et politique, une sorte de maîtrise calme et précise ne 
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continue pas à être le trait caractéristique de la femme chinoise qui la distingue de 
l’homme,”203 or “pour la Chinoise, du haut en bas de l’échelle sociale, l’amour est affecté 
d’un coefficient négatif.”204  In order to produce a paradigm that would be applicable to 
Chinese women as a whole, Kristeva and Beauvoir ignore potential differences between 
distinct regions, social classes, and ethnic groups, as well as between rural and urban 
dwellers.   
Additionally, rather than accounting for history, both texts produce a simplistic 
dichotomy between traditional (Confucian) China and contemporary (socialist) China, in 
which one is revered and the other derided.  However, while Spivak suggests that Des 
Chinoises reflects “a broader Western cultural practice” of studying “the ‘classical’ East 
with primitivistic reverence, even as the “contemporary East” is treated with realpolitikal 
contempt,”205 what seems to occur in both texts is a privileging of the present at the 
expense of the past.206  Beauvoir, for instance, admits an utter lack of interest in classical 
China: “J’étais indifférente à la Chine ancienne. La Chine, pour moi, c’était cette patiente 
épopée  qui commence aux jours sombres de La Condition humaine et s’achève en 
apothéose le 1er octobre 1949 sur la terrasse T’ien An Men; c’était cette révolution 
passionnée et raisonnable qui avait non seulement délivré  de l’exploitation paysans et 
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ouvriers, mais libéré de l’étranger toute la Chine.” While Kristeva also seems to value 
contemporary China over traditional China, the distinction she makes between the two 
periods has an additional layer of difference. Although she praises the socialist potential 
for radical emancipation, she also glorifies the Taoist tradition in opposition to the 
Confucian tradition. She produces a second, hierarchal dichotomy within Chinese 
tradition, one that conveniently does not allow for any complicity between Taoism and 
Confucianism, even though, as Rey Chow remarks, “perhaps it is exactly Taoism’s 
equation of the female principle with “silence” and “negativity” that traditionally allows 
its coexistence and collaboration with Confucianism’s misogyny.”207 In short, both 
Beauvoir and Kristeva’s interpretations draw upon a Western epistemological model of 
“progress,” in which socialist China is portrayed as undergoing radical political change 
and modernization – processes that ultimately result in gains for women’s rights.   
Des Chinoises opens with a description of Kristeva’s encounter with a group of 
nameless Chinese peasants in the village of Huxian: “Une foule immense est assise au 
soleil: elle nous attend sans mot, sans mouvement. Des yeux calmes, mêmes pas curieux, 
mais légèrement amusés ou anxieux, en tout cas perçants, et sûrs d’appartenir à une 
communauté avec laquelle nous n’aurons jamais à voir.”208  Under the gaze of these 
silent women, Kristeva’s own identity is destabilized and becomes a central question: 
“Qui parle donc, face au regard des paysans de Huxian?”209  As Spivak notes, Kristeva’s 
reflection on Chinese women is “obsessively self-centered” and barely masks a 
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contemplation on the (Western) self.  Here again is a European theorist seeking to 
question “the millennially cherished excellences of Western metaphysics” vis-à-vis the 
other, the non-West.  Interestingly, in the moment of being looked-at-but-not-seen, 
Kristeva recognizes her own gaze, hidden by “false colonial civility.” She wonders, what 
did the peasants do in staring at her but return her own gaze masking a universal 
humanism: “le regard innommable des paysans de Huxian, qui en fait, ne faisaient rien 
d’autre que me renvoyer le regard que moi, je portais sur eux sans oser le leur montrer, 
pétrie d’humanisme universaliste, de fraternalisme prolétarian et de fausse civilité 
colonialiste.” 210 
  It is that moment of irreducible strangeness that Kristeva seems to actively seek.  
For it is in that otherness that something radically new (such as the revolution attempted 
but not achieved in May ’68) might happen in the West.211  Of the relation between May 
’68 and the “otherness” sought in China, Kristeva notes: [...] l’alterité de la Chine est 
invisible si celui ou celle qui parle ici, en Occident, ne se place pas là où notre tissu 
monothéiste et capitaliste s’effrite, pourrit, se casse. Mais où? Ce qui vient tout de suite à 
l’esprit: les luttes de classes, les nouveaux appareils politiques et idéologiques surgis 
après mai ’68.”212  
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Kristeva thus establishes a radical difference between “us and the villagers of 
Huxian,” East and West, as a means of self-understanding, as a site of potential change – 
for the West.  She furthermore locates this difference specifically in Chinese women:  
[…] dans l’histoire ancienne mais aussi tout au long du socialisme chinois et 
jusqu’à nos jours, le rôle des femmes et par consequent la fonction de la famille 
ont, en Chine, une spécificité que le monothéisme occidental ne connaît pas. 
Observer la Chine en ce lieu-là, c’est donc essayer de la suivre dans ce qu’elle a 
de particulier: un regard cherchant à mésurer la distance qui me sépare de ceux de 
Huxian.213   
 
It may be useful here to contextualize Des Chinoises theoretically, in terms of Kristeva’s 
position on the ontological category of “woman.”  This task is complicated by the fact 
that, in 1974, Kristeva’s position was not yet fully articulated; the text can be read as a 
flawed, essentialist precursor to her later more nuanced analyses of gender and sexual 
difference.  Although not evident in Des Chinoises, Kristeva has emphasized the danger 
of group classifications such as “woman”, “heterosexual” or “homosexual” that ignore 
individual differences.  In place of a unified subject, she would later argue for a “subject-
in-process.” 214  Yet, in Des Chinoises, “woman” is conceptualized as the “negative” of 
man, as existing “hors du temps, hors du savoir”215 that is, outside the framework of 
Western history and metaphysics.  Rey Chow suggests that in the same process of 
figuring women as “totally ‘outside,’ ‘negative,’ ‘unrepresentable,’ Kristeva makes China 
a place totally outside of, or negative to the West, so that “the binary oppositions 
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China/West and woman/man come to mean the same thing.”216  The text is hence based, 
as Hayot notes, on two scales of difference, gender and culture, and sexual distinction is 
equated with cultural difference. 
 The binary system Kristeva adopts is manifest in the very structure of the book: 
Des Chinoises is divided into two parts. The first, “De ce côté ci” (“From this Side”) 
presents a short history of gender relations in the Christian West, against which the 
second part, “Femmes de Chine” (“Chinese Women”) is evaluated antithetically.  
Women are located outside the social order, voiceless:  “Les femmes […] dans le 
monothéisme capitaliste, reste en deça du seuil de l’expression: sans voix, corps muet, 
toujours étranger à la cohésion sociale.”217  Women in the West exist outside the 
“symbolic paternal order.”218  In contrast, her analysis of the conditions of Chinese 
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women reveals a sexual and social economy wholly other to the West, one that retains 
traces of a matrilocal system (repressed by Confucianism).  In contrast to the 
monotheistic West (an entity generalized across diverse Indo-European cultures), Chinese 
society is represented as having two kinship models, an ancient system based on “la mère 
au centre” and the contemporary “famille féodale confucéenne patriarcale contre laquelle 
va se battre la révolution socialiste.”219   
In a broad, historiographical gesture, Kristeva traces this shift in models to around 
B.C. 1000.  Evidence for the original matriarchal system is based on folklore, Marcel 
Granet’s writings on Chinese civilization, Lévi-Strauss’ work on the elementary 
structures of kinship, and a handful of translated works of Chinese literature, including 
manuals of the Art of the Bedchamber circa the first century A.D., and a Qing Dynasty 
classic, The Dream of the Red Pavilion. Without devoting any attention to problems of 
translation, or inquiring into the status of the two latter works (are they typical, marginal, 
representative of a particular class, etc.?), Kristeva conflates discursive representations 
with material reality.  The Dream is described as “un roman de la dynastie des Qing [qui] 
témoigne bien des moeurs des familles nobles, et on l’étudie beaucoup en Chine 
actuellement pour y voir le reflet de la lutte des classes indissolublement liée aux luttes 
intra- et interfamiliales.”220  No mention is made of how Chinese readers actually 
interpret the novel.   
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essentializes the masculine as “logical” (and French) the feminine as “non-logical” (and Chinese). 
	
219 DC, p. 74. 
 





Beauvoir likewise constructs a utopian image of China as the new promised land, 
an “other” to both Western capitalism and Stalinist totalitarianism based on a handful of 
examples and literary texts.221  In the chapter, “La famille,” Beauvoir links socialist 
reform with a transformation in the status of women in the family unit.  Chinese women 
are depicted as victims of the traditional domestic structure:  “La famille traditionnelle 
brimait tous les individus: elle leur déniait à tous la liberté, l’amour et le Bonheur 
conjugal. Mais c’étaient les femmes qui en étaient particulièrement victimes […] je crois 
qu’en aucun pays du monde leur sort n’a été si abominable.”222  The improved conditions 
of women after the passage of the 1950 Marriage Act – which instituted broad changes in 
traditional marriage practices, including the banning of arranged marriages, polygamy 
and concubinage, the introduction of free choice in marriage partner, and the legalization 
of divorce – is deployed as proof that socialism works in China: “la marche vers le 
socialism implique l’émancipation de l’individu, l’affirmation de son droit à disposer de 
lui-même. Le mariage, la maternité sont devenus libres. L’amour est tenu pour une valeur 
“progressiste” […] Le chemin de la collectivisation est aussi celui qui fait accéder la 
femme à une dignité humaine, les jeunes gens à la liberté.”223  
These optimistic observations appear guided more by hearsay and discursive 
representations than by a critical analysis of material conditions.  Although Beauvoir 
chafes at initially seeing only “symbolic signs” of China (pagodas, temples, The Great 
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Wall, rickshaws, etc.) with limited access to Chinese “reality,” she claims that over the 
course of six weeks, she is able to encounter the “real” China via her Chinese 
acquaintances (all of whom are Francophone or at least Anglophone), and her 
unsupervised walks in town.  For instance, a quote from a single woman of privileged 
class is used to support the generalization that “[toute] Chinoise, du haut en bas de 
l’échelle sociale,” views love negatively, whereas “En Occident, même la femme qui 
place son métier par-dessus tout accorde une valeur positive à l’amour.”  Beauvoir 
continues, “il faut qu’elle soit entièrement délivrée du poids du passé pour pouvoir 
adopter une attitude positive où elle féliciterait non d’échapper à l’amour, mais d’être 
libre d’aimer à sa guise.” 224 The implication is that the liberation of Chinese women 
entails emancipating oneself from the weight of China’s burdensome paternalistic past, 
adopting a positive attitude towards love, and ultimately, to be as free to love as the 
bourgeois Western woman. 
In addition, by comparing what she sees and hears around her to what she’s read 
in books, she confidently concludes that Chinese Communism is “admirablement adapté 
aux besoins concrets de la nation,”225 and that Communism “apparaît donc pour les 
peuples d’Asie comme l’unique salut possible.”226  Her interpretation appears to be based 
largely on using “living examples” to “complement and round out” textual 
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representations of China circulating in the West.227 This method of reading another 
culture undergirds Beauvoir’s construction of an ideal, modern China where “le 
capitalisme, la propriété privée, le profit, l’héritage […] sont appelés à disparaître par 
étapes, sans violence.”228  That is, Beauvoir’s China pre-exists her trip, the Chinese are 
already constituted in her imagination before they even enter into the realm of social 
engagement. By defining Chinese women in advance as a uniform group, Beauvoir 
overlooks the fact that women are produced through social relations as well as implicated 
in forming them. In effect, to a certain extent, she seems to be repeating Sartre’s 
intellectualization of the “experience of being black” in Orphée Noir. As Fanon has 
famously argued, “Sartre’s mistake was not only to seek the source of the source but in a 
certain sense to block that source [...] And so it is not I who make a meaning for myself, 
but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing, waiting for me.” 229 
In her reaction against the homogenizing tendencies of the dominant anti-China 
discourse of the 1950s, Beauvoir, like Kristeva, ultimately reproduces the same structures 
of homogenization and cultural relativism.  This tendency to concurrently criticize and 
reproduce hegemonic thought also underlies her theorization of “woman” as the “other” 
of man: “woman is defined exclusively in relation to man.”230  In a phrase which sums up 
both French feminist representations of Chinese women (as Rey Chow notes, simply 
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replace “man” with “the Western theorist” and “woman” with “China”), Beauvoir asserts, 
“Man feminizes the ideal he sets up before him as the essential Other, because woman is 
the material representation of alterity.”231  For Beauvoir, woman has no ontological status 
independent of man, she does not, cannot exist except as the mirror image of man.  
Within this Hegelian model, China and Chinese women are folded into the “other” 
category in opposition to the West.  Although Beauvoir sets out to censure hegemonic 
relations, her approach reinforces binary divisions between China/the West, and between 
men and women.  
To a large extent, Kristeva and Beauvoir were bound by their historical and 
theoretical contexts. In employing a dialectics of difference based on the categories of 
self and other, they advanced the ideas of the very ideology they hoped to criticize.  This 
ironic consequence was amplified by the generic conventions and commercial nature of 
the travel narrative form. As personal reflections on the experience of being a foreigner in 
an exotic land, travel essays reflect more about the values and concerns of the observer 
than the observed; as texts written for a popular audience, travel writing is often 
constrained by commercial pressures exerted by the publishing industry.  
 
He-Yin Zhen and Anarcho-Feminism 
 
In imagining what an analysis that does not rely on binary categories might look 
like, the work of early twentieth century anarcho-feminist He-Yin Zhen (1884-1920?) 
offers a helpful counterpoint. In contrast to Beauvoir and Kristeva who ultimately 
reinforce the binary opposition between “East” and “West,” He-Yin’s analytical approach 
                                                       




suggests that the world “cannot be dichotomized into native and non-native, Chinese and 
non-Chinese, male and female;” it is “Chinese and global at the same time and it is 
always already gendered.”232 Although He-Yin is considered one of the founders of 
Chinese feminism, her work has been largely forgotten, obscured by the greater fame of 
her husband, renowned classical scholar Liu Shipei, with whom she founded and edited 
the journal Natural Justice (Tien Yee or Tian Yi) in 1907, along with the revolutionary 
nationalist Zhang Ji.233 Because they both used pen names, and sometimes wrote 
collaboratively, He-Yin’s work has often been misattributed to her husband. As seen in 
Chapter One, the Tokyo-based Natural Justice was one strand of an emerging Chinese 
anarchist movement exiled abroad; what is less well-known is that Natural Justice was 
also the official organ of the Society for the Restoration of Women’s Rights (Nüzi Fuqian 
Hui), which sought to eradicate male dominance and change subservient female behavior. 
For example, it prohibited serving as a concubine or second wife, and came to the aid of 
any woman oppressed by her husband.234   
 The recent translation of He-Yin Zhen’s essays in The Birth of Chinese Feminism 
has confirmed her authorship on several new articles, and made available for the first 
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time the capacious range of her thinking. As the editors assert, He-Yin offers a “total 
theory”, a systemic and systematic examination of the roots of oppression. While the 
origins of Chinese feminism are traditionally located either in a European-derived male 
liberal discourse of quan, or rights (voting rights, property rights, education rights, etc.), 
or in Western feminism235, Liu, Karl and Ko’s translation demonstrates that the Chinese 
women’s movement was not a mere offshoot of socialism, a complement to nationalism, 
or derivative of Western feminism, but operated in a completely different framework. For 
one thing, it introduced communism to Chinese radical intellectuals. The first chapter of 
The Communist Manifesto was published in Chinese for the first time in Natural Justice, 
suggesting that communist thought was translated through feminism; that is, feminism 
introduced communism and other radical ideas to China, not the other way around.236 For 
another, He-Yin Zhen, unlike many of her feminist compatriots (both male and female) 
did not subordinate the “women’s question” to nationalist struggles.237 He-Yin also 
regarded the progress of Euro-American women in attaining rights with skepticism, 
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century. Thus, as Taiwanese scholar Liu Jen-P’eng has noted, native feminism, whether associated with 
male liberal, nationalist discourse or Western feminism, inevitably stems from outside (men as opposed to 
women, the West as opposed to China). In The Birth of Chinese Feminism, p. 37.  
 
236	Marxism did not receive systematic articulation in China until after the 1911 Revolution (and especially 
after the 1917 Russian Revolution). 
 
237	Many Chinese feminist discourses of the time were tied to a nationalist discourse of saving the nation. 
Reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao bemoaned the subjugation of Chinese women – 
through footbinding, concubinage, lack of education, dependence on relatives, etc. – as emblematic of 
China’s larger problems on the world stage. This largely male feminist discourse linked saving China’s 
women (via unbinding their feet and freeing their minds) to saving the nation (jiuguo). Women, were thus 
in a way, blamed for holding back China’s national progress. Once the Qing Dynasty was overthrown in 
1911, however, little was done in terms of advancing women’s rights. A call for women’s suffrage was in 





considering it a form of “sham equality.” In “On the Question of Women’s Liberation,” 
for instance, she argues, 
To liberate women means letting women enjoy equal rights and sharing the fruits 
of all freedoms. If we decided to follow the model of the current European and 
American systems, we would get our freedom in name but not in substance and 
also would have equal rights in name only […] Asian women have generally been 
impressed by the advances in the civilizations of Europe and America. They 
believe that European and American women have already achieved the goal of 
liberation and are enjoying the equality and freedom whose precedents they are 
content to follow. There is no reason why in the age of women’s liberation our 
women should be satisfied with sham freedom and sham equality.238 
 
Unlike many of her contemporaries, He-Yin did not consider Euro-American concepts of 
liberty or capitalist modernization to be naturally “better,” or opposed to Chinese 
tradition. Rather, she saw the imperialist powers of Europe, America and Japan as 
“representing more advanced ways in which newly emerged and now-globalizing forms 
of oppression—industrial waged labor, democratic polities and female suffrage, 
enlightenment knowledge—could attach themselves to native forms of subjection,” to 
subjugate the poor and oppressed “on [an even] larger scale and in less delectable 
ways.”239 
As an anarcho-feminist, He-Yin Zhen did not support nationalism or state 
government of any form. In an overview of how women’s rights were conceptualized in 
late Qing China, historian Mizuyo Sudo identifies four representative images emerging 
from the women’s rights debates, including “mothers to the nation,” “equals to men in 
                                                       







duty,” “seekers of new roles,” and He-Yin Zhen’s “disavowal of female citizenship.”240 
Sudo suggests that all four images originated in the concept of natural rights but differed 
in how they conceived of gender roles; only He-Yin rejected the dualistic framework 
separating male roles and female roles entirely, and saw a fundamental contradiction 
between natural rights and women’s rights, as well as between natural rights and the 
nation-state system. He-Yin believed that women who tried to gain equality with men 
through traditional structures as warring militants, legislators or politicians only served to 
reinforce those oppressive structures. Noting the failure of broadened suffrage to improve 
the welfare of the poor in Europe and America, she asserts, “the roots of social inequities 
reside in the system of parliamentary representation itself.”241 She warns against letting 
the universal suffrage movement limit women’s liberation by placing into government 
upper-class women who would then oppress the majority of women. 
Although some scholars describe Natural Justice as a predominantly anarchist 
journal, noting that only twenty percent of articles were devoted directly to women’s 
issues242, and other critics describe Natural Justice as “China’s premier feminist journal 
during its year and a half of publication,”243 what seems evident is that for He-Yin, there 
was no sharp distinction between the aims of anarchism and the aims of feminism. 
Feminism for He-Yin appears to be, as Tani Barlow has described, “the record of 
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thinking about what a truly just society will look like” for everyone.244 For He-Yin, 
“gender equality implies equality among all human beings.”245 Tracing the origins of 
inequality to three aspects of social life: 1) the act of marking two concepts – such as man 
and woman – different, and thus, creating a hierarchy; 2) the emergence of private 
property and economic exploitation; and 3) the development of parliamentary 
representation and political structures that place power in the hands of a few (usually the 
wealthy and elite), He-Yin’s solution is the elimination of these fundamental forms of 
oppression. She proposes to destroy the very analytical categories through which 
difference and inequality is generated; insofar as the state protects private property, 
abolish the state; insofar as the family is founded on patriarchal forms of oppression, 
eliminate the traditional family. In place of the structures that produce oppression, He-
Yin advocates gongchan, or communal property, and equal labor. 
In the essay, “On the Revenge of Women,” she further shows how the oppression 
of Chinese women is produced by and inscribed in Confucian scholarship and ritual 
practices (such as marriage and funerary rites) that have been naturalized over centuries 
of daily repetition. He-Yin does not conceive of the female subject as the ontological 
negative of man as Beauvoir and Kristeva seem to do. The “other” does not arise only as 
the mirror image of the self, but rather is pre-existing to the self. It is through social and 
political relations – namely scholarship and social institutions and rituals – that the pre-
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existing “other” is labeled a hierarchical inferior. He-Yin notes that although Confucian 
teachings promote the subservience of women, a handful of male scholars champion the 
minority view that “husband and wife are counterparts of equal weight” and “of one 
body.”246 Conversely, some women have so internalized their inferior status that they 
publicly promote subservience to men, and these women are then, in turn, touted as 
exemplary models of womanhood in order to control all women.  The “traitor Ban” for 
instance is cited as insisting that ‘it is proper for a husband to remarry, but a woman must 
by no means serve two men.’ ”247   
 He-Yin’s critique of Confucian scholarship and rituals as a principal means of 
producing systemic social inequality achieves its force by her skillful use of classical 
rhetoric. That is, she engages with Confucian texts on their own terms; she partakes in the 
same hermeneutical convention of commentary as one might find in the Book of Rites, 
the Book of Songs, or the Book of Changes. In order to expose men’s hegemonic claim to 
knowledge, she must prove herself as scholarly as the Confucian sages. In her effort to 
show that “Confucian scholarship enabled men to cater to their self-interest,” and that 
through ancient teachings, “the relationship between men and women thus became one of 
absolute inequality,” she parses case after case of textual excerpts.248 In the example 
below, the translators have explicated the source titles and separated the citations by 
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bullet points, whereas in the original essay, He-Yin Zhen abbreviated titles and skipped 
lines in her citations because she assumed that readers, like herself, were well-schooled in 
the Confucian classics and had committed canonical citations to memory: 
Song dynasty Confucianists followed with an even more draconian suppression 
and control of women; women were despised so much that they were cast beyond 
humanity. Since then, scholars and officials have held fast to the teachings from 
the Han and Song dynasties … As these teachings became convention, no one 
questioned how wrong they were. The shrewd who knew these teachings were 
wrong whitewashed them to further their self-interest; the dumb swallowed the 
teachings without a shadow of a doubt … all Confucian teachings are teachings 
that kill people. One by one, they can be listed as follows: 
 
• Book of Changes (Yijing, the Qian hexagram): “[Although there is beauty 
in yin, it will not accomplish kingly projects.] Neither can the way of the 
earth, the way of the wife, and the way of the subject.” 
• Xunzi (chapter on “Rulership”): “The Son of Heaven [the ruler] cannot 
have a wife so as to announce to the world that he is peerless.” 
[translator’s note: this is a play on homonyms; the Chinese word for wife 
qi妻, being the homonym of qi齊, “being equal” or “a peer,” the citation 
refers to the fact that the wife cannot be a peer. In effect, she is addressed 
as hou 後, “after,” “behind,” or “queen.”] 
• Biographies of Exemplary Women (citing the Book of Rites, chapter 13): 
“Before a woman marries, she takes her father as heaven. When married, 
she takes her husband as heaven.” 
• Book of Rites (“Suburban Rites”): “The man goes in person to meet the 
bride, the man taking the initiative and not the woman [according to the 
idea that regulates the relationship between the strong and the weak.]” 
• White Tiger Discourse (“On Marriage”): “The rites of marriage: Why is it 
that a man takes a wife and a woman leaves her house to marry? It is 
because yin, being lowly, cannot have her own prerogatives; she relies on 
yang to accomplish things … etc.249 
 
This piling on of examples may seem repetitive and heavy-handed to readers 
unfamiliar with classical Chinese texts, but reflects the standard practices of Confucian 
scholarship, particularly of the New Text Confucian tradition popularized by the Han 
                                                       





school of learning.250 To attack canonical Chinese thought systematically in this way was 
truly radical for its time. At the book launch of The Birth of Chinese Feminism, the 
editors noted that He-Yin’s criticism of Confucianism is one of the first such 
comprehensive critiques in Chinese history – analogous to Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s 
feminist attack on biblical scholarship, or Beauvoir’s analysis of biases against women in 
Western thought in Le Deuxième Sexe.251 
“On the Revenge of Women” is of particular interest as a counterpoint to 
Beauvoir and Kristeva’s contemplations on the status of Chinese women under 
communism due to its handling of textual examples. Whereas Beauvoir and Kristeva tend 
to conflate discourse with reality in their reflections on Chinese women without exploring 
the reciprocal influences between text and society, He-Yin Zhen treats books as having 
an important role in shaping the existing social order.  She advances that classical texts 
are not simply reflections of society; they espouse values that are ritualized, sedimented 
into cultural practices, and become embodied experiences.  Her writings also offer a 
glimpse into the role East Asian feminists played as theory-makers rather than as 
ethnographic objects of study. Perhaps most importantly, she offers us a set of analytical 
categories that may prove productive in future examinations of the workings of societal 
hierarchies and inequalities. 
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Productive Categories of Analysis: Beyond Sex, Gender and Class 
 
 He-Yin provides two key analytical categories through which to examine social 
life and its various forms of oppression: nannü (literally ‘man-woman’; roughly ‘gender-
class’) and shengji (livelihood). Liu, Karl and Ko have suggested that nannü is “a more 
comprehensive rubric than ‘sex-gender’” and that shengji is “a more enabling rubric than 
class.”252 Nannü, the most crucial term in Chinese feminist discourses of the twentieth 
century, is most often glossed as gender. Nannü pindeng, for example, is translated as 
gender equality. However, He-Yin Zhen’s use of the term is more complicated. In their 
attempt to account for the various valences of nannü as a category in Chinese and 
English, the editors/translators remark: 
Interpreting nannü as a kind of ‘gender’ has the advantage of assimilating He-Yin 
Zhen’s work into the discourse of late-twentieth-century feminism familiar to 
Anglophone readers. By the same token, it could ensnare us in conceptual traps. 
Translating nannü literally word for word – nan for ‘man’ and nü for woman – 
into two or several English words, ‘man and woman’, or ‘male/female’, is just as 
unsatisfactory because the literal translation could contradict He-Yin Zhen’s 
theoretical project, which takes nannü as a single conceptual mechanism, used as 
both noun and adjective, that lies at the foundation of all patriarchal abstractions 
and markings of distinction.253 
 
 
Thus the translators choose to alternate between its various semantic possibilities 
(gender; man and woman; male/female), and in some cases, leave the term untranslated. 
The categorical flexibility of nannü would be impossible to sustain if one were to 
presume linguistic equivalence in translation; nevertheless, as Liu, Karl and Ko 
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emphasize, what is at stake is not the incommensurability of languages, but the playing 
out of “the theoretical resonances […] between nannü and “gender” or any other such 
categories in contemporary feminist theories, which have always passed back and forth 
through a multiplicity of modern languages.”254 Modern Chinese itself was in great flux 
at the time, exposed to novel translations and neologisms from Japanese, English and 
other mediated foreign language sources. Looking at the global interplay of these terms 
can provide insight into their limitations and uses. 
To that end, it might be useful to re-evaluate the Western notion of “gender” in 
light of He-Yin’s concept of nannü. In Joan Wallach Scott’s essay “Gender: A Useful 
Category of Historical Analysis,” Scott examines the utility and limits of gender as an 
analytical framework for three key theoretical approaches (feminist studies of the origins 
of patriarchy, Marxism, and psychoanalysis). Noting that “gender” as a way to “designate 
social relationships between the sexes” did not appear until the late twentieth century, 
Scott attributes its primary usefulness to analyzing “social relationships based on 
perceived differences between the sexes” and as a way of “signifying relationships of 
power.”255 While the concept of gender developed as a way of emphasizing the cultural 
construction of sexual difference, differentiating itself from biological “sex,” it also 
tended to reinforce the male/female binary. Furthermore, gender historians have applied 
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the concept across cultural and linguistic divides, as well as across historical time, 
leading to criticisms of its ahistoricity. 
In more recent years, feminist scholars have started to question the biological 
sex/socialized gender distinction. Judith Butler was one of the first to question the 
separation between sex and gender in her 1990 classic Gender Trouble: “If the 
immutable character of sex is contested” she wrote, “perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is 
as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with 
the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction 
at all.”256 More recently, feminist biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling urges readers to 
radically rethink the opposition between biology and culture, for “the changes [in sexual 
anatomy] that occur throughout the life cycle all happen as part of a biocultural system in 
which cells and culture mutually construct each other.”257  
Elsewhere, Scott notes another limitation in feminist epistemology, remarking 
that the concept of “woman” is based on sexual differences taken to be “natural;” this 
naturalized difference then justified the exclusion of women from partaking in the 
universal rights of man (in France, from 1789 until 1944). 258 Feminist agency, Scott 
argues, is paradoxical. As a movement, feminism aimed to eliminate “sexual difference” 
in politics, but to do so it had to use the group identity “women” – an identity produced 
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through difference. In order to claim equal rights with men, feminism reproduced the 
very difference it sought to eradicate. Scott’s rather optimistic argument in Only 
Paradoxes to Offer is that despite the contradictions inherent in feminism, French 
feminists still managed to achieve greater parity.  
He-Yin Zhen would argue that this parity – suffrage and parliamentary 
representation – is a false parity. As long as analytical categories marking difference 
exists, no true equality can be achieved. Allowing some women, notably the propertied 
elite, to vote or hold office merely reinforces the structures that produce inequality in the 
first place. Decades before feminist scholars began to question the gender/sex divide, or 
the distance between the subject and object of knowledge maintained by such categories 
of sexual difference (long held to be a patriarchal prerogative), He-Yin Zhen employed 
nannü in a way that collapsed such distinctions. 
In “On the Question of Women’s Liberation,” He-Yin writes, “[men] created 
political and moral institutions, the first priority of which was to separate man from 
woman. For they considered the differentiation between man and woman (nannü youbie) 
to be one of the major principles in heaven and on earth.”259 Her critique of “nannü 
youbie” is not of the difference between men and women per se, but the marking of that 
difference, which subsequently creates gendered social identities, and forms of power and 
domination based on that distinction. Seen as a mechanism of distinction that has evolved 
over time, nannü youbie “was the foundational material and metaphysical mechanism of 
power in the organization of social and political life in China.”260 The marking of nan and 
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nü as unequal enabled material, or physical oppression in the form of enslaving, 
cloistering, prostituting, and otherwise maiming or abusing the bodies of women. In “On 
Women’s Labor”, she shows how poor women, young girls, slaves and lower-class boys 
were all subject to such marking. Nannü is then also always already a type of class 
marking. The various forms of oppression generated by such marking were legitimized 
and reiterated philosophically, philologically, historically, and legally, through canonical 
texts and institutionalized rituals. As He-Yin repeatedly argues, the Chinese written 
character for slave (nu 奴) is inflected with the stem radical for woman (nü⼥), 
indicating that “the body is nannü’ed and thus ‘enslaved’ in a political-discursive prison 
even before it is ‘sexed.’”261 
Insofar as nannü is an entrenched concept in the patriarchal discursive tradition 
He-Yin critiques, she seems to be attempting to undo “nannü” (or “undo gender” as 
Butler might put it) from within the tradition that produced it. Questioning the category 
“nannü” in this way allows her to trace the roots of women’s oppression to the category 
of distinction itself, and to propose a potential solution in the elimination of this category 
as an organizing principle of social life. This solution is perhaps most evident in “The 
Feminist Manifesto” when she asserts that getting rid of categories that mark difference 
would bring true equality: “By [saying] ‘men’ (nanxing) and ‘women’ (nüxing), we are 
not speaking of ‘nature’ as each is but the outcome of differing social customs and 
education. If sons and daughters are treated equally, raised and educated in the same 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 





manner, then the responsibilities assumed by men and women will surely become equal. 
When that happens, the nouns ‘men’ and ‘women’ would no longer be necessary.”262 
 If nannü provides a totalistic rubric encompassing sex, gender and class, shengji 
(livelihood) enables a broader critique of global modernity, capitalism, and the nation-
state. For He-Yin Zhen, property relations and economic relations were key to gender and 
other forms of inequality. In the essay “Economic Revolution and Women’s Revolution,” 
she identifies the change from a communal system (gongchan zhidu) of marriage and 
property to a private property system – and the subsequent consideration of women as 
property – as the source of oppression:  “the beginning of the system of women as private 
property” is the “beginning of the system of slavery.”263 While greed for private property 
first manifested itself as brute force and physical enslavement, it later developed into the 
acquisition of wealth and socioeconomic power, creating new forms of enslavement to 
the wealthy and powerful. Because the state was the protector of these new forms of 
private wealth, and subordinated women’s emancipation to the logic of the state, He-Yin 
Zhen was deeply critical of all state systems. This perspective was radically different 
from the view of the majority of her contemporary revolutionaries such as Sun 
Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) and Liang Qichao, both of whom saw the establishment of a 
republican state as the primary means by which to establish national and individual 
liberty. 
 This essay, which appeared in the December 30, 1907 edition of Natural Justice 
intimately links women’s revolution with economic revolution on a global scale, and 
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proposes a notion of revolution far more radical than communist revolution per Marx and 
Lenin. He-Yin asserts, “…if you desire to realize a women’s revolution, you must begin 
with an economic revolution.”264 She further defines an economic revolution as “the 
overthrow of the system of private property, [its replacement] with communal property,  
[and the abandonment] of all monies and currencies.”265 In effect, she is calling for the 
abolition of monetary systems so that human relationships, and particularly, relationships 
between men and women, no longer need to be constrained by financial considerations: 
“…we must first abandon money. Once that happens, economic equality would follow; 
the majority of men and women would no longer be constrained by money, and they 
could then rely upon their mutual love to unite in marriage.”266  
 
Conclusion: Chinese Feminism, a Competing Universal? 
 
As we have seen, Beauvoir and Kristeva’s accounts of Chinese women 
underscore the methodological difficulties of studying East Asia from a Western 
perspective – that is, from a certain “anthropological vocation” that assumes the ability of 
the West with its scientific methods and theories to understand “natives” better perhaps 
than they can hope to understand themselves. Although their constructions of China as a 
utopian space are employed in critiquing the West, Beauvoir and Kristeva sustain, rather 
than destroy, the hierarchical relation between Western theory and the Chinese subject.  
Their production of a universal category of Chinese women is based upon a binary logic 
that defines China/Chinese women as “other” (negative, peripheral) in relation to the 
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West (positive, central).  This methodological flaw supports their projects of discovering, 
not so much the diverse, concrete conditions of Chinese women, but something radically 
new and different that might offer alternative modes of being and thinking – whether that 
be an ideal socialist regime, or traces of an ancient matriarchal system. The true center of 
these projects is not China or its women, as their titles or prefaces propose, but the West.  
This approach not only limits theoretical analysis, it reinforces Western cultural 
imperialism.  In recent years, a number of approaches calling for the “decentering” of 
one’s analytical strategy have been proposed. Aiming to avoid colonialist tendencies, 
these approaches propose that we look at specific groups of women locally – not in 
opposition to the West, but in relation to the various networks of power and resistance in 
which they are immersed and that they shape.   
A few years ago (in 2010), Kristeva advocated a similar approach at a conference 
on contemporary Chinese women held at the University of Paris 7 - Denis Diderot.  The 
conference was associated with the Simone de Beauvoir Prize for Women’s Freedom, 
which was awarded to two Chinese women, Ai Xiaoming, documentary filmmaker and 
professor of Chinese literature at Sun Yat-sen University and Guo Jianmei, lawyer and 
founder of the Chinese NGO, Women’s Law Studies and Legal Aid Center at Beijing 
University. 267  During the opening remarks at the conference the next day, Kristeva, chair 
of the jury committee, commented: 
Voici une puissance émergente, la Chine, qui fascine et qui inquiète et dans 
laquelle - tout compte fait malgré tout- les droits des femmes progressent. Notre 
rôle, en tant que jury [...] est de reconnaître que les droits des femmes sont 
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universels mais que leur promotion prend le chemin des diversités culturelles 
[...]268 
 
In espousing the universalism of women’s rights, all the while insisting on 
acknowledging and respecting the particularities of Chinese culture, Kristeva claims that 
the ultimate goal of organizations like the Jury Committee of the Simone de Beauvoir 
Prize is to work together with Chinese women and men to promote universal human 
rights – a task which she insists cannot be completed without taking into consideration 
the specificities of each civilization, each individual and their precise histories.  Is this a 
correction, a lesson learned from critiques of Des Chinoises, or the staging of a 
repetition?  What does it mean for Chinese women activists to be recognized by the West 
for championing universal values based on Western feminist thought? Given that such 
recognition can enhance Ai and Guo’s capabilities to make changes in China, one 
wonders if such a prize helps ‘native’ women improve local conditions while at the same 
time reinforcing existing imbalances on a larger, global scale. 
The question remains, how does one avoid reductionism and relativism in 
analyzing other cultures? To start with, we might avoid imposing a monolithic, universal 
category of “Chinese women” by analyzing how theoretical categories are constructed in 
a variety of political and social contexts (accounting for rural/urban, regional, class, 
generational and historical differences) among particular groups of women.  These 
contexts may, as Chandra Mohanty remarks, “often exist simultaneously and overlaid on 
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top of one another.”269 Mohanty cites Maria Mies’ 1982 study of the lace-makers of 
Narsapur, India as an example of a “careful, politically focused, local analysis” that 
avoids reductive generalizations by focusing on the contradictions “inherent in women’s 
location within various structures.” 270 By delineating the tensions between housewife 
ideology, self-perception, inter-relationships between the lace-makers, industry structure, 
and patriarchal norms and institutions, Mies reveals the intricacies and effects of 
particular power networks without reducing the women to mere “victims” or some other 
such simplistic category. The lace-makers are studied from their specific, concrete 
historical situation rather than in relation to similar or different systems in the West. 
Although this study does well to avoid theoretical generalizations, its empirical 
methodology does not seem applicable to most humanistic studies.  
A number of feminist scholars have proposed intersectionality – the analysis of 
how race, gender and sexuality “intersect in shaping structural, political, and 
representational aspects of violence against women of color”271 – as a corrective 
methodology. Liu, Karl, and Ko, however, are skeptical of the potential of 
intersectionality studies to do anything more than resort to an analysis of identity politics 
complicit with a conception of the state grounded in the “very regimes that underpin and 
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reproduce injustice rather than [provide] a way out of structuring forms of inequality.”272 
Bringing He-Yin Zhen to bear on intersectionality studies, they ask:  
If it is true that gender, sexuality, and race intersect to produce ‘women of color,’ 
do the same categories produce ‘white men’ as privileged subjects of the modern 
liberal state or ‘white women’ as women unmarked by race or class? If the answer 
is yes, then how do the same categories produce simultaneously the oppressor and 
the oppressed? How do they help us understand the structure of oppression, which 
seems universal and yet also quite historically specific?273 
 
They point here to a fundamental flaw in the theorizing of race and gender in 
intersectionality studies. In articulating an identity politics for “women of color,” such 
studies ignore the ways in which modern racial categories are continually produced and 
universalized. He-Yin Zhen’s unpacking of the nannü category as a constantly 
(re)produced and historically grounded political act goes beyond both gender as category 
and intersectionality as method. While Beauvoir and Kristeva’s Orientalism might be 
traced to their reliance on a dialectics of difference that privileged the gaze of the other, 
He-Yin’s theorizing managed to escape the Orientalist gaze, not because she was a 
“native” thinker, but because of her unique application of anarchism to feminism, and 
feminism to anarchism. Because anarchism is not interested in creating parity within 
structures but in dissolving the structures themselves, He-Yin was able to create 
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La Chinoise II: Translating Mao Zedong Thought and the Cult of Mao 
 
In an iconic production still from Jean-Luc Godard’s 1967 film La Chinoise, three 
young French students dressed in worker blues stand behind a disorderly mound of Little 
Red Books, their arms raised, each waving a red vinyl copy in salute to Mao. Iconic 
cultural symbols of the nineteen sixties, The Little Red Book or Le Petit Livre Rouge, the 
popular appellation for Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, and the iconoclastic 
movie La Chinoise have come to emblematize the phenomenon known as French 
Maoism, a political and cultural vogue among French leftists that conflated China, the 
cult figure of Mao, Mao Zedong Thought274 and the Chinese Cultural Revolution into a 
singular trope for radical politics and revolution. Based loosely on Dostoevsky’s 1872 
novel The Possessed, La Chinoise follows the militant and didactic activities of five 
students of varying philosophies and political temperaments who have converted a 
bourgeois apartment outside of Paris into a Maoist cell where they listen to Radio Pékin, 
host seminars and debates on Marxism-Leninism, cite passages from Mao, and plot 
revolutionary deeds such as the assassination of the Soviet minister of culture in Paris. 
The selected assassin, Véronique, also known as La Chinoise for her absolute devotion to 
the Maoist fight against capitalist imperialism, mistakenly reverses the digits of the hotel 
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room number and kills the wrong man. Ultimately unsuccessful in their revolutionary 
project, the cell disbands at the end of the summer. 
Although there is no consensus on whether the film parodies or champions the 
revolutionary political zeal of the young Maoists portrayed in the film, most critics would 
likely agree with Grace An’s description of the film as “portraying the ideological 
imagination at work in the late 1960s in search of alternative models and cultures.”275 I 
emphasize ideological imagination here in order to highlight the ways in which Maoism 
was an invented, discursive construct, the product of global translational processes that 
involved numerous interlocutors, institutions, collaborations, decontextualized 
appropriations and (re-)imaginings. Born in an era of political dissent marked by anti-
colonial national liberation movements, the Cold War, and irreconcilable divisions within 
the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français, PCF), Maoism came to embody 
the hopes and ideals of leftists disillusioned with the failed promises of the dominant 
capitalist and socialist systems. During the long 1960s worldwide276, China served 
variously as muse, “projection screen,” “crucial detour,” and “flexible signifier” for 
Western leftists who saw in revolutionary China the potential for a radical utopian 
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alternative to the widespread social ills caused by Western capitalism and imperialism on 
the one hand, and Soviet totalitarianism on the other.  In France, writers and thinkers as 
diverse as Jean-Paul Sartre, Henri Lefebvre, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser, Alain 
Badiou, and Phillippe Sollers have at one time or another taken up the “pro-chinois” 
banner, or been labeled a French Maoist by researchers of the period. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, Simone de Beauvoir and Julia Kristeva saw Mao’s socialist policies 
towards women as paving the way towards a global revolution in women’s rights. 
Over the last thirty years, there have been a growing number of studies, including 
intellectual histories, memoirs, sociological investigations, and document collections 
published on French Maoism. For the last two decades, at least in North America, some 
of the richest scholarship has focused on the theoretical and political engagement of 
prominent French philosophers with Maoism. 277 These studies tend to exhibit two main 
trends: incisive critiques of the Orientalism of French Maoists, and attempts to rethink 
French thought and politics from a transnational perspective. In the first case, scholars of 
Orientalism criticize Maoist intellectuals’ tendency to idealize and reify China as a 
radical cultural and political “other” in the service of specific (Western) theoretical 
agendas, thereby reinforcing the very societal structures they aimed to challenge in the 
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Paris: French Student Maoism of the 1960s." History of European Ideas vol. 31.no. 4 (2005): 472-90; 
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first place.278 More recently, a number of studies have turned to an earlier Maoist 
moment, one prior to May 1968: Althusser’s engagement with China during a 
particularly fraught moment within French Marxist circles. Camille Robcis, for example, 
claims that Althusser’s China and his interpretation of Marx were responses to the 
political and theoretical impasses confronting French Marxism during the early 1960s.279 
Wolin’s Wind from the East offers perhaps one of the most comprehensive portraits, 
connecting the Maoism of diverse figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, 
Alain Badiou and Philippe Sollers. While critical of their fanciful and misguided 
appropriations of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Wolin argues that French Maoism 
nevertheless inspired not only theoretical innovation but also a number of important 
grassroots social movements, challenging the assumption that Maoism (and more 
generally, the contestatory spirit of May ’68) was an error of youth that merely resulted in 
a return to the status quo. 
These studies of Maoism as an Orientalist and transnational phenomenon provide 
valuable insights into why and how China served as an especially salient muse for the 
                                                       
278	Spivak, as elaborated in Chapter Two, has famously criticized Kristeva’s Orientalist Des Chinoises, and 
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development of French theory during the 1960s and 70s. Critics of Maoism decry the 
tendency of Maoists to write about and idealize China without any knowledge of the 
country, its customs or especially, its language. While I agree with postcolonial critiques 
of Orientalism, and Wolin’s claims that, despite their Orientalist misreadings, Maoist 
intellectuals’ engagement with China proved to be theoretically and politically enriching, 
I am wary of the general focus on a few prominent philosophers and French texts, and a 
periodization that seems to either conflate Maoism with May ’68, or divide the 
phenomenon into a before and after May ’68 – as if May were the determining event 
rather than the other way around, or, as Wolin writes, as if Maoists were “the heirs of 
May 1968’s emancipatory quest,” even though Maoist activities predated the revolts of 
May.280 The exclusive focus on avant-garde French theory obscures the multidimensional 
and syncretic aspects of French Maoism. For one thing, it leaves out the role of Maoist 
China’s rather significant translation machine in spreading Mao Zedong Thought and 
shaping perceptions of China worldwide. For another, it overlooks the role of workers 
and anti-colonial “Third World” movements, many of which began to coalesce in France 
and elsewhere worldwide in response to or in tandem with Maoism. Moreover, the 
representation of May ’68 as a pivot point obscures the relationship between Maoism and 
May ‘68, and reinforces the myth of May as a Paris-based youth revolt, and of Maoism as 
a student and professor-led movement.  
Although May ’68 and Maoism had deep connections to the university milieu, 
both movements were also clearly much broader and more heterogenous. As Kristin Ross 
                                                       





has argued, the popular perception of May ‘68 as a student revolt erases the participation 
of workers and third-world militants, as well as the pre-history of May and its origins in 
the Algerian and Vietnam wars. After all, not only students went on strike. Over nine 
million people across all industries stopped working, leaving the country at a standstill 
for over five weeks. The immediate trigger of the student strikes, furthermore, was the 
anti-war protest of the Maoist grassroots group Comité Vietnam de base on March 22. 
While I will not argue that the “intoxication” with Mao in France approaches May ’68 in 
terms of scope and legacy, it was certainly not merely a marginal, intellectual 
phenomenon – a “thunderbolt,” in the words of one critic, that flashed hot and bright only 
to vanish within a decade.281 In fact, it seems safe to say that French Maoism spanned at 
least two decades and is still relevant in some circles today, as Badiou has consistently 
argued.282 
In short, the existing scholarship on Maoism raises several questions: Was French 
Maoism really the sole province of a marginal, elite group of leftist French philosophers 
and writers? What are we to make of, on the one hand, the characterization of French 
Maoism as a radical, anti-intellectual movement spearheaded by elite intellectuals a step 
removed from (or as most accounts put it, a step behind) May ‘68, and on the other, 
French Maoism as a popular, cultural movement encompassing art, fashion, music, and 
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film thoroughly enmeshed with – even derivative of – the broader May revolts283? How 
did it function within the radical decolonization movements of the period? Could the 
French fascination with Mao, as Camille Robcis asks, “perhaps operate as a deflection of 
its colonial worries?”284 And if it did so, how are we to reconcile the simultaneous Maoist 
engagement of anticolonial African thinkers, students, and workers with elite theoretical 
concerns that may deflect or mask Maoism’s Third Worldism?285 
I would like to suggest that Maoism, like May ’68, was a more heterogenous 
phenomenon than leading accounts portray. It was more than the “heir of May 1968,” its 
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284	Robcis, Camille. "May '68 and the Ethical Turn in French Thought." Modern Intellectual History, p. 
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“Maoist.” See Dieng, A. A. Les grands combats de la FEANF: De Bandung aux indépendances, 1955-
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L’Harmattan, 2003; and Mémoires d’un étudiant africain. Vol. II.  De l’Université de Paris à mon retour 
au Sénégal (1960-67). Dakar: CODESRIA, 2011. See also Dedieu, Jean-Philippe and Aissatou Mbodj-
Pouye "The First Collective Protest of Black African Migrants in Postcolonial France (1960-1975): A 
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harbinger, or the “Chinese dreams” of an elite group of established philosophers and 
brilliant young Althusser disciples.286 It may have achieved a certain momentum and 
status via the work of French intellectuals, but it came into being from the travels, 
translations, and transculturation activities of diverse groups – at times collaborative, at 
other times conflicting – of students, workers, intellectuals, and immigrants.287 Given that 
both Maoism and May ’68 are largely dismissed today as politically ineffective and 
utopian in dominant media accounts, part of my goal in illuminating the relationship 
between the two is to recuperate the history of these two movements. Reactionary 
politics, such as that embodied by ex-French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s call to 
“liquidate May ’68,” have served to erase the revolutionary and political aspects of May, 
recuperating originally subversive slogans such as “Vivre sans contrainte and jouir sans 
entrave” into the unofficial mantra of today’s privileged class. By analyzing the 
processes of translation and diffusion of Mao’s ideas during this period, including their 
circulation among diverse Sino-French and “Third World” networks, and their translated 
forms, I will argue that Maoism was a trope of revolution created out of overlapping 
temporalities and rival concepts of modernity that ultimately transformed the very 
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The Birth of French Maoism 
 
Most accounts of French Maoism trace its origins to a global existential crisis, 
particularly among leftists, that created fertile conditions for the adoption and 
development of alternative political and cultural models.288 In France, as in much of 
Europe and North America, this crisis manifested itself as a profound disillusionment 
with the failed promises of both Euro-American capitalism and Soviet socialism between 
the second World War and the end of the Cold War. After World War II, the blatant 
contradictions of the Enlightenment teleology of modernity and progress became 
impossible to ignore: modernity’s exploitative power structures egregiously belied its 
democratic and emancipatory project; scientific and technological progress had led to the 
creation of the atom bomb, a weapon with the potential to destroy mankind; rapid 
economic growth in leading capitalist countries had not led to greater equity but to a 
culture of excessive consumption and growing inequality; the promises of Marxist theory 
had led to the sclerosis of Soviet state bureaucracy and brutal authoritarianism.289 By 
1968, the rising affluence experienced during les trentes glorieuses did not lift all boats 
so much as produce an increase in social and political alienation, leading Raymond Aron 
to declare in La révolution introuvable: 
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It is true enough: millions of people have jobs which offer no reason for living; 
neither production nor consumption can provide existence with meaning. . . If the 
present phase of history can be defined in terms of ballistic missiles, thermo-
nuclear weapons, the moon race and the arms race, should we be surprised that 
part of the student population wavers between the negation of the hippies, an 
aspiration towards redemptive violence, and escape towards a new utopia?290 
 
Aron's dismissive account of May '68 as a bourgeois "psychodrama," while patronizing 
and one-dimensional, nonetheless aptly captures the widespread sense of existential 
alienation, particularly among socially conscious middle-class youth who lamented the 
lack of political possibility under De Gaulle's Fifth Republic. Among French Marxists, 
the political positions of the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français, PCF) 
in regards to the most pressing issues of the time – the Algerian War, the Vietnam War 
and the Sino-Soviet split – were indefensible and led to deep divisions within the French 
left. With the PCF’s passivity regarding anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements and 
its compromises with De Gaulle’s authoritarian government, the PCF was increasingly 
seen as betraying its commitment to revolutionary causes. As Julian Bourg puts it, leftists 
“were stuck with a Party whose mythical role in the Resistance paled before its pitiful 
response to the Algerian War and its seeming abandonment of the world revolutionary 
cause. PCF rapprochement with the Fifth Republic meant a rapprochement with 
bourgeois and even religious culture.”291 That is, throughout the sixties, the PCF 
increasingly began to resemble just another entrenched structure in an oppressive system, 
one that “[funneled] young people into military bureaucracies to fight imperialist wars, or 
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into capitalist bureaucracies … to earn a living as a supporting cog in a system of 
repressive privilege.”292  
For French intellectuals and workers who were left of the PCF, the search for 
alternative models encompassed various forms and ideologies, including but not limited 
to a rethinking of classical Marxism/Marxism-Leninism (Althusser), Maoism, anti-
colonialism, and Third Worldism, or tiers-mondisme. Maoism itself represented the 
convergence of multiple interests: it was a unique reinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism 
based on revolution in a Third World country that had been subject to semi-colonialism; 
Mao not only positioned himself as a leader of anti-imperial Third World struggles but 
the Cultural Revolution became a poignant symbol of permanent revolution. For many 
“early” Maoists (those who supported Mao prior to 1966), anti-colonial struggles in 
former French colonies such as Algeria and Vietnam became their link to Mao as an 
important leader and theorist of revolution, and to Maoism as a particular form of tiers-
mondisme. Anti-colonial defense lawyer, Jacques Vergès, for instance, founded the 
journal Révolution, which is often cited as one of the first Maoist publications in 
France.293 Subtitled Africa, Latin America, Asia, Révolution’s inaugural issue in 
September 1963 celebrated third world independence movements and published texts by 
Liu Shaoqi, then Vice Chairman of the CCP and President of the PRC.294 Born in Siam 
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and raised in the French colony of Réunion, Vergès had a distinctive transcolonial 
trajectory. The son of a French diplomat and a Vietnamese woman, Vergès, in his own 
words, was sensitive to the inequities of colonialism at a young age.295 Through 
connections with other colonial students while enrolled at the University of Paris, he 
became a confidant of Pol Pot, and a supporter of the Algerian and Palestinian armed 
struggles. Vergès represented a number of high-profile terrorism defendants including 
Djamila Bouchired, and later in his career, defended war criminals such as Cambodia’s 
Khmer Rouge head of state Khieu Samphan. Younger leftists, such as Robert Linhart, a 
key figure in student Maoist groups associated with Althusser and the École normale 
supérieure (ENS), likewise, was drawn to Maoism through an interest in tiers-mondisme. 
Linhart was purportedly first exposed to Mao Zedong Thought through his travels and 
meetings with anti-colonial radicals in the newly independent Algeria in 1964.296 In 
effect, many French radicals including Linhart obtained Mao’s texts not yet available in 
France in Arab or African countries, an interesting reversal of location from the interwar 
period when Paris served as a principal site for collaboration between African and Asian 
anti-imperialist intellectuals and militants.297  
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As a vocal supporter of anti-colonial armed struggle, Sartre is often credited as 
paving the way to an emergent tiers-mondisme in his 1961 preface to Frantz Fanon’s 
Wretched of the Earth. That same year, the book publisher François Maspero founded the 
journal, Partisans, which explicitly linked the journal’s support for the Algerian War 
(1954-1962) with the “emergence of the third world … inaugurated by China”:   
“[We] support the Algerian Revolution. We support it in a much vaster context, of 
which it is only one element: the emergence of the third world. We think that our 
era, and probably all the second half of the twentieth century will be dominated 
by the gigantic phenomenon brusquely inaugurated by China: the accession of 
people of color to the political history of the world, and their growing 
participating in its economic, cultural, and social history.”298 
 
If the French Communist Party’s passivity in the face of anti-colonial struggle 
was seen as a betrayal of the revolutionary cause, the PCF’s allegiance to Moscow during 
the Sino-Soviet split served as the stimulus for the formation of the first Maoist circles 
independent of PCF control in 1963. In effect, the Sino-Soviet split was one of two “great 
events” that shook the Communist world during the late fifties and early sixties according 
to Louis Althusser in his preface to the English edition of For Marx.299 Althusser’s 
reinterpretation of Marx identifies the Sino-Soviet rupture and its catalyst, the Twentieth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as major turning points for 
the French left. During the CPSU's Twentieth Congress in February 1956, Nikita 
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Khrushchev made his famous secret speech denouncing Stalin’s abuse of power and his 
cult of personality. While some French leftists commended the speech as a sign of the 
CPSU’s openness to critique, the PCF staunchly denounced Khrushchev’s attempts to de-
Stalinize, going so far as to support the brutal repression of the Hungarian Revolution by 
Soviet troops in the fall of 1956. The Hungarian Revolution in effect marked a definitive 
point of rupture for many disillusioned French leftists who then quit the party. A second 
major wave of departures occurred after the PCF officially sided with Moscow in the 
Sino-Soviet conflict. 
The CPSU’s Twentieth Congress led effectively to China’s rupture with the 
Soviet Union, a rift that would ripple across Communist parties and party alliances 
worldwide.300 China found Khrushchev’s remarks to be irresponsible and revisionist, and 
began to distance itself from Soviet leadership, critiquing Khrushchev’s revisionist call 
for “peaceful coexistence” with imperialist and non-socialist countries, and boldly 
promoting a unique Chinese model of revolution with the launch of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution (wuchanjieji wenhua de geming), Mao’s last effort to root out 
revisionists within the CCP. Between 1956 and 1965, the relationship between Beijing 
and Moscow progressively deteriorated, culminating in the CCP polemic, “On 
Khrushchev’s Phony Communism and Historical Lessons for the World” – a text that is 
often cited as laying out Mao’s justifications for the launch of the Cultural Revolution. 
Harshly criticizing the “revisionist Khrushchev clique” for installing a “dictatorship of 
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the privileged stratum of the Soviet bourgeoisie” and restoring capitalism, Mao expounds 
the need for a “dictatorship of the proletariat” per Marxist-Leninist theory. 301 
For many French intellectuals and radical activists, the Cultural Revolution 
symbolized a vital renewal of the revolutionary cause. The PCF, however, toed the Soviet 
line. Although the Party initially denounced Khrushchev’s secret speech, by 1961, it 
began to endorse Soviet reforms and calls for peaceful coexistence, triggering the critique 
of many left-leaning intellectuals, notably Althusser, for this seeming turn to humanism. 
In his 1963 essay, “Marxism and Humanism,” Althusser links Soviet revisionism (and by 
extension French revisionism) to its embrace of humanism: “the Soviet Union has 
proclaimed the slogan: All for Man, and introduced new themes: the freedom of the 
individual, respect for legality, the dignity of the person.”302 Humanism became the 
ideological justification for the new Soviet policies of peaceful coexistence and peaceful 
transition, and for the PCF’s entrenchment in the political and administrative structures of 
the Fifth Republic.303 As a result of the Sino-Soviet rupture and the PCF’s humanist turn, 
the first Marxist-Leninist circles split off from the PCF to form the Cercle d’étude et de 
documentation, and the Fédération des cercles marxistes-léninistes in 1964, which was 
renamed the Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste de France (PCMLF) in 1967. One of 
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the largest Maoist groups prior to 1968, the PCMLF was comprised primarily of 
workers.304 
At the same time, radical student groups also began to splinter off the Union des 
étudiants communistes français (UEC), the youth arm of the PCF.305 The UEC itself was 
divided into diverse groups of PCF, Maoist, Trotskyist, and “Italian”306 supporters. In 
1964, the Italian student faction was successful in passing a resolution that called for the 
independence of the UEC from the PCF, and organizing a sold-out public debate 
supported by Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. 307 Nevertheless, the PCF 
regained control of the UEC, and the “Italians” were expelled from the party, followed a 
few months later by the Trotskyists. The Maoists, led by Robert Linhart and the Cercle 
d’Ulm under the tutelage of Louis Althusser, stayed with the UEC and attempted to 
reform the party from within.308 Their goal was not to break with but to “[conquer] the 
                                                       
304	These early Marxist-Leninist circles were formed primarily of pro-Chinese members of the Association 
populaire franco-chinois and the Association d’amitié franco-chinois, groups originally created under the 
aegis of the PCF. The PCMLF was the largest and most Leninist of the Maoist groups. Unlike the “anti-
hierarchical” Maoist groups (according to Belden Fields’ terminology), they subscribed to Lenin’s vision of 
a hierarchical organization, with centralized power and an elite vanguard leading the masses. The PCMLF 
also had the official support of the PRC. After being dissolved by government decree in 1968, they went 
underground and were little heard of. 
 
305	The UEC was formed by the PCF in 1956 as a way to limit the influence of non-communist student 
unions, but began to have serious disagreements with its “parent” organization after 1963. See J. Bourg, 
“The Red Guards of Paris” (2005). 
 
306	Sympathizers of Palmiro Togliatti, secretary general of the Italian Communist Party. 
 
307	The discussion “What Can Literature Do?” was held on December 9, 1964 at the Sorbonne. See 
Simone de Beauvoir, Yves Berger, Jean-Pierre Faye, Jean Ricardou, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jorge Semprun. 
Que peut la littérature? Paris: Union générale des editions, 1965. 
 
308	Although Althusser was critical of the “theoretical poverty” of the French Communist Party and its turn 
to economism and humanism, and consequently, in turn criticized by the PCF and disparagingly labeled 
“pro-chinois”, he never officially left the Party. For more about Althusser’s theoretical positions during this 
period, see Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 




interior of the Communist Party, in order to re-Bolshevize it and make it into a 
revolutionary formation.”309 Towards that end, the ENS Maoists began publishing the 
highly theoretical Cahiers marxistes-léninistes in February 1965.310 Between 1965 and 
1966, a series of disagreements between the UEC/PCF and the Cercle d’Ulm, including 
the Maoists’ refusal to support the PCF-backed socialist presidential candidate, and their 
embrace of the Chinese Cultural Revolution resulted in a formal rupture.  
In the November-December 1966 issue of the Cahiers marxistes-léninistes, the 
Maoists of the rue d’Ulm, this time against the influence of Althusser, officially broke 
with the UEC. Approximately 100 members splintered off into a new group, the Union 
des jeunesses communistes marxistes-léninistes (UJCml). The UJCml privileged class 
struggle, continued revolt against revisionist “theoretical fools,” and an affinity between 
Chinese and French Marxist-Leninists. Leading up to May 1968, the UJCml led two 
major initiatives – one supporting third-world anti-imperialism via the Comités Viêtnam 
de base, and another organizing workers in factories, using the method of enquête 
(investigation) adapted from Mao’s concept of proletarian democracy. Rallying around 
the famous Mao slogan, “Who does not investigate has no right to speak,” UJCml 
members went into factories and rural provinces to learn from workers and farmers.311 
Dismissing the May student revolts as a petit-bourgeois concern, the UJCml completely 
                                                       
309	Bourseiller, Les maoïstes, p. 58. 
 
310	The journal would publish its last issue in May/June 1968. For an overview of its publishing trajectory, 
see Chateigner, Frédéric "D'althusser À Mao. Les Cahiers Marxistes-Léninistes." Prochinois Et Maoïsme 
En France (Et Dans Les Espaces Francophones). Ed. Lanuque, Jean-Guillaume et al. Vol. 10 - mai 2010 
Dissidences. Lormont: Le bord de l'eau, 2010. 
 
311	See Donald Reid, "Etablissement: Working in the Factory to Make Revolution in France." Radical 





missed the initial uprising at the Nanterre campus. However, the Nanterre uprising itself 
was triggered by attacks between the Maoist-supported Comités Viêtnam de base and the 
right-wing group Occident, which led directly to the closure of the campus on May 2.312 
Furthermore, Omar Blondin Diop, a Senegalese Marxist-Leninist who played himself in 
Godard’s La Chinoise, and was later rumored to have been killed in a Senegalese prison 
for his anti-government protests, worked closely with Daniel Cohn-Bendit in the March 
22 Movement founded at Nanterre.313 Diop was expelled from the ENS St. Cloud (today 
ENS Lyon), and from France for his involvement in May ’68 at the same time that Cohn-
Bendit was expelled from Nanterre and to Germany. Thus, while the Maoists are said to 
have missed the boat in May, it was in fact only certain members of the UJCml who 
dismissed the Nanterre revolts.314 Other Maoists, including members of the PCMLF and 
Maoist anticolonial activists supported and joined the students and workers on the night 
of the barricades, May 10-11. Despite the differing attitudes of Maoist groups toward the 
revolts, it is apparent that Maoism in its various forms helped create the conditions that 
made May possible. 
A period of intense self-criticism among UJCml leadership immediately followed 
the May uprising, and the group dissolved into various leftist groups. Some members 
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joined the clandestine PCMLF while the core merged with the March 22 Movement to 
form the Gauche prolétarienne (GP). Until its dissolution in 1974, the GP was active in 
promoting a more militant form of revolt associated with revolutionary violence, 
including the kidnapping and sequestration of factory chiefs. Partially due to the support 
of Sartre and the renown of members who would later attain media celebrity as ex-Maoist 
“New Philosophers,”315 the well-documented activities of the GP have to a certain degree 
become synonymous with French Maoism in general – in no small part because it was 
also seen, as Belden Fields writes, as the most “French” of all Maoist groups. 
Distinguishing between “hierarchical” and “anti-hierarchical” Maoist groups, Fields links 
the anti-hierarchism of the GP to the utopian thought of Rousseau, Proudhon and Fourier. 
In particular, Fields identifies a resemblance between Rousseau’s General Will and 
Mao’s mass line, noting that,  
Rousseau … argued that … the executive structure would have to be forced to 
take direction from the masses and to be held accountable to them. In Mao, this 
becomes the ‘mass-line.’ Lenin’s model, in which the masses learn from, and is 
accountable to the party, is transformed by Mao into one in which the party learns 
from, and is accountable to the masses, in this instance, the Chinese peasantry. 
The chief example of this was … the Cultural Revolution, where the General Will 
(represented by the Red Guards) forced the functionaries, professors and officers 
back out into the fields and work places so as to reconnect government and 
masses. 316 
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According to Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China, Mao is known to have had a 
keen interest in French utopian socialism, and was familiar with the work of Rousseau.317 
However, the point here is not who influenced whom, but the cross-circulation of French 
and Chinese revolutionary sources and their dialectical interplay as they took on different 
meanings in varying contexts. As Keith Baker has noted, since revolutionary concepts 
such as liberty and equality, and the idea of a social contract “have existed more or less 
confusedly in all human society,” trying to reconstruct a history of revolutionary ideas 
could lead to “an endless genealogical regression into the history of political 
doctrines.”318 To avoid such a regression, I will focus here more narrowly on the 
discursive mobility of key concepts and events that took on particular significance: how 
and why did the Paris Commune, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the Third World 
come to be mobilized by radicals in the French and Chinese contexts to effect cultural 
revolution? 
Thus far, we have seen how a political crisis within the French left and a wider 
societal discontent with the status quo created conditions conducive to importing 
alternative paradigms. China’s Cultural Revolution itself can be attributed to a crisis 
within the CCP. In effect, the theoretical and political impasses within both international 
communism and French Marxism converged with China’s own party crisis and Mao’s 
launch of the Cultural Revolution. In the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward 
(1959-1961) and the Sino-Soviet rift, influential CCP leaders began criticizing Mao’s 
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policies, particularly the Great Leap Forward, which had caused a nation-wide famine. 
Most famously, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, after meeting with Khrushchev in Tirana 
in 1959, openly criticized Mao’s cult of personality and the failures of his modernization 
policies, and was subsequently expelled from the Party. Internal dissent continued to 
fester, and the CCP pursued several social and economic policies that Mao considered 
conservative and revisionist. As the schisms between China and the Soviet Union, and 
Mao and the Chinese Communist Party grew, Mao began to revisit classical Marxist 
theory and became particularly interested in Marx’s interpretation of the Paris Commune. 
Although prior to 1957, little was written about the Commune in China, between 1961 
and 1966 it had become the subject of several translated histories, journal articles, 
academic symposia and commemorative exhibits.319 As Chinese scholars debated the 
contemporary relevance of the Paris Commune (as interpreted and canonized by Marx), 
Mao began to see the Commune and its realization of “the dictatorship of the proletariat,” 
as a crucial model to emulate in order to forestall the embourgeoisement and 
“bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution”320 – a degeneration that seemed to Mao as 
menacing at home as in the Soviet Union. In the CCP document, “On Khruschev’s Phony 
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Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World,” the Paris Commune is identified 
as the origin of the international proletarian revolution, and its overthrow as the 
beginning of a series of “capitalist restorations” (of which the Soviet Union under 
Khrushchev was the latest).321 By March 1966, a major article published in Hong-ji (Red 
Flag), the main Maoist theoretical organ, would mark an important shift in emphasis in 
the use of the Paris Commune as a model for Chinese politics: “peaceful coexistence” is 
doomed to failure; armed revolution and overthrow of the bourgeois state structure are 
necessary as is the initiative of the masses in the form of direct election and recall.322  
The Communard uprising was officially deemed an important model of political 
reorganization in the famous “Sixteen Points” of August 1966, and became the model of 
political reorganization for the Shanghai People’s Commune of February 1967.323  In the 
Sixteen Points, Mao articulated his agenda for “smashing” the bureaucratic-military state 
apparatus that he regarded as infiltrated by “capitalist roaders” and revisionists, calling 
for the masses to rebel against existing state and party organs in order to revive the 
revolution and install a true dictatorship of the proletariat.324 Red Guard manifestos 
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proclaimed that “the true proletarian revolutionaries” of China were now the legitimate 
bearers of “the red banner of the Paris Commune.”325 In its first year, the Cultural 
Revolution was hailed in the Peking Review as “a new experience of extensive 
democracy” modeled on the Paris Commune and characterized by: 
 
… [the] creativeness of the revolutionary masses… [the] free airing of views, 
putting up big-character posters, carrying on great debates, and going to other 
units and places to exchange revolutionary experience. The masses … have the 
right to criticize and make suggestions about Party and state policies, and every 
aspect of the state apparatus. The masses have the right to criticize leading cadres 
at all levels no matter how meritorious their service, how high their position, or 
how senior their qualifications. A system of general elections, like that of the 
Paris Commune, is introduced without exception for all organs of power leading 
the Cultural Revolution. The masses have the power to replace through election or 
recall any elected member at any time.326 
 
This heady description of the early days of the Cultural Revolution was borne out to a 
certain extent by the short-lived Shanghai People’s Commune, also known as the January 
Storm. Between the end of 1966 and the formal declaration of the Shanghai People’s 
Commune on February 5, 1967, rebel workers, militant students and revolutionary party 
cadres overthrew the existing government structure in Shanghai, and installed a novel 
state structure modeled on the Paris Commune. Although the Shanghai Commune did not 
introduce general elections or abolish the standing army, it nevertheless empowered the 
masses by transferring some authority to mass representatives and mass organs – for 
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approximately a month. 327 Shortly thereafter, Mao decided that Revolutionary 
Committees comprised of PLA, cadres and workers would make the most effective local 
government organs, and the Commune was replaced by the state-decreed Revolutionary 
Committee of the Municipality of Shanghai. 
In an ironic turn, the student rebels in France saw themselves as the “Red Guards 
of Paris.” It is no coincidence that the Maoist groups in France that followed most closely 
the Cultural Revolution practices of learning from and with the masses seemed the most 
“French,” for they shared a grounding with Marx and Mao in certain utopian strains of 
thought deriving from the French revolutionary tradition. Camille Robcis’ comment that 
“China is a French political fantasy” thus takes on a double meaning: “China” is the 
epistemological product of French thinking, and it is also, in a way, a utopia come to life, 
a concrete change in the political relationship between the masses and the state that draws 
upon an older French dream of continuous revolution and “communal luxury,”328 or as 
Badiou recently put it, “La Révolution Culturelle est la Commune de Paris de l’époque 
des États socialistes.”329 
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Maoism’s Multiple Temporalities and Rival Modernity 
 
The intertwined nature of the French and Chinese revolutions, the fact that 
Chinese Red Guards were imitating the Paris Communards while the soixtante-huitards 
thought of themselves as Parisian Red Guards, tells us a great deal about the ‘discursive 
mobility’ of the Paris Commune and the Cultural Revolution through space and time, and 
hence about the historicity of the translation/event. At stake in China’s laying claim to a 
French revolutionary tradition is its articulation of a rival modernity – a remapping of 
spatiality and temporality via a competing universal theory. China in effect offered 
Western leftists and Third World radicals a “third way,” a promising path out of the 
impasse between “U.S. imperialism” and “Soviet social-imperialism” during the 
sixties.330 Attaining “a unique status as a universal form of philosophy and knowledge 
that no other Chinese thought has ever achieved,”331 Maoism became the global name for 
a theory of revolution canonized in China as Mao Zedong Thought. Based, theoretically, 
on an alternative interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and grounded, practically, in 
Chinese political struggles, Maoism “[aspired] to not only rewrite Western values and 
ideas, Marxism in particular, by way of integrating the universal principles of Marxism 
with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, but also to create […] a vision of 
alternative modernity, by way of transforming Marxism into a non-European, henceforth 
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more universal, vision of modernity.”332  
Here, I would like to examine the conceptualization of Mao Zedong Thought as a 
“more universal vision of modernity.” Since the phrase “alternative modernity” may 
imply a concept that is secondary or subordinate to the European vision, I will henceforth 
refer to Mao’s concept as a “rival modernity.” This concept was first formulated in the 
1930s and 40s in response to the Japanese invasion of China, and the subsequent civil 
war between the CCP and the GMD (Nationalist Party), and envisioned a revolution and 
nation-building project quite distinct from Comintern-directed ideology.333 Mao’s rival 
modernity culminated in the launch of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966, which 
inspired radical revolutionary moments worldwide, including to a certain extent, May 
’68. Maoism as transculturated Mao Zedong Thought thus engaged multiple 
temporalities: it was grounded in past Chinese political and military conflicts, deployed 
in present-day France and elsewhere as a solution to the contradictions of the 
contemporary world, and it opened up the possibility of a future world revolution. That 
future, in hindsight, dissipated with a series of pronounced failures: the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, the end of May ‘68, and the end of the Cold War. Yet one could say 
that Maoism lives on today, as symbol, relevant theory and concrete practice in the form 
of Maoist militants in Nepal, India and elsewhere, in the continued relevance of Mao as a 
legitimizing symbol of revolution for the CCP, or in the purported resurgence of Maoism 
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in China since the election of President Xi Jinping.334 Insofar as one might speak of 
specters of Marx, we could say there exists a spectral Maoism as a particular form of 
Marxism-Leninism. In an age of ever worsening disparities in wealth and income, both 
within and between nations of the “first” and “third” worlds, and unprecedented political, 
cultural, social and ecological instability, Mao’s challenges to the dominant world order 
and his attempts to transform global political relationships, however effective or 
ineffective, ephemeral or enduring we may consider them, have continued symbolic 
import. 
In particular, Mao’s Theory of the Differentiation of Three Worlds offers a 
remapping of geopolitical space that to a certain extent still resonates today. Despite the 
replacement of First and Third World with new paradigms (notably, North-South), the 
category lingers in everyday speech, however uncritically. Appropriating the positivist 
paradigm of Three Worlds developed by European and American social scientists after 
World War II, Mao proposed a reconfiguration to match the new world order of the Cold 
War. In the original Eurocentric conception of the 1950s, the world was divided into a 
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first world of capitalism that was rational, democratic and free of religion and ideology, a 
second world of communism that was somewhat rational, technological and authoritarian, 
and a third world that was underdeveloped, irrational and religious. In other words, the 
first two worlds were “modern,” and the third world “traditional.” This modernization 
discourse was, in the words of Arif Dirlik, “informed by a historical teleology that placed 
the first world at the end of history,” serving to preserve Euro-American political and 
economic hegemony.335 Ironically, especially after the Bandung Conference of 1955, the 
concept was coopted by many “Third World” nations as a means of political mobilization 
in their national liberation struggles against Euro-American domination.  
Mao’s Theory of Three Worlds was one of the most significant appropriations, 
turning the concept on its head to unite the poor, populous countries of the Third World 
against the technological and military dominance of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In a 
talk with Zambian President Kaunda during the latter’s state visit to the PRC in February 
1974, Mao is reported to have stated, “In my view, the United States and the Soviet 
Union form the first world. Japan, Europe and Canada, the middle section, belong to the 
second world. We are the third world […] With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to 
the third world. The whole of Africa belongs to the third world, and Latin America 
too.”336 Mao’s reorganization of global relationships designated Asian, Latin American 
and African “Third World” countries as “the revolutionary driving forces of world 
history,” and Second World countries such as France as potential allies that “could be 
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tapped by revolutionary forces ... in a new global united front against the [First World] 
superpowers.”337 In Mao’s conception, the geographical “Third World” rather than the 
First World represented the “end of history,” the pinnacle of progress and modernity.  
Although Mao’s Theory of Three Worlds was not officially articulated until the 
early seventies, its precursor, Mao’s idea of a “third way” between U.S. capitalism and 
Soviet social-imperialism, resonated with French radicals in search of alternatives to 
Soviet socialism and played directly into CCP strategies for the dissemination of Mao 
Zedong Thought. At the height of French Maoism, support for “third world” revolution 
and tiers-mondisme converged with Maoism’s anti-colonial and anti-imperialist call to 
arms.338 Mao’s “sinicized” Marxism-Leninism emphasized the central role of peasants in 
the revolution, the “New Democracy” to be achieved by guerrilla warfare, and continuous 
cultural, or ideological revolution to be fought mainly through cultural “weapons” such 
as literature, film and popular art. In his famous “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on 
Literature and Art,” Mao declared that literature and art in China should “become a part 
of the entire revolutionary machine, functioning as a powerful weapon for uniting and 
educating the people, and beating and destroying the enemies, and helping the people 
whole-heartedly fight against their enemy.”339 By the time Mao launched the Cultural 
Revolution to combat what he saw as revisionist elements within the Party that could 
curtail the revolution, the CCP had already established a vast propaganda strategy, 
translating Mao’s works into hundreds of languages, and disseminating them through 
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links with radical booksellers and institutions worldwide in “Third World” countries as 
well as in potentially China-friendly “Second World” countries such as France.  
Naming culture explicitly as a site of contestation, Mao aimed to transform minds 
as a necessary first step to achieving world revolution. To that end, in the midst of the 
Cold War, several publications detailing the achievements and programs of the PRC, 
translations of Chinese literature, Mao’s Selected Works, and perhaps, most notably, the 
condensed version of Mao’s collected essays, Quotations from Chairman Mao, or the 
Little Red Book, were exported worldwide as cultural weapons. In Lin Biao’s preface to 
the Quotations, the book is described as a “spiritual atom bomb” to combat the actual 
bombs amassed by the U.S. and Soviet Union. According to Alexander Cook, this 
“weapon of mass instruction, the intercontinental delivery system for a potentially world-
shattering ideological payload,” perhaps more than any other text, embodied Mao Zedong 
Thought in its most potent and universal form.340 In the next section, I explore how 
China’s translation strategies and transnational distribution networks in general, and the 
Little Red Book in particular, turned Mao Zedong Thought into a global language, a kind 
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The Transculturation of the Cult of Mao: Global Networks, Border Crossings, 
 Translated Forms 
 
While most accounts of French Maoism take it to be a uniquely French 
construction, imagined, molded, and disseminated in France by French intellectuals, I 
would like to elaborate on the popularization of Maoism as shaped by Mao himself – and 
the key role played by translation – between the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949 and Mao’s death in 1976 both within China and worldwide. For Maoism 
was not simply a construct of Western radicalism, it was also shaped significantly by 
Chinese efforts to further world revolution and facilitated by the transnational 
collaboration of foreign experts and militant bookstores worldwide. I will start with a 
general overview of this strategy, then examine a particular instance of translation, the 
Little Red Book, as an example of the creation of a “common and universal currency of 
revolution.” 341 I will further examine its subsequent appropriation by a number of French 
Maoists in the elaboration of their theory and practice.  
As a number of scholars have shown, from 1949 onwards, the PRC fully 
recognized the importance of translation and created a large-scale, systematic cultural 
diplomacy and educational exchange program to promote New China globally.342 This 
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strategy included the crafting of an internationalist socialist identity with other socialist 
states,343 the framing of China as a Third World leader and friend to oppressed nations, 
and the positioning of Chinese socialism as an alternative to the hegemonic world 
systems represented by the United States and the Soviet Union. Activities supporting 
these objectives were organized and implemented by the Foreign Languages Press and 
the International Bookstore344, and were greatly intensified during the Sino-Soviet split. 
By 1962, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the China Cultural Council explicitly 
announced that the primary goal of distributing Chinese texts abroad was to “accelerate 
world revolution,”345 and Zhou Enlai, at the Eighth Plenum of the CCP Central 
Committee, declared that “the center of world revolution had moved from Moscow to 
Beijing.”346 With the aim of “creating a global language of Maoist revolution,” the PRC 
subsidized the translation and distribution of numerous foreign-language publications 
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through the Foreign Languages Press and the International Bookstore, including the 
introduction of foreign socialist (mostly Soviet) works into Chinese, and the export of 
translated Chinese literature (i.e., literary classics, May Fourth literature, contemporary 
socialist realist works) and political texts (with a focus on Mao’s writings347) worldwide 
– primarily to “in-between regions,” a broad swathe of countries situated economically 
and politically between the United States and the Soviet Union. These “smaller” powers 
included socialist and developing countries fighting against imperialism and colonialism, 
as well as capitalist countries that were friendly to China, anti-imperialist and anti-war – 
in effect, countries that shared certain interests with China, notably the desire to be more 
independent from the two superpowers. Although overseen by the Chinese government, 
both the Foreign Languages Press and the International Bookstore were truly 
transnational collaborations involving numerous foreign experts, translators and 
communist bookstores worldwide. An internal FLP record, for example, documents that 
“between 1956 and 1967, the Foreign Languages Press plans to create forty-two positions 
for foreign experts (including eleven nationalities).”348 These foreign experts based in 
China included returning overseas Chinese, translators and experts from both capitalist 
and socialist countries, and short-term foreign translators hired for specific projects. In 
some cases, such as in Eastern Europe, translations were undertaken by local embassies; 
although these books were translated locally, they were still published through the 
Foreign Languages Press. Through progressive overseas organizations affiliated with the 
International Bookstore, some translations (notably the Selected Works of Mao Zedong 
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and Quotations from Chairman Mao) were undertaken locally by foreign agents – 
sometimes at the request or with the sanction of the PRC, at times without the PRC’s 
knowledge. Thus, while the International Bookstore was primarily the distribution arm of 
the PRC’s publicity machine, it occasionally sanctioned local translations.  
The International Bookstore’s extensive global network encompassed 545 stores 
in 87 countries by 1963, including numerous radical bookshops in France, many of which 
were founded in the sixties and seventies.349 In effect, the sixties were the “golden age” 
of militant bookstores in France, and Maoist shops like Le Phénix, Norman Bethune, Gît-
le-coeur, La Commune, Les Herbes Sauvages, La dialectique sans peine, and perhaps 
most famously, Maspero’s Joie de lire in the Latin Quarter served as gathering places for 
French leftists and anticolonial activists – and were often the site of reprisals and attacks 
by reactionary groups such as Occident.350 The four-volume Selected Writings of Mao 
Tse-Tung appeared in French bookstores between 1962 and 1968; Pékin Information, the 
French version of Peking Review, first appeared in 1963; and the French translation of Le 
Petit livre rouge came out in 1966. In addition to these translated works undertaken by 
the Foreign Languages Press and exported by the International Bookstore, leftist 
bookshops also carried many pro-Chinese French journals such as L’Humanité nouvelle, 
Cahiers marxistes-léninistes, Révolution, and La Cause du peuple. 
Along with the Foreign Languages Press and the International Bookstore, Radio 
Beijing, China’s Central Broadcasting Station (Zhongyang renmin guangbo diantai) 
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served as an important vehicle for the global diffusion and promotion of Mao Zedong 
Thought. Arguably even more effective in the transmission of Mao’s ideas than its 
extensive bookstore networks, Radio Beijing was broadcast in over 27 languages in more 
than 135 countries.351 Radio Pékin, its French branch, began diffusing programs based on 
Mao Zedong Thought such as “Quotations from Chairman Mao: On Imperialism and All 
Reactionaries are Paper Tigers,” “All the People of the World Love Chairman Mao,” and 
“China in the Eyes of Foreign Friends” after the launch of the Cultural Revolution in 
1966. To a certain extent, the print and broadcast activities of the Foreign Languages 
Press, the International Bookstore and Radio Pékin testify to China’s considerable “soft 
power” tactics during the Cold War period. Economically strapped by its external 
expenditures and military involvement in Vietnam and Korea, and internally by the 
Cultural Revolution, China sent little in the way of money or arms to its “Third World” 
and “in-between” allies during the 1960s. Rather it depended on translation as an 
important strategy in realizing an internationalist socialist solidarity in “in-between” 
regions, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but also among China 
sympathizers in France.  
 The global success of the cult of Mao is exemplified by the distribution of the 
Quotations of Chairman Mao, at one time one of the most translated and circulated books 
in history; between 1966 and 1969, its official circulation was second only to the Holy 
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Bible, even excluding the countless local and foreign editions and unauthorized 
mimeographed and handwritten copies.352 Originally produced as a portable domestic 
military training manual in 1964, by 1971, it had been translated into 36 languages and 
published about 110 million times abroad. 353 During the first three years of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1969), over a billion official volumes were issued. The first edition 
printed on May 16, 1964 was classified as “internal” army reading, and sized to fit into 
the pockets of military uniforms. A second edition printed to commemorate the 38th 
anniversary of the founding of the PLA in 1965 became the standard “army volume.” 
Further reduced in size and clad in red vinyl, the Little Red Book was often sold out and 
difficult to acquire by the general public. At one point, the State Council’s Foreign 
Affairs Department issued a recall of all foreign copies of the book because it did not 
represent a complete collection of Mao Zedong Thought and was meant solely for 
internal use. The clandestine nature of its initial publication, and the difficulties 
associated with obtaining a copy greatly heightened demand, turning the book into a 
veritable cult object.  
Containing 427 extracts from Mao’s speeches and texts written between 1929 and 
1964, the standard army volume is arranged into 33 thematic chapters (on the people’s 
war, education, art, etc.). Stylistically, the book is a blend of two genres, the Analects of 
Confucius and a modern ideological primer. As a collection of excerpts from Mao’s 
complete Selected Works, the more accessible Quotations empowered ordinary Chinese 
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citizens with the ability to recognize when cadres deviated from Maoist doctrine. As 
decontextualized sound bytes, they were also specially suited to appropriation by radicals 
advancing various leftist agendas. Appearing in French bookstores in 1966/1967, Le Petit 
livre rouge quickly became a symbol of revolutionary struggle, encapsulated in the pop 
song, “Mao Mao,” performed by Claude Channes in La Chinoise: “C’est le petit livre 
rouge/qui fait que tout enfin bouge.” While French Maoists were exposed to and engaged 
with Mao’s texts as early as the 1950s, I would like to focus on Le Petit livre rouge and 
Mao’s Selected Works, which did not become available in France until the mid-sixties.354 
As a symbol of the Cultural Revolution, Le Petit livre rouge in particular was mobilized 
in varied ways by diverse groups leading up to and immediately following May ’68. 
Emblazoned on posters at the Sorbonne, Mao slogans like “Une étincelle peut mettre le 
feu à toute la plaine”355 and images of Mao were ubiquitous during the revolts of May 
’68.  
 Mao Zedong Thought proved especially provocative and attractive to French 
Marxists because of its reconciliation of theory and practice. Theoretically, it offered a 
scientific method – dialectical materialism – for understanding the contradictions of the 
modern world. Practically, it offered a number of strategies for changing the world for the 
better in line with its theory. In particular, French Maoists were drawn to two tactics: 
armed struggle mainly via street protests, and clashes with the police and right-wing 
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groups (e.g., Comités Vietnam de base), and learning from the masses via what would 
become known as the “enquête” and the “établissement” (in factories like Renault-Flins 
and Peugeot-Sochaux). In addition to philosophy and politics, the convergence of Maoist 
theory and practice can be seen in a number of artistic projects, from the silk-screen 
posters produced by various artist collectives during May ’68 to Godard’s projects with 
the Dziga Vertov Group to Situationist experiments with cinéma détourné.  
As an example of a translated text that reworks Maoist theories and practices, 
René Viénet’s underground film, La Dialectique peut-elle casser les briques? (1973) 
merits closer inspection. Produced at a moment when many leftist intellectuals were 
repudiating their radicalism, and some among the Far Left were considering a “Common 
Program” with the Communist and Socialist parties to win future elections, the film 
represents a remarkable attempt to subvert the assimilation of radical ideologies into 
hegemonic power structures. Viénet’s group took an existing Hong Kong kung fu film – 
Tu Guangqi’s Crush (a.k.a. Crush Karate, 1972) – removed the soundtrack, and 
substituted French voice-over commentaries and subtitles to create a new story out of the 
old. Announcing itself as “le premier film entièrement détourné de l’histoire du 
cinéma,”356 La Dialectique stages an allegory of class struggle between ‘proletarians’ and 
‘bureaucrats.’ At the same time, it transgresses capitalist modes of production through a 
Situationist tactic called détournement. First articulated by Guy Debord and Gil Wolman 
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in their 1956 article, “Modes d’emploi du détournement”, this surrealist-inspired 
technique engages in a form of politically charged, creative piracy.357  
In French, détournement encompasses detour, deviation, deflection, 
misappropriation (détournement de fonds), and more violently, hijacking (détournement 
d’avion). The most common English translation, “diversion,” misses many of these 
meanings, but when translated back into French, adds an element of divertissement – or 
fun, amusing, light entertainment. La Dialectique captures all of these significations to a 
certain extent: It “highjacks” a Chinese text from Hong Kong, and reterritorializes it in 
Paris in French. It transgresses the normal modes of production, pirating an existing 
commodity, revamping its content, and renouncing profit and the dominant system of 
exchange value. It is playfully self-mocking, parodying reactionary bureaucrats and 
radical leftist in-fighting alike. The imposed narration of a revolutionary insurrection 
coincides with images of unarmed peasants and workers fighting against sword-wielding 
officials who go door to door bullying and harassing local men and women.  
Since the original soundtrack has been removed, the viewer is forced to speculate 
on the location, period, and plot of the original film. Based on costumes and other visual 
clues, I would infer that the original story centered on an anti-colonial revolt in Korea 
against Japanese occupation. The Situationist film turns the Japanese-Korean conflict into 
a class struggle between tae-kwon-do practicing “proletarians” and armed “bureaucrats.” 
The film’s protagonist, Pai Piau, who is a master of both martial arts and dialectical 
materialism, upon visiting his old tae-kwon-do school (the headquarters of a diverse 
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leftist camp encompassing Situationists, Trotskyists, Marxists, and anarchists), finds that 
it has been infiltrated by state bureaucrats and bourgeois capitalists who have convinced 
some leftists to quit the school and join the state. Pai Piau, with his advanced dialectics – 
he has read diverse radical philosophies from Marx to Reich, and all the books published 
by Champ Libre  – unites the remaining revolutionaries in a series of street battles that 
culminate in a showdown between Pai Piau and the leading bureaucrat, a battle “à armes 
inégales” pitting “la Dialectique contre le Pouvoir.” While the proletarians win the fight, 
it is clear that the struggle is not over; the narrator contends that, after all, “détourner un 
film ne suffit plus.” In light of the fact that the Situationist International disbanded in 
1972, shortly before the release of the film, this ending suggests Viénet’s awareness of 
the limitations of dialectical materialism, and the need for revolutionary theory and 
practice to constantly evolve to meet new situations. In the case of France in the mid-
1970s, the new situation meant the disavowal of May ’68 by the Nouveaux Philosophes, 
the incorporation of previously radical intellectuals and activists into the bureaucratic 
power structure, and even, a few years later, the assimilation of radical practices like 
détournement into profitable ventures.358  
Yet, on another level, the choice of Tu Guangqi’s film implies a certain, perhaps 
unintended poetic justice. Tu fled to Hong Kong from Shanghai after World War II, and 
began making nationalist Mandarin-language films for the Asia Film Company, which 
was established in 1953 with American money. As Meaghan Morris points out, Tu was a 
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right-winger who “helped remake and reinterpret — indeed, détourner — successful left-
wing dramas and themes from a right-wing nationalist perspective.”359 Whether or not 
Viénet was conscious of this biographical detail, La Dialectique’s techniques of 
displacement and distanciation challenge the tired notion of translation as fidelity; by 
referring to itself as a text détourné, it points to the décalage between voice-over and 
visual image, original and translated text, the author’s intentions, and the text’s 
unintended, surplus meanings. 
 
Conclusion: From Revolution to Ethics? 
 
In the aftermath of May ’68 and the Cultural Revolution, emancipatory mass 
initiatives such as French worker-student collectives and the Shanghai Commune were 
dissolved, central state power restored, and revolution largely rejected as a means of 
political reinvention. Both events were deemed disastrous “failures,” most damnably by 
those who had participated in the events themselves. In effect, a major consequence of 
May ’68 was the “exorcism” of revolution from leftist vocabulary, and, to a certain 
extent, the dissolution of radical Left politics altogether.360 One interpretation of the 
immediate post-May situation in France posits that “the dominant intellectual sense of the 
period was the massive reaction against all forms of centrally organized political 
authority – whether in the form of the self-proclaimed Revolutionary party or the 
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Bourgeois state,”361 that is, the dissent was anti-hierarchical in nature. But given France’s 
strong centralizing political traditions, the critique of the state was primarily projected 
elsewhere – specifically onto the 1917 Soviet Revolution and its legacy, which quickly 
became indissociable from totalitarianism, especially after the publication of 
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago in 1974. In an intellectual (perhaps more 
appropriately ideological) move linking revolution and totalitarianism, several former 
Maoists such as Bernard Henri-Lévy, Pascal Bruckner and André Glucksmann drew a 
direct line of continuity between Stalin’s labor camps and Jacobin Terror. By drawing 
upon the thought of Arendt and Popper362, criticizing “old masters” such as Sartre and 
Nietzsche, and renouncing their own Maoism as naïve and misguided, the self-
proclaimed New Philosophers published and spoke frequently in various news outlets, 
becoming the media’s go-to representatives of the May generation. What they may have 
lacked in coherence or rigor, they have made up for in notoriety as their anti-totalitarian 
and anti-Soviet discourse came to dominate post-May accounts of the event’s legacy.  
The decisive delegitimization of revolution in France is most often attributed to 
historians like François Furet, whose conceptually more rigorous Penser la révolution 
française (1978) cemented the historical link between revolution and totalitarianism. 
Furet’s revisionist history places the French Revolution at the origin of both liberal 
democracy and terror and totalitarianism, contending that the former was undermined by 
the latter. Another popular scholarly interpretation asserts that the revolutionary projects 
                                                       







of the 1960s did not simply degenerate into totalitarianism but sowed the seeds for an 
emergent activist civil society. For instance, Bourg and Wolin claim that the GP’s (and 
by extension, French Maoism’s) most important contribution lies in its civil rights legacy. 
The GP’s associations with a variety of emerging grassroots groups fighting for 
immigrant, worker, environmental and prisoners rights were important precursors to 
various rights movements in later decades, including the Mouvement des travailleurs 
arabes. Remi Hess attributes the origins of the women’s and gay rights movements (what 
became the Mouvement de libération des femmes and the Front homosexuel d’action 
révolutionaire) to the experience of the short-lived Maoist group, Vive la Révolution, 
whose rejection of bourgeois society was based on Henri Lefebvre’s critique of everyday 
life.363  
Elsewhere, Bourg has suggested that 1968 was a pivotal moment in the 
transformation of an old revolutionary script.364 It was a moment when revolution itself 
mutated, as he argues, into reform-oriented antinomian democratic movements; it was a 
turn “from revolution to ethics.”365 From its Marxist goal of eliminating bourgeois class 
power, revolution became more narrowly focused on the struggles of particular groups 
and interests. It was a moment when the convergence of revolutionary traditions and what 
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Bourg terms a “radicalism without revolution” would lead to new types of “non-
revolutionary contestatory social action.”366 In some ways, the redemptive narratives of 
Maoism and May ’68 dovetail with the critique of revolution as totalitarianism. But to 
frame the legacy of the sixties as a turn from revolution to ethics, or as a shift from 
revolution to rights implies a false dichotomy between revolution and rights that obscures 
their common origin, and reinforces the dominant account of May as a misguided cultural 
revolt of youth. In this narrative, mistakes of youth are redeemed by a humanitarian 
attention to various civil and human rights. This redemption narrative is perhaps most 
strikingly exemplified by Bernard Kouchner, ex-gauchiste, founder of Médecins sans 
frontières and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs under Sarkozy. As Kristin Ross 
has cogently argued, many former leftist radicals who are today high-ranking officials 
and high-profile intellectuals had to give May some credibility in order to establish their 
own moral credentials.367 Thus their portrayal of May is predominantly that of a youth 
revolt or cultural revolution gone awry – but one that was not without some positive 
legacy on the present: it nurtured the women's, anti-racism and gay rights movements, 
and feeds seamlessly into the current neoliberal climate privileging individualism and 
human rights. 
More significantly, this critical/redemptive narrative also obscures the paradoxical 
origin of human rights identified by Lynn Hunt: the concept of human rights effectively 
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shares the same origin as totalitarianism – revolution.368 Hunt traces the development of 
rights outlined in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen into human 
rights as a series of discontinuities and breaks, importantly arguing that while human 
rights are imagined to be universal and to transcend history, they are historically 
contingent and grounded in specific times and places.369 By divorcing revolution from its 
originary link to rights, the critical/redemptive narratives that surfaced in the wake of 
May obscured these discontinuities and contributed to the displacement of political 
visions of a more just government to a wholly new concept of human rights focused on 
state abuses of the rights of individual human subjects. Thus while I concur with Bourg 
that a resignification of revolution occurred after 1968, I contend that the important 
epistemological and ideological shift is not from revolution to ethics but rather the 
disassociation of revolution and ethics – a disassociation that subsequently enabled the 
devaluation of revolution from its sacred place in the identity of the French Republic to 
its being seen as devoid of possibility, and leading inevitably to tyranny, violence and 
terror, to the exact opposite of its emancipatory ideals.  
       It should be noted that 1968 is not the first time French writers and reactionaries 
who perceived of revolution as a threat to order took its miscarriage as an opportunity to 
write it off. As Dominica Chang maintains, after 1848, the romantic view of revolution as 
“imbued with [the] messianic promise” of “a new, more socially just world order” gave 
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way to a discourse of revolution as dangerous, absurd, a “tragicomedy” and a “failure,” 
eventually paving the way for “the acceptance of a republic gained through parliamentary 
politics.”370 What is unique to the desacralization of revolution in the late twentieth 
century is precisely the separation of revolution from its moral and philosophical 
foundation in Enlightenment notions of natural rights. In effect, the delegitimization of 
revolution converged with a number of attacks on Enlightenment thought, most 
influentially Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Though originally 
published in 1947 as a critique of Hitler’s National Socialism and the Nazi horrors that 
had led to their exile, the book did not gain traction until the 1970s. Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s argument that “Enlightenment is totalitarian” because it turned reason into 
fascist repression and irrational domination later inspired a multitude of studies critical of 
Enlightenment philosophies, including that of Dorinda Outram, who attributes the 
totalitarian nature of the French Revolution to Enlightenment rationalism and 
universalism.371 The rejection of revolution and Enlightenment led in part to a moral 
transcendence of politics that culminated in a championing of human rights as a new 
internationalism, what Samuel Moyn has termed “the last utopia.” Moyn argues that 
human rights “survived as a moral utopia when political utopias died,” effectively 
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displacing other international visions – such as socialism, communism, Maoism, pan-
Africanism, etc. – for a better world.372  
To a certain extent, though in quite different ways, the desacralization of 
revolution can be observed in post-Mao China as well. After the death of Mao in 1976, 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was denounced by the CCP as “ten years of 
chaos.” Under the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the party released an official 
statement declaring the Cultural Revolution to have been “responsible for the most severe 
setback and heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the State and the people since the 
founding of the People’s Republic.”373 Although “initiated and led by Comrade Mao 
Zedong,” the Revolution’s excesses were attributed to over-reaching “counter-
revolutionary” officials – the disgraced general Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, led by 
Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing and comprised of her associates, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan 
and Wang Hongwen.374 By shifting the bulk of the blame to Lin Biao and the Gang of 
Four, this narrative allowed Maoist policies room for error while upholding the overall 
correctness of Maoist principles, thereby affirming the legitimacy and legacy of the 
Chinese state. Under the new CCP policy of gaige kaifang (reform and opening up), 
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revolution was discreetly replaced by reform in political slogans like “building socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.” This new Chinese socialism under Deng emphasized 
economic productivity and modernization rather than building a socialist utopia.  
As in France, a changed political landscape converged with a concomitant shift in 
historical evaluations to bid “farewell to revolution” (gaobie geming). This shift would 
occur in China not in the late seventies after the recognized “failure” of the Cultural 
Revolution but in the early nineties following another failed mass revolt – the 1989 
events at Tiananmen Square.375 One of the first to criticize “that holy word, revolution,” 
Liu Xiaobo, a central figure in the June Fourth protests, claimed that the sense of sacred 
righteousness attached to the term revolution drove the Chinese people to idolize self-
sacrifice and martyrdom while masking the fact that democracy never existed under 
Communist rule.376 In his reflection on why the 1989 democracy movement failed, he 
points to CCP use of revolution to justify party authoritarianism, asserting that in post-
1949 China, revolution implied “justice, correctness, kindness, virtue, good fortune, and 
holiness. It has also implied supreme authority.”377 Liu Xiaobo’s view was reiterated and 
extended in Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu’s influential book, Gaobie geming: Huiwang 
Ershishiji Zhongguo (Farewell to Revolution: Looking Back Upon Twentieth-Century 
China). Without conflating revolution and totalitarianism as did the New Philosophers 
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and revisionist historians of the French Revolution post-May, Chinese intellectuals such 
as Liu Xiabo, Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu called for the replacement of revolutionary 
understandings of history and philosophy with a less radical approach to studying the 
historico-philosophical problems of modern China. As Rebecca Karl notes, this “farewell 
to revolution” signaled not only “a condemnation of twentieth-century Chinese 
intellectuals and political history for its supposed fetishizing of revolutionary solutions to 
crises,” but also called for scholars “to completely de-radicalize thought, practice and 
political social ambition.”378  
This deradicalization of history, philosophy and politics led to what Wang Hui 
terms in The Politics of Imagining Asia and elsewhere, a depoliticization, that is, “a 
process in which state mechanisms have gradually appropriated active subjectivity or 
subjective agency within ‘state rationality’ in track with the global market.”379 In other 
words, late twentieth-century China abandoned revolutionary paradigms in favor of a 
modernization track in line with a neoliberal global capitalism that encourages the 
commodification of subjects as human capital. As China underwent modernization 
reforms and ‘opened up,’ many survivors of the Cultural Revolution began writing 
memoirs of their experiences, leading to the emergence of what became known as scar 
literature in China, while writers who immigrated abroad began to recount their Mao-era 
experiences for foreign readerships. In the next chapter, I will examine how bicultural 
Sino-French authors translate the Cultural Revolution for Francophone audiences in a 
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post-socialist climate, both confirming and contradicting dominant discourses about 
China and the GPCR – and contributing to the erasure of events like the Cultural 








Revolution in Retrospect: The Francophone Cultural Revolution Novel  
 
Since the late 1980s, a growing number of Chinese writers have been writing and 
publishing in French to some acclaim, culminating in the appointment of François Cheng 
to the Académie Française in 2002. The commercial popularity of the “roman franco-
chinois,”380 not only in France but also internationally, has led to growing critical interest, 
further valorizing the status of these transnational works. A good percentage of these 
Chinese Francophone writings include semi-autobiographical tales of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, and in particular, its reeducation campaign. Written in French and 
published primarily in Paris for a Francophone audience, these novels unsurprisingly tend 
to focus on France and French literature. What is surprising, however, is the absence of 
revolution, and indeed of any notion of revolutionary politics, in these novels that are 
ostensibly about the lived experience of revolution. 
Novels like Dai Sijie’s best-selling Balzac et la petite tailleuse chinoise (2000), 
François Cheng’s Le Dit de Tianyi (1998), and Wei-Wei’s Une Fille Zhuang (2006) 
recount individual hardships suffered during the Cultural Revolution while constructing 
an image of the French Republic as a privileged site of individual freedom and creative 
liberty. These semi-autobiographical, coming-of-age tales portray young men and women 
who were sent to the countryside to be reeducated by peasant laborers, but whose true 
reeducation occurs through the illicit reading of French literature. French, as the language 
                                                       





of self-liberation, is associated with Enlightenment ideals and human rights, as well as 
with a certain idea of France as a world literary capital. This romantic image has been 
criticized for its one-dimensional nature, and unabashed marketing appeal to a French 
audience.381 For Andrew Watts, the exotic idealization of France flatters French readers 
while at the same time criticizing ideological oppression in China.382 For other scholars 
like Michelle Bloom, France is not necessarily privileged as superior in these texts; rather 
the cultural interplay of “East” and “West” culminates in a form of cultural hybridity.383 
Taking another approach, Yvonne Hsieh suggests that Balzac et la petite tailleuse 
chinoise should be read as a warning against misreading literature in general, and Dai 
Sijie’s text in particular, rather than as a representation of either French or Chinese 
culture.384  
While these studies provide insights into the ambiguous nature of intercultural 
exchange, it is inaccurate to claim that their emphasis on French culture merely reflects 
France’s opinion of its own cultural status, and/or serves to enhance the books’ marketing 
appeal to a French audience. In some instances, the books’ promotional blurbs and 
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publisher reviews conflict with their actual content. The fact that many of these works 
have been translated into numerous languages, including Chinese, and have proven to be 
popular worldwide, further suggests a global consumer appeal that cannot be reduced to 
French audience expectations. Another issue is that these studies tend to focus on a single 
novel by Dai Sijie, limiting potential insights into broader questions about the 
relationship between the literary imagination and historical consciousness. Most 
significant, however, by focusing on cultural hybridity, exoticism, or a critique of 
Chinese political repression, they seem to miss the question of what a portrait of 
hybridity or exoticism or CCP political repression in our contemporary transnational age 
might reveal about how popular culture both reflects and shapes dominant ideologies.  
Below, I extend the scope of study to include a larger corpus, and focus on the act 
of translation and the role of the bicultural translator as a recurring theme in several 
novels to draw out what gets lost or displaced in translating the Cultural Revolution to 
Western, and in particular, French audiences, and why. It should be noted that the corpus 
selected in this chapter does not encompass all Francophone works depicting the Cultural 
Revolution. Rather, they were chosen based on three criteria: 1) thematically, they 
emphasize the reading and circulation of literature in translation, and the narrators are 
themselves translators in multiple ways; 2) generically, they represent coming-of-age 
stories; and 3) the selected novels have all been well received in France, having won 
literary prizes, topped best-seller lists, or been included in scholarly curricula. In other 
words, I look at works that have reached a fairly wide audience. Additionally, the 
majority of the novels have also been translated into other languages, including Chinese 




Focusing on three popular novels that thematically privilege the reading and 
circulation of literature in translation during the Cultural Revolution raises a number of 
questions. How are popular depictions of the Cultural Revolution produced and 
disseminated in a transnational context? How do literary accounts by Chinese diaspora 
authors writing in French affirm, resist, or challenge dominant narratives about the 
Cultural Revolution? How do they affirm, resist, or challenge French audience 
expectations about Chinese culture and history? What unique insights does literature 
offer that historical accounts of traumatic upheaval may not? 
 
Literary and Historical Contexts:“A Thousand Cultural Revolutions Have Bloomed” 
  
The last three decades have witnessed an extraordinary proliferation of works 
published in China and elsewhere depicting and analyzing the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. Contemporary discourses about the Cultural Revolution include historical 
monographs, personal memoirs, semi-autobiographical novels, fiction, plays, poems, 
documentaries, dramatic films, unofficial online archives and discussion groups, and 
most recently, “red tourism”385; there are even Cultural-Revolution-themed restaurants.386 
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Since the “memory boom” in the 1990s, as Guobin Yang writes, “it has become 
increasingly difficult to speak of the Cultural Revolution. A thousand Cultural 
Revolutions have bloomed.”387 In spite of, or because of this proliferation of narratives, 
the Cultural Revolution remains “a dark shadow on the Chinese subconscious”388 nearly 
forty years after its end. 
For some scholars, these diverse narratives provide a positive corrective to earlier, 
more monolithic accounts that either treat the Cultural Revolution as having utopian 
potential (as per Western Maoists in the 1960s), or condemn it wholesale (as per 
dominant contemporary opinion). Suzanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, for example, suggests 
that the plural, fragmentary interpretations circulating today are supplanting the dominant 
narrative, representing at once a beneficial diversification of historical accounts, and 
preventing China from coming to terms with its history in a coherent manner.389 In 
contrast, I propose that if the Cultural Revolution remains a specter on the Chinese 
subconscious, it is not because of the loss of a master narrative, but precisely because 
there is a dominant narrative that exists in tension with alternative accounts – and that 
still tends to overshadow other versions.  
Today, most accounts of the Cultural Revolution – historical, autobiographical 
and fictional – tend to conflate the revolutionary Red Guard movement of 1966 to 1968 
with the violent repression associated with the Gang of Four that occurred in the 1970s. 
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Writers and historians worldwide in other words tend to follow the Chinese Communist 
Party’s periodization, which served the purpose of labeling the Red Guards ultra-leftist 
and the Gang of Four as counter-revolutionary, thereby allowing the Chinese government 
to discredit both groups and preserve party legitimacy. In 1966, faced with widespread 
social discontent after the nationwide famine resulting from the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-1961), and growing economic inequities between urban and rural areas, Mao 
Zedong launched the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in an effort to revive what 
he believed was a dying revolution. Mao’s attempt to revitalize class struggle and popular 
democracy spun out of control, exacting an immense social and human toll. The mass 
youth, or Red Guard movement the Cultural Revolution inspired split into competing 
factions. Communist leaders struggled for control of the party apparatus, and the People’s 
Liberation Army was called upon to prevent the collapse of the Chinese state, and 
oversee the dispersal of the student Red Guards from the cities to the countryside. Over 
the course of ten years, over a million people may have been persecuted, and tens of 
thousands may have died, many of hardship, malnutrition, illness, and suicide.390 The 
calamities of the Cultural Revolution resulted in the destruction of the fragile foundations 
of the socialism it sought to nurture as a disillusioned populace and cynical party 
bureaucrats turned away from socialist politics, and towards reform (gaige) and opening 
up (kaifang). In order to effectively put into motion its new gaige and kaifang policies, 
the new party leaders addressed the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in ways designed 
to placate the public and stabilize party legitimacy. 
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The official storyline of the Chinese Communist Party stresses “ten years of 
catastrophe” (shinian haojie) perpetuated by a handful of villains. Published in 1981, the 
party-sponsored “Resolution on Historical Questions of the Party” describes the Cultural 
Revolution as “responsible for the most severe setback and heaviest losses suffered by 
the Party, the State and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic,” and as 
an event “initiated and led by Comrade Mao Zedong.”391  The document then goes on to 
exculpate Mao by blaming the resultant mayhem of Mao’s bad idea on the “counter-
revolutionary forces” who oversaw its planning and realization – the disgraced general 
Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, led by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing and comprising her 
associates, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen.392 By shifting the bulk 
of the blame to Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, this narrative allows Maoist policies room 
for error while upholding the overall correctness of Maoist principles, thereby reaffirming 
the legitimacy and legacy of the Chinese state.  
The emergence of a new literary genre called scar literature (shangwen wenxue, 
literally, “literature of the wounded”) in the late 1970s and reportage literature in the 
1980s reinforced this perception of great personal suffering at the hands of a few 
scoundrels. Written by “victims” of the Cultural Revolution, many of whom were newly 
rehabilitated party members, most works of this genre take the form of short stories, 
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semi-autobiographical novels, or personal memoirs focusing on the suffering of ordinary 
citizens during the Cultural Revolution.393 The translation of such texts into English and 
other languages, as well as memoirs written in the following decades, primarily in 
English, by Chinese diaspora writers lent further credibility to the dominant victimization 
narrative worldwide. Popular books and films such as Nien Cheng’s Life and Death in 
Shanghai (1987), Jung Chang’s Wild Swans: Three Generations of Chinese Women 
(1991), Anchee Min’s Red Azalea (1994), Ha Jin’s Waiting (1999), and Zhang Yimou’s 
film To Live (1994) received numerous awards, were translated into many languages, and 
published or distributed worldwide. Wild Swans, for example, has been published in 37 
languages and sold 13 million copies, according to the author’s official Web site.394 
Waiting won the National Book Award for Fiction and the PEN/Faulkner award, and was 
a finalist for the 2000 Pulitzer Prize. Life and Death in Shanghai topped best-seller lists 
and was lauded in a Washington Post book review as “[ranking] with the foremost prison 
diaries of our time.”395 The influence of such popular memoirs cannot be underestimated. 
In a study of Wild Swans, Shuyu Kong points out, “Millions of readers who would not 
normally have come into contact with China will have formed their judgments of its 
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recent history on Jung Chang’s account.” Jung’s version of the Cultural Revolution, 
corroborated by its sales numbers and inclusion in academic settings such as in history 
syllabi, is taken by many readers to be a realistic and accurate portrayal of Chinese 
politics and life in China. 
Part of Wild Swans’ popular success is due to its writing style: it offers Western 
readers a captivating page-turner. Like other books of its genre, it tends to reduce 
complex historical events into a simplistic villain-victim narrative. A former Red Guard 
in Sichuan province who fled to England after the Cultural Revolution, Jung Chang traces 
her family’s generational trials and tribulations against the turmoil of modern Chinese 
history, portraying herself as a victim and survivor of China’s political upheavals. Having 
the luck and savvy to immigrate to the West in 1978, Jung portrays herself as a humane 
Red Guard, never duped like so many others by Mao’s propaganda. In offering Western 
readers an engrossing, dramatic tale of victimization, as Shuyu Kong asserts, Jung Chang 
elides all evidence of personal collaboration or involvement in misdeeds or violence.396  
While the widespread persecutions, public humiliations, and factional warfare of 
the Cultural Revolution period cannot be denied and should not be overlooked, 
victimization tales such as this mask important aspects of the larger story. By creating a 
simplistic dichotomy between good and evil, victim and perpetrator, they fail to account 
for individual responsibility and agency. A notable exception to the dominant victim-
villain dichotomy that structures best-selling narratives about the Cultural Revolution is 
Rae Yang’s Spider Eaters, a complex narrative that evokes the ambivalence of the 
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period. Yang portrays an ardent young girl devoted to Mao and the revolution, as both 
victim and victimizer.397 Currently a professor of Chinese language and literature at 
Dickinson College, she describes her personal involvement in beating, stealing, and 
criticizing class enemies, including teachers and classmates, and admits to having felt 
little sympathy for those she targeted, believing them to be traitors to the revolution. In 
contrast to Wild Swans, which invites the reader to identify with a rational narrator who 
holds herself above the fray, Spider Eaters leads the reader into an uneasy identification 
with a morally ambivalent narrator.  
While less well-known internationally than Anglophone Cultural Revolution 
memoirs, Francophone accounts of the Chinese Cultural Revolution have been very well-
received in France, as well as worldwide in translation. Below, I show how three 
Francophone Cultural Revolution texts simultaneously affirm and complicate dominant 
discourses about the Cultural Revolution, as well as about cultural difference. Reading 
the texts in conjunction with their cultural, historical and political contexts, I argue that 
while they depart radically from the Cultural Revolution narratives of the 1980s and early 
1990s, they nevertheless maintain a similar set of historically determined oppositions. 
Whereas the earlier Cold War-era narratives tend to depict a polarized ideological 
struggle between (Western) capitalist and (Eastern) communist societies, culminating in a 
liberatory escape to the West, Dai Sijie, François Cheng and Wei-Wei’s texts all brush 
over the political content of the Cultural Revolution in favor of a narrative that privileges 
coming-of-age during a revolution that, for the most part, is remarkably devoid of 
                                                       





revolutionary struggle. As I will show, this elision of political content is replaced by an 
emphasis on cultural identity and difference as seen through the lens of translation/the 
translator. A grid of oppositions remains but political or class struggle has morphed into 
civilizational and linguistic differences. I suggest that this shift reflects the wider post-
Cold War, post-socialist emphasis on ethics, human rights, and bourgeois 
individualism.398 On the one hand, these texts reinforce ethnocentric oppositions and 
stereotypes. On the other, by foregrounding processes of translation, they call attention to 
the possibility of misreading and mistranslation, destabilizing their own authority and by 
extension, the authority of the authors to speak for, or from any fixed “Chinese” identity. 
Moreover, the novels’ presentation of the French as the language of liberation brackets 
out its history as the language of domination in colonial contexts.    
	
	
Une autre rééducation: Balzac et la petite tailleuse chinoise  
 
Published by Gallimard in 2000, Dai Sijie’s first French-language novel, Balzac 
et la petite tailleuse chinoise, (hereafter Balzac) has won several literary awards, been 
translated into over 30 languages, and adapted into a Chinese-language film. 399 After 
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achieving enormous success in France, it was belatedly translated into Chinese and 
published first in Taiwan, then in mainland China where it met with a more ambivalent 
reception.400 Based largely on the author’s personal experience as a reeducated youth 
during the Cultural Revolution, Balzac is a coming-of-age tale in which two educated 
urban youths are sent to labor camps to “learn from the masses” in the countryside. Their 
real reeducation, however, comes through the illicit reading of French literature. French, 
as the language of self-liberation, is associated with Enlightenment ideals and human 
rights, as well as with a certain idea of France as a world literary capital. This 
representation is juxtaposed with a contrasting image of revolutionary era China as 
backwards, irrational, and anti-intellectual.  
Although I largely agree with scholarly critiques which hold that Balzac is 
somewhat one-dimensional and reductive in both its idealization of French literature and 
characterization of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, I would argue that something more 
complicated is taking place on a literary and thematic level, as well as in terms of 
marketing and public reception. While Balzac indulges the cultural narcissism of Western 
audiences, it also, via the trope of translation, points to the contradictions and ideological 
values that structure the formation of cultural identities, calling any static reading of 
identity into question.  
Lawrence Venuti’s important study, The Scandals of Translation provides a 
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useful frame for thinking about the reception of Balzac. Venuti advances that the global 
marketplace is dominated by Anglophone works in translation, and tends to favor the 
reading preferences of Anglo-American readers. Legitimacy and best-seller status are in 
turn conferred by institutions such as PEN and UNESCO that, as Emily Apter puts it, 
distribute awards that “implicitly reward a kind of writing compatible with the normative 
baggage of the award.”401  As a result, popular genres such as thrillers, romance novels, 
or texts read for entertainment that often glamorize metropolitan life and values, are 
disproportionately published, leaving certain works “untranslatable” because they are 
unmarketable, either too exotic or not exotic enough.  
Whether consciously or subconsciously influenced by market demands, Dai’s 
novel seems to have hit the transnational literary jackpot: it has been consecrated with 
five French literary awards, best-seller status in France, translation into numerous 
languages, inclusion in French school curricula, and adaptation into a globally circulated 
film. Published in the same year that another Chinese writer and French citizen, Gao 
Xingjian, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, Balzac et la petite tailleuse 
chinoise received the Prix Roland Jouvenel conferred by the Académie française, and the 
Prix Relay du roman d’évasion organized by the travel services conglomerate Lagardère. 
The latter prize emphasizes the book’s easy consumption and transportability. It can be 
packed into a carry-on as light vacation reading; wherever the reader may be, it immerses 
the reader in a picturesque and exotic locale. Yet, per Apter’s description, Balzac is not 
too exotic, for it operates within a framework of oppositions familiar to Western 
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audiences: urban/rural, bourgeois/peasant, modern/primitive, orality/literacy, self/other, 
male (as agent of knowledge)/female (as receiver of knowledge).  
The novel opens with an encounter between the two protagonists, Luo and Ma, 
and the farmers and peasant workers they are sent to live with in an isolated mountain 
village. Having just trekked all the way across the mountains, exhausted and mud-soaked, 
the bourgeois city youth and their peasant “captors” are described in antagonistic terms: 
“We looked like pathetic reactionary soldiers from a propaganda film after their capture 
by a horde of Communist farm workers.” Immediately upon arrival, they are 
distinguished from the horde of peasants by class. Their literacy and possession of a 
violin and an alarm clock brand them as outsiders to the Chinese farmers who have come 
to inspect the two “foreigners” and their foreign objects. In asides to the reader such as 
“Chers lecteurs,” and “Vous vous en souvenez certainement […],” the narrator creates a 
complicity with the Francophone reader, who is invited to share the derision of the 
peasant captors:  
Levant le violon à hauteur de ses yeux, [le chef du village] le secoua avec 
frénésie, comme s’il attendait que quelque chose tombât du fond noir de la caisse 
sonore. J’avais l’impression que les cordes allaient casser sur le coup, et les frettes 
s’envoler en morceaux.  
Presque tout le village était là, en bas de cette maison sur pilotis perdue au 
sommet de la montagne. Des hommes, des femmes, des enfants grouillaient à 
l’intérieur, s’accrochaient aux fenêtres, se bouscalaient devant la porte. Comme 
rien ne tombait de mon instrument, le chef approcha son nez du trou noir et renifla 
un bon coup. Plusieurs gros poils, longs et sales, qui sortaient de sa narine gauche, 
se mirent à grelotter.402 
	
To prevent the uncultured peasant community from destroying the “jouet bourgeois,” Luo 
and Ma play a song Luo ingeniously titles, “Mozart pense au président Mao.” The 
                                                       




comedy of the scene depends upon the disparity between the audience and the narrator’s 
shared knowledge (of what a violin and a sonata are, of who Mozart was), and the 
peasants’ ignorance. This disparity emphasizes class differences as well as what Rey 
Chow terms the inequitable temporalities between cultures and languages. The urban, 
educated youth with their manipulation of the technological symbols of progress are on 
the side of modernity, while rural China is rendered as ignorant and backwards. The 
Chinese peasants are depicted as illiterate, coarse, bestial: they swarm like insects, cling 
to the windows, and shove against each other (“grouillaient à l’intérieur, s’accrochaient 
aux fênetres, se bousculaient devant la porte”); the village chief smells the violin 
twitching his long, dirty nose hairs as an animal might sniff an unknown object. Dai Sijie, 
through his narrator, situates himself on the side of modernity and mobilizes the class 
instincts of his likely (French) readers, while the Chinese peasants and the revolutionary 
movement that granted the peasants authority symbolize primitiveness, ignorance, and 
lack of culture. 
 The inequitable temporalities between cultures are underscored in a literal fashion 
through the protagonists’ use of an alarm clock. Since the peasants have never seen a 
clock before and do not know how to tell time, Ma and Luo are able to manipulate time 
by setting the clock backwards or forwards. In doing so, they are able to direct the work 
schedule and tempo of the village. The chief of the village is especially intrigued by this 
strange object, and usurps the power it accords when the two teenagers are sent to town 
for an errand. Furthermore, while the Chinese seamstress of the book’s title is described 
as having “une nature primitive” and being “pas civilisée,” the French books Ma and Luo 




himself to “civilize” the seamstress by reading Balzac novels to her. In this instance, 
translation suggests the inferiority of the home culture: Balzac and Western literature 
stand for civilization, while China, embodied by the seamstress, is depicted as primitive, 
needing the civilizational advantage of an education in French literature. The seamstress 
is also depicted in this initial description as a passive receiver of knowledge. 
 Ultimately, the joke is on Luo and Ma, as their plan for transforming the 
seamstress into a sophisticated young woman backfires, and they end up burning the 
illicit books they risked so much to obtain. Over the course of being read Balzac and 
Flaubert, the seamstress slowly transforms from “une simple montagnarde” into a 
fashionable, ambitious woman conscious of her country bumpkin accent. Realizing that 
“la beauté d’une femme est un trésor qui n’a pas de prix,” (229) the seamstress fashions 
herself a bra, a fitted Mao jacket and smart white shoes, affects a city accent, and leaves 
the mountain – and a flabbergasted Luo and Ma – behind. What the seamstress seems to 
have learned and internalized is a sense of individualism that manifests itself in an 
attention to fashion, romance, and urban life. 
 In effect, Balzac ironically enacts a reversal of the ideological transformation that 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution intended. In launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao 
envisioned a transformation of people’s beliefs and behavior as a necessary precondition 
for a permanent revolution. Revolution could not be achieved, in fact it would be 
undermined, Mao believed, unless peasants became aware of their agency to change 
history and construct a socialist Chinese nation-state strong enough to oppose Western 
imperialism. Literature and art served as paramount political instruments, an argument 




circulation of “Red classics” as instrumental to the transformation and politicization of 
popular consciousness. Ironically, what we get in Balzac is not a peasant who attains 
revolutionary consciousness through exposure to revolutionary art but one who adopts 
bourgeois consciousness modeled on nineteenth-century French literature. 
 We might read this ironic reversal as an implicit critique of Maoism and the 
Cultural Revolution, as a kind of jest on Mao. On one hand, it can be read as an 
“emancipation” of the seamstress from her circumscribed life as an uneducated, rural 
female peasant laborer. Yet, considering the fates of the female heroines of her two 
favorite French novels, the Count of Monte Cristo (Mercédès joins a convent and is never 
heard from again) and Madame Bovary (Emma commits suicide), one has to wonder 
what kind of emancipation her departure represents. Indeed, the seamstress leaves her 
natal village only after very narrowly escaping social ostracism with the aid of Ma. 
Pregnant and terrified, she enlists the help of Ma to secure an illegal abortion. Left 
unresolved in the novel is just what kind of choices the illiterate seamstress might have 
once she leaves the village.403  
 In a counter-reversal to the implied critique of Mao, the disappointed protagonists 
Luo and Ma burn the French books they had once cherished, in an ironic reenactment of a 
common tactic of Red Guard censorship during the Cultural Revolution. The gesture also 
evokes the typical disillusionment experienced by protagonists in many nineteenth-
century French novels. In the end, nineteenth-century French literature has helped to 
erode community stability. While very effective in cultivating individual desires and 
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dreams, it offers little in the way of helping to realize them. These two plot twists make it 
impossible to read Balzac as either a straightforward critique of Maoism or as an 
idealization of French literature. I would thus agree with Yvonne Hsieh’s argument that 
Balzac is a cautionary tale about misreading404, but I would add that through the trope of 
translation, the incorporation of multiple perspectives, and the mise-en-abime structure of 
the text, Balzac also points to the manifold subject positions that reading, storytelling and 
translation open up.   
In the first place, translation is a recurring trope that functions as a mechanism of 
social exchange and transformation. In Balzac, translation begins with an individual act 
of reading that results in a new subjectivity through identification with a story’s 
characters, and more importantly, through the act of storytelling. Ma, for instance, is most 
taken with Romain Rolland’s Jean-Christophe and its portrayal of one man’s triumph 
over a lifetime of obstacles:  
Jean-Christophe, avec son individualisme acharné, sans aucune mesquinerie, fut 
pour moi une révélation salutaire. Sans lui, je ne serais jamais parvenu à 
comprendre la splendeur et l’ampleur de l’individualisme. Jusqu’à cette rencontre 
volée avec Jean-Christophe, ma pauvre tête éduquée et rééduquée ignorait tout 
simplement qu’on pût lutter seul contre le monde entier.405  
	
It is his admiration for Jean-Christophe that makes him desire, for the first time in his 
life, to possess a book all for himself and “non plus comme un patrimoine commun à Luo 
et à moi.” He has Luo dedicate Jean-Christophe to him for his twentieth birthday, and in 
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exchange, he dedicates three Balzac books to Luo. At this moment of property exchange, 
we finally learn the anonymous narrator’s name: 
Sous ma dédicace, je dessinai trois objets qui représentaient chacun des trois 
caractères chinois composant mon nom. Pour le premier, je dessinai un cheval au 
galop, hennissant, avec une somptueuse crinière flottant au vent. Pour le 
deuxième, je représentai une épée longue et pointue, avec un manche en os 
finement ouvragé, enchâssé de diamants. Quant au troisième, ce fut une petite 
clochette de troupeau, autour de laquelle j’ajoutai de nombreux traits formant un 
rayonnement, comme si elle avait remué, retenti, pour appeler au secours.406  
	
 It is also after this moment of self-naming that the narrator begins to take on 
greater storytelling agency. Although Ma has been the main first-person narrator since 
the beginning of the tale, he has operated rather like Venuti’s invisible translator, 
allowing himself to go unnamed while granting all storytelling power to Luo. Luo is the 
talented storyteller, able to craftily weave quick tales to get himself and Ma out of trouble 
with the village chief, and to evoke tears from any audience with his dramatic 
storytelling. Luo is also the little seamstress’ lover. But if Ma, for the first half of the 
book is merely a sidekick, halfway through the narration, Luo disappears on a family 
errand, and Ma takes over as the little seamstress’ companion and ad hoc educator. He 
visits her regularly to prevent other young men from befriending her, and more 
importantly, to read French books to her. In this transfer of roles, Ma’s process of 
translation becomes visible: 
Lire à haute voix une page entier me paraissait insupportablement ennuyeux, et je 
décidai de faire une lecture approximative, c’est-à-dire que je lisais d’abord deux 
ou trois pages ou un court chapitre […] Puis, après une courte rumination, je lui 
posais une question ou lui demandais de deviner ce qui allait se passer. Une fois 
qu’elle avait répondu, je lui racontais ce qu’il y avait dans le livre, presque 
paragraphe par paragraphe. De temps à autre, je ne pouvais m’empêcher d’ajouter 
des petites touches personnelles, pour que l’histoire amusât davantage. Il 
                                                       




m’arrivait même d’inventer des situations, quand je trouvais que le vieux père 
Balzac était fatigué.407  
	
The liberty that Ma takes in translating Balzac evokes a late Qing tradition of novelistic 
translation. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century witnessed an extraordinary 
proliferation of translated Western fiction in China. The style of translation was 
determined by its form, with an all-knowing storyteller inserted into the narration of 
Western novels. As David Pollard writes, “…the long novels were told by a story-teller in 
episodes with versified chapter headings and chapter endings…The story-teller 
intervened freely in his narrative, to express judgments… and to direct the progress of the 
story. The reader was constantly reminded that the story-teller was in control.”408 The 
story of Ursule Mirouet or the Count of Monte Cristo thus becomes Ma’s story. In the 
tradition of renowned late Qing translators of French literature, Ma discovers his agency 
and voice in the act of translating. In the process, he transforms himself, the original 
story, and his audience (the seamstress). 
 It is through reading, adapting, and bartering stories that friendships and alliances 
are formed, favors and services exchanged, and the narrator comes into his own as a 
storyteller. At the same time, the story is not told solely through Ma’s perspective. The 
novel includes three separate chapters narrated from the perspectives of the seamstress, 
Luo, and a local miller who witnesses an amorous encounter between Luo and the 
seamstress. These short chapters focus on each character’s perception of the relationship 
between Luo and the seamstress. Up to this point, the seamstress is seen entirely through 
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the narrator’s eyes and appears devoid of any interiority. For the seamstress, it is not 
simply listening to foreign fiction, but performing passages from the texts that sparks a 
transformation. It is after she and Luo stage an impromptu, imagined scene between the 
Count of Monte Cristo and Mercédès that, suddenly, her sense of self is expanded: 
“C’était pour moi une expérience toute nouvelle. Avant je n’imaginais pas qu’on puisse 
jouer quelqu’un qu’on n’est pas tout en restant soi-même, par exemple jouer une femme 
riche et << contente >>, alors que je ne le suis pas du tout.”409  
 This quote points to the multiple levels of mirroring and transculturation 
occurring in the text. Luo, Ma and the seamstress undergo transformations by identifying 
with particular characters (Jean-Christophe, the Count of Monte Cristo, Mercédès, Emma 
Bovary) in nineteenth-century French novels. By transmitting or acting out those stories, 
they in turn become storytellers. On another level still, the implied reader mirrors the 
actual readers. What might be the significance of this mise en abime? That is, what is the 
significance of French/Francophone readers reading a novel about Chinese youth 
undergoing a cultural revolution, who in turn are reading nineteenth-century French 
literature – a literature with its own relationship to revolution?  
 The jeu-de-miroir structure, for one thing, reveals interesting connections between 
the novel’s reception, and the formation of cultural identities, both domestic and foreign. 
With respect to Chinese cultural identity, the historical and geographical particularities of 
the main characters are notably generic if not altogether absent. Aside from the alarm 
clock that Luo and Ma tinker with to the point of completely forgetting what time it 
actually is, we have little indication of what year, month, or time events actually take 
                                                       




place. In a country as massive and geographically and ethnically diverse as China, we 
know only that Luo and Ma have been sent to the exotic-sounding (and perhaps 
symbolically named) “Phoenix of the Sky” mountain near the village of Yong Jing. The 
author-narrator offers us a mere “deux mots sur la rééducation," namely that almost 
anyone with a high school education was considered “intellectual” and in need of 
reeducation. Noting that the real reason Mao decided to launch the Cultural Revolution 
remains debatable, the narrator hastily concludes that it must have been because “Mao 
haïssait les intellectuels.” As for the characters’ psychological depth, although the text is 
written in the first person and from multiple perspectives, we learn surprisingly little 
about each character’s inner world. Aside from descriptions of the seamstress’ beauty and 
the peasants’ animal-like, uncivilized behavior, the narrative focuses on the plot of illicit 
reading, and the humorous adventures and misadventures that ensue. The few instances 
of psychological description or reflection occur as responses to texts/performances: the 
narrator’s awakening after reading Jean-Christophe, the seamstress’ new consciousness 
after embodying an affluent French woman through role-play. Ultimately, as the title 
suggests, this is a book about Balzac, as a metonym for French literature and culture, and 
his influence on a young Chinese seamstress, who has no name and no specific identity 
other than as love interest and representative peasant laborer.  
 This anonymity is crucial to the cultural affinity between the Western reader and 
the Chinese narrator, and to the novel’s popular global reception. In his study of 
translated bestsellers, Venuti draws upon Pierre Bourdieu to identify a “popular 
aesthetic” favoring realist discourse as a strategy pursued (consciously or unconsciously) 




the different, potentially conflicting odes and ideologies that characterize [particular] 
audience[s],”410 Venuti argues that, 
Bestsellers blur the distinction between art and life by sharing a specific 
discourse: although cast into various genres—fiction and non-fiction, novel and 
history, romance and memoir, horror and self-help—they favor melodramatic 
realism that solicits the reader’s vicarious participation. This is perhaps most clear 
with bestselling fiction, which depends for its success on the reader’s sympathetic 
identification with characters who confront contemporary social problems.411  
	
Although Venuti’s study focuses on best-selling translations of foreign texts, his 
argument is applicable and salient to bestsellers by diaspora writers purportedly 
representative of a foreign culture. The more anonymous and generic the (foreign) 
people, place and time of a work of fiction, the more utilizable it is as a projection screen 
for the reader’s own experiences – that is, the more easily it can be domesticated into a 
new market, whether French or Chinese.  
 In the long run, best-selling novels by Chinese diaspora writers, in a manner 
similar to the European travel essay and ethnographic text, may offer more insight into 
French identity than into that of the foreign culture. That is, texts like Balzac fail to tell us 
very much about Chinese culture, identity or history, but in that failure, they productively 
illuminate how a domestic French subject with a particular ideological position informed 
by various codes and agendas is constructed via the representation of a foreign culture. 
Domestic cultural identities, as Venuti writes, are formed through a process of 
“mirroring” or self-recognition:  
…the foreign text becomes intelligible when the reader recognizes himself or 
herself in the translation by identifying the domestic values that motivated the 
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selection of that particular foreign text, and that are inscribed in it through a 
particular discursive strategy. The self-recognition is a recognition of the 
domestic cultural norms and resources that constitute the self, that define it as a 
domestic subject. The process is basically narcissistic: the reader identifies with 
an ideal projected by the translation, usually values that have achieved authority 
in the domestic culture […].412  
	
In Balzac, the impact of self-recognition is doubled through the stylistic strategy of jeu-
de-miroir, which also serves to extend the melodramatic realism of nineteenth-century 
French novels. As Luo, Ma and the seamstress identify with the characters in these 
stories, often by altering the texts, so the implied and actual reader(s) may have had 
similar experiences of reading, perhaps even specifically reading Balzac, Dumas or 
Flaubert, in their youth. While the reeducation campaign and rural life in the mountains 
may appear foreign to Western readers, so little of this context is described that the 
reader’s attention is focused entirely on the central plot intrigue, which involves 
bourgeois “social problems” such as rebelling against authority, discovering oneself 
through reading and new friendships, negotiating a love triangle, and so forth.  
Ultimately Balzac, as Venuti has formulated, has “created and consolidated the 
terms of cultural recognition for both hegemonic and developing countries but without in 
any way diminishing the linguistic and cultural hierarchies in which these countries 
continue to be positioned.”413 French is not only privileged as the language of 
emancipation, its revered status is advanced by Dai’s repetition of the melodramatic 
realist form of the nineteenth-century French novel. Through a narrative structure that 
oscillates between foregrounding binary cultural and class differences, dismantling them 
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(through the trope of translation and plot reversals), and resetting them (through jeu-de-
miroir), Balzac and its French reception affirms a certain idea of “Frenchness” while 
simultaneously questioning the power of literature, of its potential to both emancipate and 
betray. 
 
Gender, Language and Pedagogy in Une Fille Zhuang 
 
While an unexpected encounter with French literature in translation serves to 
create, cement and in the end destabilize relationships in Balzac, the memoir Une Fille 
Zhuang (Éd. de l’Aube, 2006)414 recounts how the author’s unanticipated turn to French 
provides a degree of order and stability in an uncertain and chaotic era. Like Luo and Ma, 
Wei-Wei spends much of her time during the Revolution searching for illicit French 
literature that she reads both in translation and in the original French. The only one of the 
three texts in this chapter to be based entirely on the author’s life, Une Fille Zhuang takes 
place between 1974 and 1981, offering the reader a glimpse of the close of the Maoist 
era. Wei-Wei’s adolescence overlaps with the rustification campaign, the slow re-opening 
of universities, and the opening of China and its markets to foreigners. At 17, Wei-Wei is 
sent to work in the fields immediately after graduating from high school. Later, she 
becomes one of the lucky few to be sent to university. She is selected based on her 
excellent scores in Mandarin language and literature to study French. The text follows her 
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initial studies at the Institute of Minorities in the southern province of Guangxi to her 
enrollment in Beijing’s prestigious Institute of Foreign Languages.   
With its focus on learning French, simple language, and exaltation of nineteenth-
century French literature, Une Fille Zhuang, like Balzac and la petite tailleuse chinoise, 
have been endorsed as part of a “Parcours littéraire francophone” in French secondary 
schools. Promoted by the Centre Régional de documents pédagogiques (CRDP), a Paris-
based service for local teachers and students of French and other subjects, the memoir is 
presented as “un témoignage sur la société chinoise après la Révolution culturelle.” On its 
Website, the CRDP provides a dossier on Wei Wei and Une Fille Zhuang, recommending 
that teachers focus on topics such as “La répression et le contrôle des intellectuels 
pendant et après la Révolution culturelle,” “le rôle de la langue française dans le 
développement d’une conscience individuelle,” “la place de la femme dans la société 
chinoise et dans le roman,” and “Pourquoi le français ?”415 Describing Wei-Wei as “une 
victime du farce du destin” and her youth as “placée sous le signe du huanglian, 
‘l’amertume absolue,’” the CRDP invites readers to interpret Une Fille Zhuang through 
the lens of scar literature. This genre is emphasized despite the fact that Wei-Wei has 
repeatedly refused to qualify her experience as “trauma,” and has insisted on telling her 
own story, rather than a story of the Cultural Revolution:   
Un roman ne prétend pas être la mémoire collective d’un tel [sic] ou tel 
événement. Il ne se veut ni objectif ni complet. Il y a une Révolution culturelle en 
Chine, mais un milliard de Chinois. Qui pourrait dire que la vision d’un Chinois 
de ce cataclysme national est moins, ou plus vraie, que celle d’un autre? […] Je 
raconte des histoires mais pas l’Histoire. Ce qui m’intéresse ici n’est pas la 






Révolution culturelle, ni les blessures ou les cicatrices qu’elle a laissées, mais ce 
qui m’a amené à étudier le français, ce que m’a apporté la découverte d’une 
langue complètement différente de la mienne, la rencontre en moi de deux 
civilisations à la fois opposées et complémentaires, l’influence d’un tel 
entrecroisement sur ma conception du monde et de l’homme ainsi que mes 
premières expériences sentimentales.416 
	
It should be noted, also, that Wei-Wei here identifies her memoir as “un roman” rather 
than “un témoignage”; additionally, she insists on a distinction between “des histoires” 
and “l’Histoire”; and similar to Dai Sijie, she emphasizes that this memoir of the Cultural 
Revolution is not so much about the Cultural Revolution as about her study of French, 
her adventure with a language and civilization seen as radically other, yet 
complementary. In effect, Une Fille Zhuang presents itself as a novel about and in the 
French language.  
 In emphasizing the romanesque qualities of her work, Wei-Wei purposely 
distances herself from memoir writers, and the juridical expectations of “truth” that come 
with the genre of memoir. More importantly, it calls its own account of events into 
question, refusing assimilation into any master narratives about the Cultural Revolution, 
or into any discourses about “History.” Wei-Wei thus creates a separation between her 
personal history and History. While on the one hand, Wei-Wei refuses the assimilation of 
her story into dominant narratives of History417, on the other, her self-conscious 
distinction between personal history and History appears symptomatic of a trend towards 
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dehistoricization and depoliticization prevalent in both France and China since the late 
1970s, when Western leftists first began to be disillusioned with socialism and Deng 
Xiaoping embarked on a reform agenda. That is, history (both personal and with a capital 
h), as it has been narrated since the end of the Cold War and the rise of what many 
scholars call neoliberalism in 1989, has largely marginalized, or erased revolutionary 
counter-histories.  
Depoliticization in Une Fille Zhuang manifests itself as a quest for identity, and 
more particularly as a fascination with French language, literature and culture as the 
“other” of Chinese culture. That is, any revolutionary content, or sense of why the 
reeducation campaign was initiated, or what Wei-Wei thought of it, have been displaced 
onto an individual’s struggle to define herself, and the main vehicle of that quest is not 
state-enforced reeducation but a serendipitous encounter with French. Of the reeducation 
campaign, Wei-Wei concludes over the course of three pages that it was difficult, both 
physically and psychologically, but she adapted and learned to live, farm, and work as a 
rural laborer. The rest of the novel focuses on her adventures (and misadventures) with 
the French language – the linguistic and cultural differences between French and 
Chinese, the difficulty of French phonetics, definite articles, numbers, and conjugation – 
and French literature. One day she learns that “ce que l’on m’enseigne n’est pas le 
français.” That is, the copies of l’Hebdo Pékin that the students are given to read and 
translate, do not exactly reflect a natural-sounding French, or give them any sense of 
French culture. By chance, she discovers a forgotten trove of dust-covered French texts in 




Illusions perdues – and with these nineteenth-century novels, her “real” French lessons, 
and eventual transculturation begins.  
According to the CRDP, France serves as China’s “other” in Une Fille Zhuang 
because it represents liberty and freedom of individual expression in opposition to 
China’s state-sponsored oppression and negation of individuality. It is French that allows 
Wei-Wei to develop her individual consciousness and enables “la revendication d’une 
individualité”; it is the reading of French novels that permits “l’émancipation de la jeune 
femme.” This language is troubling, not only because it reinforces the entrenched 
dichotomies – Chinese oppression versus Western liberty, Chinese collectivism versus 
Western individualism – but because its use as a pedagogical tool amplifies its reach and 
authority. I would argue that Wei-Wei resists this reductive categorization, though I also 
think that, at the same time, she introduces another set of dichotomies based on the 
linguistic – and by extension – cultural differences between France and China. 
In the chapter titled “Premiers chocs,” in which describes her first encounter with 
French, she contemplates the differences between a phonetic language like French and an 
ideographic one like Chinese, the lack or presence of gendered nouns, and the lack of 
verbal tenses in Chinese. Time, described as precise and linear (“à la fois précis et 
nuancé”) in French, is presumed to be continuous and circular in Chinese (“impersonnel, 
intemporel, circulaire”). According to Wei-Wei, while French with its numerous tenses 
and modes offers “une langue littéraire géniale" to describe the psychological evolution 
of people and literary characters, as well as a rigorous, juridical language, the Chinese 
language’s reliance on the infinitive form of verbs emphasizes stability and the eternal. 




ideographic language is a longstanding myth: in fact, no purely ideographic language 
exists.418 The idea that Chinese “lacks grammar” because it lacks tenses, moods and 
gender is another myth that has been used to support the portrayal of China as backwards 
and stagnant, existing outside of time and history.  
In addition to (perhaps inadvertently) reinforcing entrenched perceptions of the 
linguistic differences between French and Chinese, Wei-Wei perpetuates a certain notion 
of Chinese women. As its title implies, Une Fille Zhuang is the story of a young Zhuang 
girl or daughter who comes of age during the Cultural Revolution. 419 In contrast to the 
main female character in Balzac who serves primarily as a love interest for the male 
protagonists, Wei-Wei’s narrator provides a female perspective, and delves more deeply 
into themes of gender and sexuality during the Cultural Revolution. On a narrative level, 
the plot revolves not just around her reading forbidden French books, but the relation 
between reading illicit texts and her revolt against the societal expectations of Chinese 
women in choosing a marriage partner 
Comment ai-je pu oublier que le marriage, en Chine, avant d’être une affaire entre 
deux individus qui s’aiment, est d’abord une affaire familiale? Que l’on n’épouse 
pas un homme ou une femme, mais sa famille? Que les enfants n’ont pas le droit 
de dire oui ou non sans avoir consulté les parents? Comment ai-je osé croire, moi, 
une fille chinoise extraordinairement ordinaire, que je faisais une exception à la 
règle générale? A qui la faute? A Bajin! A Dingling! A Tolstoï! A Stendhal! A 
Dumas! A Hugo! A Chateaubriand! A Gide!... à tous ces auteurs à la fois si 
lointains et si proches  que je fréquente ces derniers temps. C’est la faute de leurs 
pages au levain pervers de liberté individuelle dont je me délecte en cachette.420 
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At first glance, this passage appears to corroborate the CRDP’s opposition of (Western) 
liberty and individualism versus (Chinese) oppression and social collectivism, with 
women’s rights figuring as a trope of difference. But an examination of the passage 
against the historical specificities of the period reveals that such readings conflate 
Maoism, Cultural Revolution, and Chinese oppression of women. In fact, as seen in 
earlier chapters of this dissertation, “women’s liberation” and opposition to arranged 
marriages played a central part in the Communist agenda to revolutionize China. When 
the CCP took power in 1949, one of its first priorities was the passage of the New 
Marriage Act in 1950, which abolished arranged marriages, child marriage, and 
concubinage. In 1950, as well as during the Cultural Revolution, Mao attempted to 
overturn Confucian traditions, and create a new society based on the awakening of 
individual consciousness. While this attempt was not without contradiction, the lack of 
free choice in marriage and the criticism of those who, like Wei-Wei, pursued their 
individual desires against the wishes of their parents cannot be conflated with the 
Cultural Revolution.421 Moreover, the allusion to New Culture writers Ba Jin and 
Dingling along with Tolstoy, Stendhal and Hugo points to the interconnectedness of the 
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French revolutionary tradition and proponents of a new culture in China that could only 
be realized through revolution.422  
 More interestingly, there is a linkage between gender, language and pedagogy that 
evokes French colonialism while simultaneously glossing over it. In the first place, Wei-
Wei’s initiation into French requires an abrupt rupture with her past and with her mother. 
She must abandon her childhood dreams of studying medicine. French is her only higher 
education option given the government’s need to train interpreters to work in 
Francophone Africa. Moreover, she cannot enroll in the university until she denounces 
her mother, who was expelled from the Party for expressing rightist language in the anti-
rightist Hundred Flowers campaign of 1957. Following the loss of her childhood 
aspirations and the denunciation of her mother, Wei-Wei’s French lessons begin to her 
surprise with arms training and military exercises: “Le 16 octobre 1976, ma vie 
d’étudiante en langue française commence par quinze jours d’entraînement militaire. 
Première semaine, formation […] Deuxième semaine, nous passons à une affaire plus 
sérieuse: nous devons apprendre cette fois à manier le fusil et à tirer.”423  
 Her first two weeks of “French training” alludes to (without rendering explicit) 
two important historical moments linking China, France, and Africa. First, Francophone 
African regions that became Francophone through colonial force and violence is evoked 
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through the military reference and circumstantial conditions that lead her to studying 
French. Paralleling Wei-Wei’s introduction to French, mandatory instruction in French 
language in African colonies occurred in tandem with military take-over, and devalued 
mother tongues and native cultures. Second, the very fact that she is made to study 
French points to the historical contingencies of Maoist-era foreign and educational 
policy. There was a need for French interpreters in Africa because of China’s evolving 
relations with Africa as a supporter of Third World decolonization movements 
worldwide. China began sending ambassadors to Africa in 1969, and was highly active in 
Africa in the 1970s. During this time, China became the largest Communist-bloc provider 
of aid to Africa, sending money, arms, and numerous cultural, technical and 
governmental delegations. Yet, these echoes of historical political struggle, of Mao’s 
Three Worlds Theory are displaced by a focus on language learning and cultural identity.  
Paralleling the gendered nature of colonial relations in which the colonized 
subject is feminized, and French colonial institutions are masculinized, French language 
education is imparted through male teachers and male authors (Hugo, Stendhal, Flaubert, 
etc.). Wei-Wei must not only break ties with her mother, but (re)learn language through 
three male instructors of Chinese origin, who themselves learned French by way of 
French missionary and colonial institutions. She begins her formal French lessons in the 
third week, after her “vaccination politique.” Before being exposed to French, she must 
on the one hand, relinquish former aspirations and familial ties. Yet she must also protect 
herself against potential contamination from contact with a foreign language and culture. 
In effect, Wei-Wei’s encounter with French and foreign literature is frequently described 




intoxicating drug with which she voluntarily “poisons” herself: “C’est la faute de ces 
drogues à l’arôme enivrant de l’amour absolu et du bonheur de l’individu dont je 
m’empoisonne le cerveau avec la plus grande joie du monde!” French literature is a virus 
transmitted through a key organ of language, the mouth and the tongue: “Dès la première 
gorgée, ça y est, j’attrape le virus […] je viens de découvrir une autre cuisine, très 
savoureuse elle aussi, qui me donne la force de supporter I’insupportable routine 
alimentaire du dimanche au réfectoire: la lecture simultanée.” Literature, both early 
twentieth-century Chinese fiction, and especially, Western literature is depicted as a 
delicious, but dangerous food to be consumed at one’s own risk.  
The dual metaphor – literature as food, as joyful sustenance, and literature as 
poison, as virus – points to its dual capacity to nourish and to pollute. While it is tempting 
to read literature, and in particular French, as a carrier of abstract, positive values like 
liberty and individuality,424 I would argue that Wei-Wei presents us with a more 
ambiguous view in light of her foregrounding of the processes of translation. In her 
encounter with French language and literature, Wei-Wei is forced to (re)examine Chinese 
language and culture – an examination that, as we have seen, results in reductive 
stereotypes. More interesting than the stereotypes themselves is her complicity in creating 
them. That is, this is a virus that is desired and sought after, and that is spread and 
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transformed by translation in a process that reveals itself to be treacherous, but gainfully 
so: 
Je prends un roman français et sa traduction chinoise que je pose côte à côte, et 
les compare phrase par phrase, paragraphe par paragraphe. Le premier plat que je 
goûte se compose du Père Goriot et de sa traduction par Fu Lei. Pendant plusieurs 
week-ends, je me regale. Ce qui me fascine le plus dans ce va-et-vient continu 
entre les deux langues, c’est que Fu Lei réussi à surmonter les insurmontables 
difficultés linguistiques, à faire éclater les contraintes formelles pour rendre la 
quintessence palpitante du texte, à transposer dans notre chinois la langue 
française avec ses images, ses symboles, son humour, ses allusions, ses sous-
entendus … comme si Balzac avait écrit son roman directement en chinois.425  
 
Here, she makes clear that a good translator, like Fu Lei, succeeds in making the original 
sound familiar to a foreign audience. More specifically, a good translator succeeds in 
capturing the spirit (“l’esprit”) of a text, much as a good painter expresses the spirit of an 
object:  
Un peintre chinois se moque de la vérité du motif, de la ressemblance 
superficielle, donc vulgaire, de l’objet qu’il peint […] Il s’applique au contraire à 
exprimer l’esprit de l’objet qu’il choisit d’interpréter, à transmettre son souffle 
vital à partir du personnage, ce sont les traits typiques de l’animal ou de la plante 
susceptibles d’émouvoir, c’est la poésie des montagnes et des cours d’eau qui 
transcende les limites de l’espace-temps, c’est sa vision intérieure devant le 
paysage qui l’inspire … À sa façon, Fu Lei réalise dans la traduction littéraire ce 
que recherche un peintre chinois dans la peinture.426 
 
This passage provides the reader with a useful key to reading translations, to reading this 
text, as well as the other novels in this chapter. It reminds us of Benjamin’s claim that the 
task of the translator “consists in finding that intended effect [Intentio] upon the language 
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into which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the original,” 427 of 
translation as incorporating “the original’s mode of signification […] making both the 
original and the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as 
fragments are part of a vessel.”428 In other words, not only is difference desired and 
potentially assimilated, it is always already a part of the self.  
 As in Balzac, Une Fille Zhuang plays with cultural dichotomies only to dismantle 
them, ending on a highly ambivalent note. The novel concludes with a scene in the Jardin 
de Clarté in Beijing, an imperial garden ransacked by European powers during the Boxer 
Rebellion. As Wei-Wei walks through the ruins of the garden, a bird defecates on her 
shoulder, and she wonders if the stain signifies “[une] bénédiction celeste” or “[un] 
avertissement du destin.” By ending with a reference to one of the most infamous acts of 
destruction and pillage by French and British forces during the Second Opium War, the 
novel resists being categorized as simply an ode to France and French literature. It neither 
focuses on victim suffering with the narrator’s eventual “escape” to the West, nor on the 
role of French as enabling her “emancipation” as a woman and as a writer, as the CDRP 
materials suggest. A history of imperialism and Third World struggle haunts the text, 
resisting its assimilation into the villain-victim, or “tragedy-triumph-freedom” narrative 
that seems to characterize so many Cultural Revolution memoirs. Yet the fact that this 
history is hidden between the lines, displaced by the plot of reading and self-
actualization, reveals the extent to which anticolonial struggle has disappeared, as we saw 
in Chapter Three, from dominant revolutionary histories.   
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The Artist as Universal Witness in Le Dit de Tianyi 
 
In contrast to Balzac and Une Fille Zhuang, François Cheng’s semi-
autobiographical novel, Le Dit de Tianyi (hereafter, Tianyi) appears at first glance to 
transcend binary oppositions. The act of chronicling Tianyi’s story enables the narrator to 
join a very personal history with the traumatic collective history of a nation. In an 
interview with the newspaper Liberation, Cheng describes Tianyi as the intertwining of 
multiple personal histories – including his own personally lived experiences – and a 
collective historical experience:  
Tout Chinois a un double sort, individuel et collectif. Pas un seul Chinois n'a 
échappé aux bouleversements qu'a connus le pays depuis le début du siècle 
[…]Au-delà de cette accumulation d'itinéraires singuliers, il y a au centre du livre 
un drame d'amour et d'amitié, que j'ai vécu intimement et profondément. Le 
roman est fait de l'entrelacement de ce drame personnel et du drame collectif. 429 
	
Because he was exiled in France during the Cultural Revolution, Cheng did not 
personally experience persecution or reeducation, but the love triangle and friendships he 
describes are based on actual relationships. Interestingly, Cheng describes the text as 
neither autobiography nor testimony, but the fictional dramatization of a collective 
history: “Ce n'est pas une autobiographie, ni un témoignage, mais la prise en charge 
romanesque d'une multiplicité de destins, sur deux générations. Le Dit de Tianyi est […] 
                                                       







fait de tous ces récits.”430 On the one hand, he refuses the expectations of “truth” 
associated with autobiography and testimony. Yet, on the other, unlike Wei-Wei, he does 
not see personal history and History as standing in opposition to each other. 
Published by Éditions Albin Michel in 1998 and recipient of that year’s Prix 
Femina, Tianyi recounts a young Chinese artist’s quest to define himself and his destiny 
at the very moment China is struggling to determine its national identity. Spanning 
approximately sixty years from 1925 to 1982, the novel is set in the context of semi-
colonialism, the Sino-Japanese war, civil war and revolution. Its three parts encompass 
pre-World War II China (“Épopée du départ"), post-World War II France (“Récit d’un 
détour") and Cultural Revolution China (“Mythe du retour”).431 The novel recounts the 
coming of age of the fictional Tianyi as related by a Paris-based narrator. 
Born in 1925 in Nanchang, Tianyi is forced to flee south during the Sino-Japanese War. 
He settles for a time in Sichuan province where he develops an intimate friendship with 
Haolang (“L’Ami”), a charismatic poet and future communist militant, and Yumei 
(“L’Amante”), an actress Tianyi is enamored with, but who chooses Haolang. At the end 
of the Sino-Japanese war, Tianyi discovers a love for painting, and with the help of a 
mentor, prepares for a scholarship competition. In 1948, having obtained a grant to study 
painting in Paris, he sails for France where he spends decades in exile and poverty. Upon 
receiving an urgent letter from Yumei, Tianyi returns to China in 1957, and discovers that 
Haolang has been denounced as a rightist and sent to a reeducation camp. By 
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passionately proclaiming the virtues of Western painting, Tianyi gets himself sent to the 
same camp in the frigid North; reunited with his friend for a time, Tianyi later witnesses 
the senseless interrogation and brutal stoning of Haolang when Red Guards take over the 
camp in 1968. Tianyi’s story is related in French by an anonymous narrator, a fellow 
Chinese exile who met Tianyi in Paris in the 1950s, and who returns to China in 1982 to 
find Tianyi in a hospice, half-mad but keen to tell his story.  
Tianyi in this way shares some traits with literary witness, including an urgent, 
moral compulsion to listen, record, and make public. In an interview about the writing of 
the novel, Cheng describes its provenance as the result of an intensive “écoute,” an 
ethical listening to the tales of survivors: 
Au début des années 80, la plupart des Chinois qui débarquaient en France 
venaient me voir. Presque à la même époque, je suis tombé gravement malade, et 
je suis resté très longtemps couché, immobilisé dans mon lit, les yeux fixés au 
plafond. Ces exilés qui me rendaient visite avaient besoin de s'épancher. En dépit 
de mon désarroi, j'étais entièrement disponible et j'ai écouté, pendant des journées 
entières, à chaud, des dizaines et des dizaines de récits. Ce fut une période 
extraordinaire: comme je ne pouvais pas écrire, j'emmagasinais tous ces récits, ils 
se gravaient dans ma mémoire, souvent à la première personne. J'ai fini par 
connaître dans les moindres détails la vie dans les camps chinois, comment on 
mange et comment on dort, comment on travaille et comment on lutte contre le 
froid, la maladie. Le dit de Tianyi est un roman qui est fait de tous ces récits.432 
	
In a similar manner, the narrator’s retelling of Tianyi’s story results from an intensive 
period of listening; he describes his decision to relate “le dit de Tianyi” as a difficult 
obligation: “En 1993 […] comme pour m’acquitter d’une dette, j’entrepris alors la rude 
tâche de reconstituer le récit dont j’avais la charge et de le transposer en français.”433  
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 Here, François Cheng constructs a series of storytelling relays, a mise-en-abime 
of survivors, witnesses and storytellers that foregrounds the dialogic relation between the 
reader and the text. Notably, Cheng and the narrator are not witnesses but the ones who 
bear witness for the witnesses. At the time of listening, Cheng has been silenced by his 
illness. He can do nothing but act as a silent ear, a mute vessel for the stories of others. 
He is not an immediate eyewitness, but one who receives the story much later. Paralleling 
the process of reading, there is a lack of immediacy, a delay in time, and hence, perhaps, 
a greater chance for the stories to be adulterated, to change with time and perspective, or 
to be misinterpreted. On the one hand, this delay undermines the reliability of the 
narrative. On the other hand, the fact that the story is told with delay, and is an amalgam 
of multiple stories, adds to its power for it becomes more universal. It represents the 
experience of not just one individual but the collective trauma of a generation and of a 
nation. As such, the novel also holds the potential for collective healing – or the blockage 
of healing – through transference. 
 In his essay, “The Dynamics of Transference,” Freud identifies transference, or 
the redirection to a substitute (the therapist) of repressed emotions, as key to the 
relationship between psychoanalyst and patient. In redirecting his/her neuroses onto the 
psychoanalyst, the patient gains the potential to revise old scripts in collaboration with 
the listening other. This relationship of transference-neurosis in many ways resembles the 
relationship between reader and text. I would extend that resemblance to the relationship 
between witness and survivor. Cheng invites us to read his text through the lens of 
psychoanalytic transference through his evocation of the survivor (patient) who speaks, 




cited above, there is a curious reversal of the typical psychoanalyst – patient relationship: 
Cheng is the one lying prostrate on the couch, "the patient" as opposed to the 
psychoanalyst who records and writes. That he later picks up his pen to write implies a 
collapse of distinction between patient and analyst, narrator and reader.  
Told from the first person point of view, Tianyi conspicuously blurs distinctions 
between the author, narrator, protagonist, and reader. After introducing Tianyi’s story, 
how he came to hear of it, and why he wishes to tell it in a five-page avant-propos, the 
narrator removes himself from the story, letting Tianyi’s voice carry the novel for over 
400 pages until the final five pages, where the reader witnesses Tianyi witnessing 
Haolang’s persecution:  
Je vois les interrogatoires collectifs sur la place avec les accusés assis en rangs, 
sur un long banc, face à tous les groupes de Gardes rouges rassemblés […] L’Ami 
devient la cible de choix des révolutionnaires […] on le voit seul, debout devant 
la foule […]434 
	
 After Tianyi watches the Red Guards stoning Haolang to death, the narrator once again 
becomes the witness, the seeing eye (I). Suddenly, the “je vois” switches to the voice of 
the narrator:  
Je vois Tianyi; je me vois – mais celui que je vois est-il encore moi-même? […] 
Je vois Tianyi, tordu de douleur à l’estomac et aux intestins, transporté au 
dispensaire du bourg […] Enfin, je vois Tianyi transporté par camion militaire 
jusqu’à une immense bâtisse, genre d’asile pour malades mentaux et handicapés 
physiques, dans la ville de S. À partir de là, il devient anonyme.435  
	
After Tianyi is transported to an unnamed asylum outside of Paris, the final few pages of 
the novel then shifts from first to third person and free indirect speech:  
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En restituant morceau par morceau les événements d’une existence, cet être 
nommé Tianyi, si banal, si singulier, finit par permettre au courant d’une eau vive 
de relier ses parties séparées, lesquelles étaient en réalité d’un seul tenant […] 
S’avançant dans l’écriture, il est tout d’un coup frappé par une certitude. Certitude 
qu’en dépit de tout la vraie vie, intacte, demeure là […] ce qui pourrait arriver ne 
serait-il pas aussi réel que ce qui est effectivement arrivé? Effectivement arrivé? 
Qui pourrait en être sûr maintenant, tant les choses semblent par moments 
embrouillées? […] Que sait-il au juste de lui-même? Sait-il qu’à l’origine, sans la 
rencontre des trois personnes, il n’y aurait pas eu de destin? Mais combien de fois 
il lui arrive de se demander si ces trois personnes, une fois rencontrées, se sont 
jamais séparées – Tianyi est-il jamais parti et revenu? Yumei a-t-elle jamais quitté 
ce monde? Haolang s’est-il jamais perdu dans la contrée de l’extremité? Ne serait-
il pas prêt à croire quelqu’un qui viendrait lui suggérer que tout cela peut-être n’a 
été qu’imaginé?436 
	
By reconstituting “morceau par morceau” the events of Tianyi’s life, and by translating 
his tale into French, the narrator enables Tianyi’s story to circulate to a wider audience 
where it can join the universal “souffle,” the greater vessel, of which this one experience 
is a mere fragment. The novel creates a space where “la souffrance particulière de chacun 
rejoint la souffrance universelle.”437 That is, it creates a space for remembering and 
mourning. Again, paralleling the process of transference described by Freud in 
“Remembering, Repeating and Working Through,” the text thus acts as “an intermediate 
region [Zwischenreich] between illness and real life through which the transition from the 
one to the other is made. The new condition has taken over all the features of the illness; 
but it represents an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to our 
intervention.” 438 If we replace the word illness with “fictional dramatization of trauma,” 
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we have an apt description for Cheng’s writing process in Le dit de Tianyi. Our 
intervention” in turn evokes the (re)writing and (re)transmission undertaken by Tianyi, 
the narrator, François Cheng – as well as that to be undertaken by the reader.  
While, in contrast with Balzac and Une Fille Zhuang, Tianyi more explicitly 
details the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, and China’s political convulsions over the 
course of the twentieth century in contrast with Balzac and Une Fille Zhuang, it too 
displaces the political nature of such struggles onto a coming-of-age story about self-
development, friendship and romantic love. Once again, political content and class 
struggle have been evacuated in favor of an ethical endeavor to bear witness to violations 
of human rights. But if Tianyi dovetails with best-selling Anglophone scar literature, it 
departs from them in its ambivalent embrace of life in the West. In a revelatory scene, at 
a party in Paris, at “un de ces salons qui se targuaient d’avoir l’esprit ouvert,” where 
everyone seems to be an expert on Chinese thought, art, and culture, Tianyi realizes, “il 
faudrait désormais que je m’applique à être chinois, à me conformer à l’idée qu’on se fait 
d’un Chinois.”439 This reference to the alienating gaze of the other and the necessity of 
translating oneself in conformity to the other’s gaze complicates the transcendence of 
dichotomies and past suffering hinted at earlier. 
Although François Cheng is today something of an emblem of successful cultural 
hybridity, given his awareness of what is expected of him as a spokesperson for Chinese 
culture in France, one suspects that championing hybridity may not transcend reductive 
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cultural differences so much as reinforce them. Already well-known in France by the late 
nineties for his poetry, calligraphy, essays on Chinese painting and poetry, and his 
translations of classical Chinese poems, Cheng was elected to the Académie française in 
2002, partially for his successful “marriage” of French and Chinese culture, two cultures 
which, as we have seen elsewhere, have historically been viewed as diametrically 
opposed. Cheng, whose parents were among the first students to be sent to study in the 
U.S., and whose father helped to found UNESCO, is representative of an elite, mandarin 
Chinese culture that has—for French sinologists at least—become a metonym of 
traditional Chinese culture in general.  
 
Conclusion: The Cultural Revolution Novel in a Transnational Post-Socialist Age 
 
In my readings of three of the most prominent Francophone Cultural Revolution 
novels, I have demonstrated how revolutionary political content and class struggle have 
been elided in coming-of-age stories that stage transformations of the self through an 
encounter with the "other," and in the case of Le Dit de Tianyi, an ethical endeavor to 
bear witness. In each instance, mirroring the content of the Romantic and Realist French 
novels being read by the protagonists during their reeducations, emphasis is accorded to 
the individual and his/her process of self-discovery through the consumption of foreign 
tales, or through travel and transculturation. The Cultural Revolution serves as mere 
backdrop in these novels, and although we hear very little about it in the space of the 
texts themselves, it plays an extremely important role in the marketing and reception of 




cases explicitly as examples of "scar literature," even though the authors deny any such 
intentions, and although, as I have shown, the texts operate on a very different internal 
logic. In contrast, a preliminary perusal of readers' blogs and online FNAC and Amazon 
book reviews reveals a readerly interest in the extraordinary power of the "human spirit", 
the authors' passion for reading, and the romantic love stories within the texts. These 
tensions between how the works are publicized, how the authors themselves conceive of 
their texts, and how readers read the texts reflect two contradictory contemporary 
tendencies: on the one hand, the ongoing legacy of Cold War ideology to separate the 
world into "bad Communists" and "good liberal democrats," "victims of the Cultural 
Revolution" and "perpetrators of the Cultural Revolution," and on the other, the 
transnational post-socialist tendency to depoliticize content in favor of an entertaining, 
universal human interest story.   
In contrast to the official CCP narrative about the Cultural Revolution 
corroborated by Chinese scar literature of the 1970s and 1980s, Francophone accounts of 
the Chinese Cultural Revolution do not adhere to a strict victim-villain dichotomy. 
Neither do they convey a "tragedy-triumph-freedom" narrative based on the intractable 
opposition between an oppressive, socialist China and a free, capitalist West, as best-
selling Anglophone memoirs written by Chinese diasporic writers in the late 1980s and 
1990s tend to do. Rather, the political struggle has been elided, and displaced onto a 
focus on cultural differences, particularly linguistic and literary differences. That is, class 
struggle has been obscured in favor of a kind of "clash of civilizations" for which the 
battleground is not so much national identity as individual self-actualization, and whose 




collaboration and complicity – also less hostile than Samuel Huntington's problematic 
thesis. This displacement is enabled in part by the fact that the French language is 
portrayed as the language of emancipation, effectively bracketing out its colonial history 
as a language of domination.  
Moreover, the displacement parallels a historical shift from the ideologically 
polarized politics of the Cold War to a transnational post-socialism that disavows 
political and class struggle starting in the early 1990s with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. In contrast to the polarized world depicted in the earlier Cultural Revolution 
literature, these Francophone novels written at the turn of the twenty-first century 
demonstrate an increasing depoliticization in line with the ideology of transnational 
capital, and the emergence of the "ethical turn," whereby revolution is abandoned in favor 
of an emphasis on human rights and individual liberty. As I argue in Chapter Three, this 
“turn to ethics” is less of a true shift than a disassociation of rights and revolution that 
























By attending to the interwovenness of the French and Chinese Revolutions  
over the course of the twentieth century, I hope to have shown that mis/translation was 
critical to the articulation of not only revolutionary discourses and practices, but to 
shaping the historical contexts in which those discourses and practices were produced. 
Translation in this sense does not refer simply to a setting up of linguistic ‘equivalences’, 
or to a metaphor for cultural (ex)change, but rather encompasses a broad array of 
practices – rhetorical strategies, tropes, discursive formations, and so forth – that draw 
upon diverse sources and overlapping “worlds of thinking.” While these translingual 
practices are reciprocal and syncretic, negotiating between different worldviews and 
agendas, they are nevertheless carried out under conditions of geopolitical inequality. In 
the twentieth century, there were several significant shifts in the global world order that 
led to these conditions – most notably, the rise of Euro-American (especially British and 
American) dominance in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
At the turn of the 1900s, a Chinese empire plagued by nearly half a century of 
costly foreign conflicts, natural disasters, and internal rebellions (sparked by both internal 
dislocations and imported foreign ideologies) gave way, over the course of several wars 
and revolutions, to a republic (1912), that was briefly restored to a monarchy (1913), then 
torn by civil war (1927-1937; 1946-1949), and finally, split into two separate nation-
states: the communist People’s Republic of China led by Mao Zedong (1949), and the 
nationalist Republic of China in Taiwan established by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). 




their country’s weaknesses on the global stage440, and the subsequent drive to strengthen 
and save China that led to the overthrow of the Qing, the New Culture and May Fourth 
movements, and competing political parties, were in no small part driven by the 
translation and regular discussions of texts such as T. H. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, 
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, and Rousseau’s Social Contract, which were among the 
most widely read and influential texts in Chinese intellectual circles in the early twentieth 
century.441  
Classically trained late Qing intellectuals such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao 
articulated radical solutions based on both classical Confucian traditions, and new 
Western ideas such as social Darwinism. In the first chapter, I examined how the 
transvaluation of the classical Chinese concept of revolution, geming, through Sino-
European-Japanese translations of the French Revolution set the stage for the 1911 
Revolution, as well as for an emergent rights discourse that later fed into radical 
ideologies, including, most importantly, anarchism. I argued that anarchism was an 
important mode of translation in this period; it provided not only a powerful vocabulary 
for interpreting the contemporary world, but a set of revolutionary practices such as 
combining labor and learning through the Sino-French Diligent Work-Frugal Study 
program. Anarchism in this period was critical to the invention of a unique revolutionary 
discourse that attempted to negotiate between a race-based nationalism, and a socialist 
internationalism. 
                                                       
440	On the trope of awakening in late Qing China, see John Fitzgerald’s Awakening China: Politics, 
Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
 
441	Pollard, David, ed. Translation and Creation: Readings of Western Literature in Early Modern China, 





I subsequently juxtaposed the Orientalist travel writing of Simone de Beauvoir 
and Julia Kristeva on Chinese women with the anarcho-feminist political essays of He-
Yin Zhen to show that Chinese feminism is not a derivative of Western feminism, or of 
Communism, for that matter, but offers a radical transnational rethinking of gender and 
social relations in general. The benevolent, or leftist Orientalism of Beauvoir and 
Kristeva was part of a larger trend of French Maoism, which I show in a later chapter to 
be not merely a construction of French intellectuals, but the product of a vast propaganda 
and translation project initiated by Mao and the CCP. Finally, I argue that the emergence 
and popularity of Francophone literature on the Cultural Revolution both reflects and 
reinforces a radical shift in thinking about revolution in general and the Cultural 
Revolution in particular, in both China and France following the end of the Cold War. 
Revolution, largely dismissed by dominant historiographies as a failure to be avoided, is 
noticeably absent in these semi-autobiographical novels about life during the Cultural 
Revolution. I argue that revolution is displaced in these novels in favor of a plot that 
focuses on romantic adventure, entertainment (through reading French literature), and 
individual self-actualization – all values promoted by an evolving transnational consumer 
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